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Foreword
Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security –
Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks is the fifth volume in the
Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace and
it completes the Global Environmental and Human Security Hand-
book for the Anthropocene. 
This handbook addresses scientific issues of utmost importance for UN-
EP. In calling for a ‘Fourth Green Revolution’ the concluding chapter
endorses the Global Green New Deal/Green Economy Initiative (GEI)
launched during the unfolding financial and economic crisis of late
2008: At the time, few may have thought that it would gain such rapid
traction. 
However, it is estimated that around 15 per cent of more than $3 tril-
lion-worth of stimulus funds are green in nature, with that rising to
around 80 per cent in the Republic of Korea. Within a relatively short
space of time, terms such as Green Economy and Green Growth have
become common parlance in many capital cities and at key internation-
al gatherings, including G8 and G20 summits and ministerial sessions of
the OECD. 
The urgency of the challenges facing all economies, from climate
change to ecological losses, allied to the need to deliver growth, over-
come poverty and generate employment, are more apparent with every
passing year and every new decade. The Green Economy is taking root
in diverse economies and geographical locations, all allied by a common
need. 
More than two dozen governments have requested the UN Environ-
ment Programme’s (UNEP) assistance and advice how best to tailor a
transition to a low carbon, resource efficient Green Economy within na-
tional development strategies and economic planning. In China, UNEP
is collaborating with the Ministry of the Environment and relevant insti-
tutions to produce a series of sectoral green economy studies, which
will feed into the country’s five year development plan. 
A Green Economy Initiative for Africa is in preparation and studies are
underway in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia looking at
the prospects for promoting organic agriculture. In West Asia, priority
sectors for catalyzing a Green Economy have emerged following discus-
sions in countries including Bahrain, Dubai and Jordan to Kuwait, Leba-
non and Saudi Arabia.
These exciting opportunities dovetail with the acceleration of Technolo-
gy Needs Assessments under the framework of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The assessments are being
supported by the Global Environment Facility. Up to 45 countries are to
be assisted in prioritizing technologies for both mitigation and adapta-
tion to climate change, as well as investigating and overcoming potential
legal, financial, policy and other barriers to their uptake.
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The first wave of 15 countries have been selected ranging from Cote
D’Ivoire and Mali in Africa; Bangladesh, Cambodia and Indonesia in Asia
to Argentina and Guatemala in Latin America and Georgia in Europe.
With more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere now than at any time in the
past 650,000 years, it’s evident that these types of measures are imperative
to deal with the growing climate crisis. 
The Green Economy could be the biggest innovation project in history
breaching the divide as the economic models of the 20th century look less
and less able to serve a planet of six billion, rising to nine billion by 2050. 
This book, looking at global environmental change, details threats to our
future wellbeing and our security. We live in a rapidly evolving world. Sixty
per cent of the world’s largest urban areas, with a population of over 5
million, are located within 100 km of the coast. The current climate foot-
print from buildings is equivalent to 8.6 billion tons of CO2 a year, and
predicted to almost double to 15.6 billion tons of CO2 by 2030. Every year
an estimated $2 to $5 trillion is lost-almost without notice or comment
from the global economy, as a result of the degradation and destruction
of the planet’s nature-based resources. 
The public is looking to its leaders and its policy-makers for solutions. It’s
time to combine policy choices that work long-term, combined with sup-
portive market mechanisms to “green” our economies, lifestyles and jobs.
Together we can perhaps provide a route to sustainable development that
to date has eluded human-kind. In investment terms, it a low risk, high
and sustainable growth investment portfolio for the planet. 
So I welcome this volume on Coping with Global Environmental
Change, Disasters and Security – Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and
Risks and its 95 peer-reviewed chapters as an eye-opener to both the chal-
lenges but also the opportunities of our age. I hope that private founda-
tions and donors can ensure that its important ideas, debates and essen-
tial reading find their way equally onto the library book shelves of the
South as well as the nations of the North.
Nairobi, in June 2010 Achim Steiner
UN Under-Secretary General and 
Executive Director, 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
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Foreword
This 5th volume of the Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental
Security and Peace on Coping with Global Environmental Change, Dis-
asters and Security – Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks con-
tributes to the task of the United Nations University to advance know-
ledge for human security, peace, and development. Written by over 100
experts, it addresses the conceptual linkages between the four key goals
of the United Nations system of security, peace, development and the
environment.
It also completes the embedded three volumes on Global Environmen-
tal and Human Security Handbook for the Anthropocene (GEHSHA)
within the Hexagon Series. 
This book addresses in 95 chapters key environmental and human secu-
rity issues from the perspective of many disciplines, cultures and world
regions. It reviews the ongoing conceptual debate on security threats,
challenges, vulnerabilities and risks. It analyses military and political
hard and soft security dangers and concerns and assesses economic, so-
cial, environmental and human security issues especially in the Middle
East, North Africa and Asia. It also includes selected results of a sum-
mer academy organized by the Munich Re Foundation and the Institute
for Environment and Human Security of the United Nations University
(UNU-EHS) on urban centres and agglomerations as vulnerability hot
spots. Senior UNU-EHS scientists write on strategies for coping with so-
cial vulnerability and resilience building during and after the occurrence
of hazard events. 
Altogether 28 chapters deal with adaptation to and coping with Global
Environmental Change focusing on climate change, soil degradation
and desertification, water management and food and health security is-
sues. An additional 16 chapters address scientific, international, regional
and national political coping strategies, policies and measures. Finally,
the remaining seven chapters deal with remote sensing, vulnerability
mapping and indicators of environmental security challenges and risks,
with improved early warning of conflicts and hazards and propose a 'po-
litical geoecology' for the Anthropocene and a new ‘Fourth Green Rev-
olution’. 
Of the eight editors of this major scientific reference book, two women
from Mexico and Kenya and six men from Europe and North Africa,
three have been or are associated with UNU-EHS. This book contrib-
utes to the mission of the United Nations University system “to resolve
the pressing global problems of human survival, development and
welfare that are the concern of the United Nations, its Peoples and
Member States” by relying on the knowledge generated by the social
sciences and humanities as well as natural sciences based on a “holistic
approach to the complex problems that affect human security and
development”. 
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This unique compilation of global scholarship is thought provoking, an-
alytical and very comprehensive. It deserves many readers from all walks
of life. It, like the other issues of the Hexagon Series, should be availa-
ble for those seeking in depth knowledge of the complexities and secu-
rity implications of the linked social-environmental system we live in.
Tokyo, May 2010 Konrad Osterwalder
Rector, United Nations University
Under-Secretary-General of the 
United Nations 
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Foreword
“Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security
Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks” is a burning issue today. 
Climate change is a threat to vital resources and can provoke major so-
cial, economic and political problems. As such, it has major security di-
mensions and could act as a “threat multiplier” by increasing conflict
and instability in several regions.
This was already the subject of a workshop that was co-sponsored in
2005 by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. The book collates the re-
sults and recommendations of this workshop and constitutes a refer-
ence to security issues in this field. It raises awareness on global environ-
mental change and its impact on security not only among high-level
officials, scientists, but also among citizens. The topics of concern in-
clude: environmental security concepts and debates; climate change and
security; energy; water; food and health security for the 21st century. 
In addition, it will help to identify a roadmap for future multi-discipli-
nary research to better understand the vulnerability and instability driv-
en by global environmental change.
NATO is looking at the work and discussion related to climate change
with great interest. Hence, global climate change is mentioned as a glo-
bal threat to security in NATO’s long-term study on Future Security En-
vironment conducted by Allied Command Transformation. 
As an integral part of public diplomacy activities, NATO’s Science for
Peace and Security (SPS) Programme contributes to security, stability
and solidarity among NATO and partner countries, including Mediter-
ranean Dialogue countries, by facilitating cooperation, networking and
capacity-building. The main objectives of NATO’s SPS Programme are
to promote the application of the best technical expertise to problem-
solving. 
Environmental security has been identified as a key priority for NATO’s
Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and, in 2008, NATO
members agreed that the Science Security Forum would address this is-
sue in-depth by bringing together internationally-recognized experts.
The Forum clearly demonstrated the close link between global security
concerns and environmental issues related to climate change, manage-
ment of shared water resources and energy security.
Indeed, public diplomacy has an important role to play in taking the
end results of these deliberations to the public in order to explain how
these threats impact on human security. 
Brussels, January 2010 Jean-François Bureau 
NATO Assistant Secretary General
for Public Diplomacy
Chairman, Science for Peace and 
Security (SPS) Committee 
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Foreword
Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security –
Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks is the fifth volume in the
Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. It
completes the Global Environmental and Human Security Handbook
for the Anthropocene. I am pleased that one of the coeditors is a Ken-
yan and 16 contributors to the volume are from various parts of Africa,
including Egypt, Tunisia, and Mauritania (North Africa), and Nigeria,
Ghana, Niger, and Burkina Faso (West Africa). This situation ensures
that the diverse security challenges in Africa and how they have been
confronted are adequately addressed in the book. 
This scientific peer-reviewed volume contributes to crucial global dia-
logue and learning, based on topical new evidence from several disci-
plines. In the 20th century, Africa has suffered severely from the effects
of global environmental change resulting from desertification, drought,
famine, floods and heat waves. Millions of Africans have either been
killed or forced to flee their homes.
The fourth IPCC Assessment Report of 2007 estimates that climate
change will have several negative impacts on Africa, especially regarding
access to clean water, sufficient food, stable health conditions,
ecosystem resources, and security of settlements. It further estimates
that many semi-arid areas in North and Southern Africa, will become
severely water-stressed, and by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people
are projected to experience increased water stress. During the same
period, yields from rain-fed agriculture in some African countries could
be reduced by up to 50 per cent, thus affecting food security and
exacerbating malnutrition. Indeed, several African mega-deltas, due to
large populations and high exposure to sea level rise, storm surges, and
river flooding, will suffer from the impacts of global environmental and
climate change. Although Africa has historically contributed little to
climate change, the limited adaptive capacity of the countries on the
continent has increased the impact of climate change on the continent. 
This book, with 95 chapters, reviews the conceptual debate on security
threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks. It analyses military and po-
litical hard and soft security dangers and concerns in West Africa and
assesses environmental and human security issues in North Africa. The
main parts deal with the challenges of coping with Global Environmen-
tal Change, focusing on climate change, soil degradation and desertifi-
cation, water management, food and health security issues. It also deals
with scientific, international, regional and national political remediation
strategies, policies and measures. One chapter discusses early warning
systems for conflicts in East Africa and two chapters propose a ‘political
geoecology’ for the Anthropocene and a new ‘Fourth Green Revolution’.
This huge volume of excellent scholarship from all parts of the world
helps to sensitize, not only policy makers but also enable the young ge-
neration of professors and students globally but specifically, in the most
affected countries in the South. It calls for proactive and concerted ac-
tion and for a global science partnership to reduce the most debilitating
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impact of the projected trends in ëbusiness as usualí strategies. This
book deserves many readers in all parts of the world, even in the coun-
tries where university and research libraries are unable to afford such
books. It is my sincere hope that this high-quality, multidisciplinary
study and reference book, and its key messages will be made available to
university and research libraries through the support of private founda-
tions and public donors. The young generation in the South that must
cope with these challenges to their security in the 21st century must be
availed of this book. I wish the book-aid project success for the benefit
of university libraries and research institutes and their readers in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. 
New York, May 2010 Ambassador Prof. Dr. Joy Ogwu
Permanent Representative of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria to the 
United Nations 
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Foreword
Environmentally induced population displacement resulting from cli-
mate change is now indisputable. Simultaneously, as noted by the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, it is becoming in-
creasingly difficult to categorize people as displaced by any single cause:
conflict, economic marginalization, environmental degradation, climate
change, or any other factor, since their fate may be the result of a com-
bination of all or any of the above. The statistics in the report that fol-
low are alarming: 300,000 deaths and 300 million severely affected each
year by climate impacts today; currently, 100 billion US dollars of eco-
nomic losses annually and over 20 million persons displaced; and as so
often is the case, it is the poor that are worst affected, with 99 per cent
of climate change casualties taking place in developing countries (Glo-
bal Humanitarian Forum, 2009).
This is a human tragedy on a massive scale. It is also a major threat to
global security and could result in global catastrophe costing millions of
lives in climate induced wars and natural disasters. Yet governments pro-
crastinate. This is frustrating for the many of us who know that solu-
tions are available – now. But it requires a move away from the failed
unilateral strategies of the past. 
The world is facing what amounts to an existential crisis in which we
are all wholly interconnected – in everything but policy. The West Asia-
North Africa region, the intermediary meeting point of Eurasia, home
to the greatest concentration of energy reserves, and one of the most
populous, poorest, and arguably, most volatile regions of the world, is at
the centre of this global crisis. Yet, with approaches inspired by vision and
integrity, which place people at the centre, it can also offer solutions. 
The international community has a vital role here. Rather than seek to
balance power and influence in the region, global security would be bet-
ter served by fostering collaboration and inclusion in policy and attitude
at every level.
In practical terms, this means forging partnerships which bind the re-
gion together while looking outwards across the ‘energy ellipse’ (from
the Caucasus to the Straits of Hormuz) and beyond to enable regional
stabilization.
It has been universally agreed that we cannot remain dependant on fi-
nite fossil fuels, and that the development of alternative energy applica-
tions via multilateral consent and cooperation is a way forward. 
A regional community employing modern technology could use the re-
gion’s deserts to develop clean energy. The jobs created in the fields of
water desalination and solar energy, together with their service indus-
tries, would go some way towards meeting growing demands for em-
ployment – estimated by the World Bank as some 100 million new job
opportunities required by 2020. Sustainable governance of shared re-
sources would enable us to replace fossil fuels, help in solving ours and
00_GEC_Hex5.book  Seite xi  Samstag, 2. Oktober 2010  12:53 12
Europe’s energy crisis, reduce carbon emissions, slow climate change,
and maximize the carrying capacity of the trans-border area. 
Our composite security needs can only be addressed by humanizing glo-
balization. The ambitious trans-regional cooperation, envisaged in the
DESERTEC project’s high tension grid network that would connect Eu-
ropean national grids with the WANA region, would foster a new chap-
ter in terms of international energy trade for 'clean, renewable energy';
could secure international energy stability between the EU-Mediterrane-
an countries and hopefully reinvigorate the Barcelona Process. It could
provide the impetus for the establishment of not only a much needed
community for energy, water, and climate security for the Mediterrane-
an riparian regions of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, but in
due course for a water and energy authority to oversee both the oil rich
countries and those of the hinterland. Resource scarcity, resource
wealth, and human resource wealth could thus be transformed from a
source of conflict into points of cooperation.
It is with this vision of stabilizing the region on the basis of a thematic
and integrated approach that puts people, human dignity, and preven-
tive security at the forefront that I recommend this volume of work on
Coping with Global Environmental Change and hope it will galvanize
decision makers into addressing the challenges we face right now.
Amman, January 2010 HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
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The Anthropocene: Geology by Mankind 
Paul Crutzen, Nobel Laureate for Chemistry
Max Planck Institute for Chemistry
Department Atmospheric Chemistry
During 4,5 billion years of Earth history, after a long
string of biological processes, only a million years ago,
a single species ‘homo sapiens’ evolved, which grew
increasingly capable of influencing the geology of our
planet. That species is unique in the solar system and
maybe beyond. A species, us, was created with a brain
size of only some 1,300 g, which is capable of using
and manipulating the Earth’s environment in major
ways from generation to generation in a catalytic fash-
ion. Especially over the past hundred years, the
human impact has become increasingly clear. Sup-
ported by great technological and medical advances
and access to plentiful natural resources, the expan-
sion of humankind, both in numbers and exploitation
of the Earth’s resources is astounding. Let us give a
few examples.
• During the past 3 centuries human population
increased tenfold to more than 6,000 million. 
• This expansion was accompanied by a growth in
cattle population to 1,400 million (about one cow
per average size family). They produce methane
gas.
• Urbanization has increased more than tenfold in
the past century. About half of the human popula-
tion lives in cities and megacities.
• Similarly large or larger were the increases in sev-
eral other factors, such as world economy, of
industries (40 times) and of energy use (16 times).
• More than half of all accessible fresh water is used
by mankind.
• Fish catch increased 40 times.
• In a few generations humankind is exhausting the
fossil fuels that were generated over hundreds of
million of years.
• The release of sulphur dioxide, about hundred mil-
lion tonnes per year, at least two times larger than
the sum of all natural emissions, has led to acidifi-
cation of precipitation, causing forest damage and
fish death in biologically sensitive regions, such as
Scandinavia and the north-east of North America.
The situation in these regions has improved. How-
ever, in the meanwhile, the problem has got worse
in East Asia.
• 30–50 per cent of the world’s land surface has
been transformed by humans; land under crop-
ping has doubled during the past century at the
expense of forests.
• More nitrogen is applied as synthetic fertilizer in
agriculture than fixed naturally. Oversupply of
nitrogen fertilizers have led to eutrophication of
surface waters.
• Human activity has already increased species
extinction rates by orders of magnitude.
• As a result of increasing fossil fuel burning, agri-
cultural activities, deforestation, and intensive ani-
mal husbandry, several climatically important
‘greenhouse’ gases have substantially increased in
the atmosphere over the past two centuries: CO2
by more than 30 per cent and CH4 by more than
100 per cent, causing the observed global average
temperature increase by about 0.6°C that has been
observed during the past century.
• According to IPCC’s ‘business as usual scenario’,
global average temperatures are projected to rise
by 2.0–4.5°C during the current century and sea
level is expected to rise by 9–88 cm, up to 50–140
cm.
• Humankind also releases many detrimental sub-
stances in the environment and even some, the
chlorofluorocarbon gases (CFCl3 and CF2Cl2),
which are not directly toxic, but which destroy
stratospheric O3 and have led to the Antarctic
‘ozone hole’. A global catastrophe has been
averted through the Montreal Protocol and suc-
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cessive amendments. Nevertheless, it will take
more than half a century before the ozone layer
may have recovered.
• Considering these and many other major and still
growing impacts of human activities on earth and
atmosphere, and at all scales, it thus is more than
appropriate to emphasize the central role of
humankind in the environment by using the term
‘Anthropocene’ for the current geological epoch.
The impact of current human activities is pro-
jected to last and even expand over long periods.
According to M. Loutre and A. Berger (2000),
because of past and future anthropogenic emis-
sions of CO2, climate will depart significantly
from natural behaviour over the next 50,000 years
(no ice ages).
• To assign a more specific date to the onset of the
‘Anthropocene’ we propose the latter part of the
18
th century, when the global effects of human
activities became clearly noticeable, by data
retrieved from ice cores, which show the begin-
ning of a growth in the atmospheric concentra-
tions of several ‘greenhouse gases’, in particular
CO2 and CH4. Such a starting date also coincides
with James Watt’s invention of the steam engine in
1784.
• Humankind will remain a major geological force
for many millennia, maybe millions of years. To
develop a worldwide accepted strategy leading to
sustainability of ecosystems against human-
induced stresses is one of the great challenges of
humankind, requiring intensive research efforts
and wise application of the knowledge thus
acquired.
Hopefully, in the future, the ‘Anthropocene’ will not
only be characterized by continued human plundering
of the Earth’s resources and dumping of excessive
amounts of waste products in the environment, but
also by vastly improved technology and management,
wise use of the Earth’s resources, and control of
human and domestic animal population. For example,
building on the success of the Montreal Protocol, we
need something similar for climate, starting with COP
15 at Copenhagen. But maybe we run out of elements,
such as phosphorus, and will experience a short
Anthropocene. 
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Connecting Inconvenient Truths: Urgency of Nuclear 
Disarmament in a World of Pressing Problems1 
Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, 
President, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs2
The fall1 of2 the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the
Cold War, a toxic legacy of which is the nuclear
weapon. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the
“the end of history” arguing “What we may be wit-
nessing is not just the end of the Cold War or the
passing of a particular period of post-war history, but
the end of history as such: that is, the end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universaliza-
tion of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human government.” 
This neo-conservative dogma has propelled the
world into a succession of calamities. The invasion of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the bombing of its civilians, es-
calating global military expenditure of which the US
share in 2008 was 41.5 per cent, the gulag of
Guantánamo and the practice of torture and rendi-
tion, casino capitalism on Wall Street causing the
greatest financial meltdown since the Great Depres-
sion of 1929, and the general rejection of multilateral
cooperation as a means of finding durable global so-
lutions to global problems are some of them. 
With President Obama’s policies a unique oppor-
tunity exists to reaffirm multilateralism. The 58th Pug-
wash Council statement of April 2009 stated that:
the new international climate makes it possible for mul-
tilateral co-operative solutions to be negotiated for the
critical issues affecting the global community. On
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, weapons of
mass destruction, terrorism, the international economic
crisis, the urgent problem of climate change, the
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), the strengthening of the rule of law, human
rights, and other issues, the moment has arrived and we
must seize the opportunity.3 
But the international community is missing this
opportunity. In November 2009, a FAO food security
summit held to face the challenge of one billion hun-
gry people in our world today declined to commit to
the $ 44 billion needed as agricultural aid and failed
to set a target date for the eradication of hunger.
Underinvestment in agriculture – the source of liveli-
hood for 70 per cent of the poor – will mean that in
2050 when the world’s population reaches an esti-
mated 9.1 billion, we will be in a worse situation than
today.
The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenha-
gen failed to reach a binding agreement on green-
house gas emissions between developed and develop-
ing countries with pledges of financial aid. In April
2010, the Obama Administration convened a World
Nuclear Security Summit to ensure the safeguarding
of the nuclear materials in the world and counter ef-
forts of terrorist groups and the black market to ex-
ploit existing loopholes and weaknesses in the sys-
tems in place. In May 2010 the parties to the Treaty
for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
met in New York for its Eighth Review Conference
forty years after the global non-proliferation regime
entered into force.
Global interdependence has long been estab-
lished, as the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC 2007, 2007a, 2007b,
2007c) have shown. No state however powerful and
wealthy can solve the problems facing its citizens with-
out global cooperation that must be based in this cen-
1 This text is based on a speech at the Royal Society, Lon-
don, 1 December 2009.
2 Pugwash Conferences and Joseph Rotblat were jointly
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for their efforts
to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in interna-
tional politics and in the longer run to eliminate such
arms.
3 See at: <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pic/58/coun-
cil-statement.htm>.
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tury on the fundamental values of freedom, equality,
solidarity, tolerance, and respect for nature and
shared responsibility as lessons gleaned from the
pages of history. The holistic approach to interna-
tional peace and security that has now evolved com-
pels us to recognize that there can be “no security
without development; no development without secu-
rity and no security or development without human
rights” (Kofi Annan 2005). A convergence of national
and human security (Ogata/Sen 2003) is also needed.
We observe the interconnection among the problems
facing our global community from nuclear weapon
possession and proliferation, the risks of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, the problems of climate
change, the escalation of world military expenditure
to levels exceeding those of the Cold War and the
conflicts they fuel, the poverty of the ‘bottom billion’
(Collier 2007), international terrorism and the danger
of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass de-
struction, the widespread violation of human rights
and other issues. The global chain connecting us all is
as strong as its weakest link.
With the end of the Cold War we hope to end ide-
ological or civilizational confrontation. New chal-
lenges facing the global community are terrorism, na-
tionalism, and consumerism. Without global
responses we are likely to endanger the future of our
planet through nuclear annihilation or disastrous cli-
mate change or both.
The global reach of modern international terror-
ism with its complex network of funding, arms pur-
chases and supplies, training and planning, is new,
and 9/11 represents its epitome. It has resulted in a
global consensus condemning terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations, and a recognition that no
cause justifies the use of terrorism. Thirteen interna-
tional conventions were adopted to counter terror-
ism. Evidence of terrorist groups seeking weapons of
mass destruction has emerged, and the network of
clandestine nuclear proliferation activities of Dr. A. Q.
Khan enhances the danger of nuclear terrorism. Inter-
national cooperation is the key to combating terror-
ism.
That cooperation is undermined by nationalism.
With supranational economic entities like the Euro-
pean Union and other regional and global interna-
tional organizations, nation states were prematurely
regarded as historical relics of the 1648 Treaty of
Westphalia. Nationalist competition over territory
and resources dominated international politics until
World War II when the United Nations was estab-
lished with the hope of eliminating “the scourge of
war” and ushering in global cooperation for freedom,
peace, development, and human rights. In the post-
Cold War phase, nationalism is alive with multiple
ethno-nationalist groups, all seeking to achieve state-
hood. It is also evident in the actions of large coun-
tries defending their national security interests. This
trend cannot be underestimated. Dangers arise from
the covert support for terrorism by some countries to
groups elsewhere in support of irredentist claims or
international rivalries. Encouragement of groups who
have used or continue to use terrorist means by the
grant of recognition or by arms supplies violates the
global strategy against terrorism. It can also be self-de-
structive as terrorist groups created for one purpose
mutate horribly to strike back even at their own crea-
tors. 
Thus the Taliban, financed and run by the CIA
against the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan, trans-
formed themselves into the extremist force that har-
boured Bin Laden and incubated global terrorism
against the USA and others. Within South Asia, Indira
Gandhi’s short-sighted policy of encouraging Bhin-
dranwale as a counter to the Akali Dal’s dominance in
the Punjab led to Sikh terrorism and her own assassi-
nation. Examples abound but the lessons are not
learned as surreptitious means are found to finance,
arm, and otherwise support groups to destabilize
neighbours or opponents in the perceived national in-
terest. And so the unbridled nationalism of some
countries is in conflict with the common interest of
stamping out terrorism in terms of the UN strategy of
2006. We have to ensure that the legitimate pursuit of
national security interests meshes with common and
cooperative security and a norm-based structure that
serves our interests.
Nationalism spurs nuclear weapon possession that
is identified as an insurance policy for national secu-
rity and as a symbol of global power status. But nu-
clear deterrence cannot be good for some and bad for
others. Hence the clandestine WMD programmes of
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq which were discovered and de-
stroyed by the UN and the IAEA acting under the au-
thority of the Security Council; and North Korea’s
withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent nuclear
tests. There was also popular jubilation when India
and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in 1998 and
became nuclear weapon states. Similarly, there were
also strong nationalistic reactions of Iran over its en-
richment of uranium at its Natanz and Fordo facilities
belatedly reported to the IAEA.
Finally, consumerism has become an important
driver of the global economy. With mass production,
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consumerism is now a global phenomenon that lubri-
cates markets and creates a demand for commodities
and brands. The recent emergence of large econo-
mies in the South, particularly in China, India and
Brazil, has led to a demand for energy and other com-
modities, entailing a rise in prices already distorted by
agricultural subsidies in the USA, the European Un-
ion, and other developed countries. Economic nation-
alism drives protectionism, obstructing free and fair
trade. Despite the stalemate over the Doha Round of
the World Trade Organization, we need to move rap-
idly for equality in terms of trade, so allowing devel-
oping countries access to markets and to commodi-
ties that their people seek in an increasingly interde-
pendent world. We cannot continue the use of fossil
fuels to satisfy the consumer demands of the world.
The reports of the IPCC (1990, 1995, 2001, 2007) ar-
gued that case. To ignore them would be a supreme,
self-destructive folly.
The case against hydrocarbon has resulted in a
‘nuclear renaissance’. Although Article IV of the NPT
guarantees that non-nuclear weapon state parties will
have an ‘inalienable right’ to the peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy, the world has suddenly woken up to the
perils of this. It is less the threat of massive radiation
leaks or accidents, like in Chernobyl (1986) and Three
Mile Island (1979), to human lives and the environ-
ment but more the lack of credible firewalls between
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the development
of nuclear weapons. The signing of the voluntary Ad-
ditional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) is no longer the confidence building
measure. Many proposals for the multilateralization
of the fuel cycle have been made. While some states
will opt not to have their own enrichment facilities
others will not want to be dependent on foreign sup-
plies of nuclear fuel for their development needs. The
dilemma could be resolved through innovative tech-
nology with proliferation-resistant reactors and the
elimination of highly-enriched uranium. The discovery
of other cheaper and safer sources of energy and
greater investment in wind and solar power could also
lower the demand for nuclear power.
The interconnectedness of these ‘isms’ is self evi-
dent. So also is their link with prevailing crises and
the solutions. The first crisis is the possible use of the
8,392 nuclear weapons deployed by the nine nuclear
weapon states (of their combined 23,300 warheads)
either by accident or in accordance with their nuclear
doctrines (SIPRI 2009: 16). President Obama (2009)
said in Prague that 
one nuclear weapon exploded in one city – be it New
York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel
Aviv, Paris or Prague – could kill hundreds of thousands
of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no
end to what the consequences might be – for our global
safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our
ultimate survival.4 
Building on studies of a ‘nuclear winter’  (Crutzen/
Birks 1982) caused by the use of nuclear weapons,
more recent research has concluded5 that even a mi-
nor nuclear war with 0.03 per cent of the current glo-
bal arsenals will produce catastrophic climate change.
• Nuclear weapon proliferation arises largely from
the strong demand for national security in a world
of competing nationalisms where some nations
are permitted to have these weapons and others
are not. Neither the NPT nor the Nuclear Terror-
ism Convention together with UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1540 which seeks to prevent terror-
ist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
can hold this demand in check as long as nuclear
weapons are held by some states and vast amounts
of enriched uranium and separated plutonium lie
around. 
• The second crisis confronting us is climate change
caused by our global consumption patterns, the
prevailing structure of international trade and our
failure to invest in and cooperate in the search for
new environmentally friendly sources of energy. 
Both crises have the best chance of being resolved
through a nuclear weapon free world – consistently es-
poused by Pugwash and more recently endorsed by
George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and Bill
Perry.6 This vision is being pursued by President
4 The White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama,
Hradèany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, 5th April
2009; at:  <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_
office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered/> (24 November 2009).
5 A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C.
Bardeen, and R. P. Turco: “Climatic consequences of
regional nuclear conflicts”; at: <http://climate.
envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf>.
6 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger,
and Sam Nunn: "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons", in:
The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, A15, and see
also George P. Shultz, , William J. Perry, Henry A. Kiss-
inger, and Sam Nunn: “Toward a Nuclear Free World”,
in: The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008, 13; at:
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.
html?mod=opinion _main_commentaries> (24 Novem-
ber 2009).
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Obama. Any delay in implementing nuclear disarma-
ment and nuclear non-proliferation policies can be
dangerous even though Obama himself hedges on a
timetable for achieving his vision. The Obama-
Medvedev Joint Statement of 1 April 20097 and
Obama’s Prague speech of 5 April 2009 set the goals8
that are being implemented through 
• the resumption of bilateral US-Russian negotia-
tions for a follow-up to the Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty (START) that expired on 5 December
2009 with significant nuclear weapon reductions
in both countries that own 95 per cent of nuclear
weapons;
• the lifting of US impediments to the negotiation
of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the
Conference on Disarmament permitting other
countries to reciprocate;
• the message by Obama to the parties to the NPT
at their  Preparatory Committee meeting in New
York in May 2009 stressing the US commitment
to the NPT;
• the statement of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
at the Article XIV Conference of the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in New
York, 24 September 2009; 
• President Obama’s statement on 24 September
2009 and the unanimous adoption of Resolution
1887 (2009) stressing more non-proliferation than
nuclear disarmament; 
• and the return to diplomacy resulting in fresh
negotiations with Iran on the basis of IAEA pro-
posals and the prospect of direct US-North
Korean talks.
But obstructionist tactics are evident in the nuclear
disarmament area both within the USA and with
some NATO allies. As a confidence building measure
President Obama has reversed the US ballistic missile
defence plans in the Czech Republic and Poland. But
the unfulfilled agenda is huge as is the task of setting
the right conditions for a successful NPT Review
Conference in May 2010. A new US Nuclear Posture
Review must reflect the Obama vision accurately by
abandoning nuclear first use and launch-on-warning
capabilities deemphasizing the role of nuclear weap-
ons in US defence strategy. The US senate must ‘ad-
vise and consent’ to both treaties: the new START
and the CTBT. A well-organized campaign is needed
and compromises must be reached to maintain his do-
mestic and international support. The Nobel Peace
Prize Committee has referred to Obama’s “vision of a
world free from nuclear arms (which) has powerfully
stimulated disarmament and arms control negotia-
tions”. 
West European leaders, especially within NATO,
and of countries enjoying the shelter of the US nu-
clear umbrella must help persuade US Senators of the
global importance of ratifying the new START and
the CTBT. There is an international responsibility to
protect the vision of Obama. In autumn 2009, the
new German government has called for the elimina-
tion of US nuclear weapons from its soil. In the UK,
Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen, and
George Robertson9 supported this goal on 30 June
2008, as did the June 2009 report of the House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on “Global Se-
curity: Non-proliferation”10 and the launch of the Top
Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation on 29
October 2009 who share the vision of a nuclear
weapon free world. 
However, until the UK government and the gov-
ernments of other nuclear weapon states take more
practical steps towards realizing this vision, a credibil-
ity gap will remain between the nuclear weapon states
and non-nuclear weapon states within the NPT. Over
six decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki incremen-
tal steps towards a nuclear weapon free world makes
the goal seem a mirage.  The Global Zero group has
set a target of 2030 for the completion of its phased
verified programme for the total elimination of nu-
clear weapons. Reports of the International Commis-
7 The White House, Joint Statement by Dmitry A.
Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and
Barack Obama, President of the United States of Amer-
ica,  Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in
Strategic Offensive Arms; at: <http://www.white-
house.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-
A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama/>.
8 The White House, Remarks By President Barack
Obama, Hradèany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, 5th
April 2009; at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_
office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered/> (24 November  2009).
9 Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and
George Robertson: “Start worrying and learn to ditch
the bomb. It won't be easy, but a world free of nuclear
weapons is possible”, in: The Times, 30 June 2008; at:
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/column-
ists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece >.
10 UK, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee:
“Global Security: Non-Proliferation – Foreign Affairs
Committee”; at: <http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22210.htm>.
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sion for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
(ICNND), co-chaired by the former Foreign Ministers
of Australia and Japan, point to advocacy of a ‘mini-
mization’ point of over 1,000 nuclear warheads by
2025, while President Obama says “perhaps not in my
lifetime”. 
The simplest and most direct route would be to
negotiate a verifiable Nuclear Weapon Convention to
outlaw nuclear weapons as the world outlawed bio-
logical and chemical weapons. A draft Convention is
before the UN, proposed by Malaysia and Costa Rica,
and recommended by the Secretary-General in his 5-
point plan of October 2008. It will contribute towards
easing global tensions and resolving the burning is-
sues of our times – nuclear weapons, climate change,
terrorism, poverty, international finance, and human
rights which intersect. With the elimination of nuclear
weapons we have, in the words of UN Secretary-Gen-
eral Ban Ki-moon, “a global good of the highest pub-
lic”. 
There is no greater task than achieving peace and
security through disarmament. Einstein (1879–1955),
the co-author of the Manifesto that continues to in-
spire Pugwash, once said,
concern for man himself and his fate must always be the
chief interest of all technical endeavours…in order that
the creations of our minds shall be a blessing and not a
curse to mankind. Never forget this in the midst of your
diagrams and equations. 
Scientists remain at the centre of weapon laborato-
ries, the military industrial complexes, and energy
consuming industries in all countries. National loyal-
ties and protectionist pressures are strong in such sit-
uations and I can only quote the Russian playwright
Anton Chekhov (1860–1904) who said, “Science can-
not be national, in the same way that a multiplication
table cannot be national. If a science becomes
national it ceases to be a science.” The common
humanity of all scientists should act as a code of eth-
ics to ensure nuclear disarmament and to arrest and
reverse climate change. The Russell-Einstein Mani-
festo of 9 July 1955 said, “We appeal, as human beings,
to human beings: Remember your humanity, and for-
get the rest.” It is time to follow this advice before it
is too late.
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Living in and Coping with World Risk Society  
Ulrich Beck 
The narrative of global risk is a narrative of irony. This
narrative deals with the involuntary satire, the opti-
mistic futility, with which the highly developed institu-
tions of modern society – science, state, business and
military - attempt to anticipate what cannot be antici-
pated. Socrates has left us to make sense of the puz-
zling sentence: I know that I know nothing. The fatal
irony, into which scientific-technical society plunges
us, is, as a consequence of its perfection, much more
radical: We don’t know what it is we don’t know - but
from these dangers arise, which threaten mankind!
The perfect example here is provided by the debate
about the cooling agent CFC. About 45 years after the
discovery of the CFC, the chemists Rowland and Mo-
lina (1974) put forward the hypothesis, that CFCs de-
stroy the ozone layer of the stratosphere and as a re-
sult increased ultraviolet radiation would reach the
earth. The chain of unforeseen secondary effects
would lead to a significant increase of cancer all over
the world. When coolants were invented no one
could know or even suspect, that they would create
such a danger. 
The irony of risk is that rationality, that is, the ex-
perience of the past, encourages anticipation of the
wrong kind of risk, the one we believe we can calcu-
late and control, whereas the disaster arises from
what we don’t know and cannot calculate. The bitter
varieties of this risk irony are virtually endless: climate
change, mad cow decease, 9/11 terror attacks, global
financial crises, swine flue virus and latest but not last,
volcano ash clouds disrupting air traffic in Europe
and elsewhere. 
To the extent that risk is experienced as omnipres-
ent, there are only three possible reactions: Denial,
apathy, or transformation. The first is largely in-
scribed in modern culture, the second resembles post-
modern nihilism, and the third is the ‘cosmopolitan
moment’ of world risk society (Beck 1986, 1992,
2006, 2007, 2009). I would like to demonstrate that
here in three steps (drawing on empirical research
findings of the Munich Research Centre on ‘Reflexive
Modernization’):
1. Old dangers - new risks: What is new about world
risk society?
2. Ruse of history: To what extent are global risks a
global force in present and future world history,
controllable by no one, but which also open up
new opportunities of action for states, civil society
actors etc.?
3. Consequences and perspectives: In order to under-
stand the manufactured uncertainty, lack of safety
and insecurity of world risk society is there a need
for a paradigm shift in the social sciences?
Old Dangers - New Risks: What is New 
About World Risk Society?
Modern society has become a risk society in the sense
that it is increasingly occupied with debating, prevent-
ing and managing risks that it itself has produced.
That may well be, many will object, but it is indicative
rather of a hysteria and politics of fear instigated and
aggravated by the mass media. On the contrary,
would not someone, looking at European societies
from outside have to acknowledge that the risks
which get us worked up, are luxury risks, more than
anything else? After all, our world appears a lot safer
than that, say, of the war-torn regions of Africa, Af-
ghanistan or the Middle East. Are modern societies
not distinguished precisely by the fact that to a large
extent they have succeeded in bringing under control
contingencies and uncertainties, for example with re-
spect to accidents, violence and sickness? 
00_GEC_Hex5.book  Seite 11  Freitag, 1. Oktober 2010  12:32 12
12 Ulrich Beck
As true as all such observations may be, they miss
the most obvious point about risk: that is, the key dis-
tinction between risk and catastrophe. Risk does not
mean catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of ca-
tastrophe. Risks exist in a permanent state of virtual-
ity, and only become ‘topical’ to the extent that they
are anticipated. Without techniques of visualization,
without symbolic forms, without mass media etc.
risks are nothing at all. In other words, it is irrelevant,
whether we live in a world which is in fact or in some
sense ‘objectively’ safer than all other worlds; if de-
struction and disasters are anticipated, then that pro-
duces a compulsion to act.
The theory of ‘world risk society’ maintains that
modern societies are shaped by new kinds of risks,
that their foundations are shaken by the global antici-
pation of global catastrophes. Such perceptions of
global risk are characterized by three features:
1. De-localization: Its causes and consequences are
not limited to one geographical location or space,
they are in principle omnipresent.
2. Incalculableness: Its consequences are in principle
incalculable; at bottom it’s a matter of ‘hypotheti-
cal’ risks, which, not least, are based on science-
induced not-knowing and normative dissent.
3. Non-compensatibility: The security dream of first
modernity was based on the scientific utopia of
making the unsafe consequences and dangers of
decisions ever more controllable; accidents could
occur, as long and because they were considered
compensatible. If the climate has changed irrevers-
ibly, if progress in human genetics makes irreversi-
ble interventions in human existence possible, if
terrorist groups already have weapons of mass de-
struction available to them, then it’s too late.
Given this new quality of ‘threats to humanity’ –
argues Francois Ewald (2002: 275) – the logic of
compensation breaks down and is replaced by the
principle of precaution through prevention. Not
only is prevention taking precedence over compen-
sation, we are also trying to anticipate and prevent
risks whose existence has not been proven. Let me
explain these points - de-localization, incalculable-
ness, non-compensatibility – in greater detail.
The de-localization of incalculable interdependency
risks takes place at three levels:
1. spatial: The new risks (e.g. climate change) do not
respect nation state or any other borders;
2. temporal: The new risks have a long latency period
(e.g. nuclear waste), so that their effect over time
cannot be reliably determined and limited.
3. Social: Thanks to the complexity of the problems
and the length of chains of effect, assignment of
causes and consequences is no longer possible
with any degree of reliability (e.g. financial crises). 
The discovery of the incalculability of risk is closely
connected to the discovery of the importance of not-
knowing to risk calculation, and it’s part of another
kind of irony, that surprisingly this discovery of not-
knowing occurred in a scholarly discipline, which to-
day no longer wants to have anything to do with it:
economics. It was Knight and Keynes, who early on
insisted on a distinction between predictable and non-
predictable or calculable and non-calculable forms of
contingency. In a famous article in The Quarterly
Journal of Economics Keynes (1937: 213–14) writes:
“...by ‘uncertain knowledge’, let me explain, I do not
mean merely to distinguish what is known from what
is merely probable. The sense in which I am using the
term is that in which the price of copper and the rate
of interest twenty years hence, all the obsolescence of
a new invention are uncertain. About these matters
there is no scientific basis on which to form any calcu-
lable probability whatever. We simply do not know...”
However, Keynes’ admonition to open up the field of
economic decision-making to the unknown unknowns
was entirely neglected in the subsequent development
of mainstream economics (including mainstream Key-
nesian economics); and this denial of non-knowing
has become a causal condition for the emergence of
the global financial crisis in 2009.
The crucial point, however, is not only the discov-
ery of the importance of non-knowing, but that simul-
taneously the knowledge, control and security claim
of state and society was, indeed had to be, renewed,
deepened, and expanded. The irony lies in the institu-
tionalized security claim, to have to control some-
thing, even if one does not know, whether it exists! It
are precisely unknown unknowns which provoke far-
reaching conflicts over the definition and construc-
tion of political rules and responsibilities with the aim
of preventing the worst. For the time being the last
and most striking example of that are the volcano ash
clouds in spring 2010: flights are back – ash is too! 
If catastrophes are anticipated whose potential for
destruction ultimately threatens everyone, then a risk
calculation based on experience and rationality breaks
down. Now all possible, more or less improbable sce-
narios have to be taken into consideration; to knowl-
edge, therefore, drawn from experience and science
there now also has to be added imagination, suspi-
cion, fiction, fear (Ewald 2002: 273–301). The bound-
ary between rationality and hysteria becomes blurred.
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Given the right invested in them to avert dangers pol-
iticians, in particular, may easily be forced to proclaim
a security, which they cannot honour. Because the po-
litical costs of omission are much higher than the po-
litical costs of overreaction. In future, therefore, it is
not going to be easy, in the context of state promises
of security and a mass media hungry for catastrophes,
to actively limit and prevent a diabolical power game
with the hysteria of not-knowing. I don’t even dare
think about deliberate attempts to instrumentalize this
situation.
The Ruse of Risk: Global Risk is an 
Unpredictable and Impersonal Force in 
the Contemporary World
There is no better way than to start with an example:
in 2005 Hurricane Katrina destroyed New Orleans.
This was a horrifying act of nature, but one which si-
multaneously, as a global media event, involuntarily
and unexpectedly developed an enlightenment func-
tion which broke all resistance. What no social move-
ment, no political party, and certainly no sociological
analysis (no matter how well grounded and brilliantly
written) would have been able to achieve, happened
within a few days: America and the world were con-
fronted by global media pictures of the repressed
other America, the largely racialized face of poverty.
How can this relationship between risk and the crea-
tion of a global public be understood? In his 1927
book The Public and its Problems, John Dewey ex-
plained that not actions but consequences lie at the
heart of politics. Although Dewey was certainly not
thinking of global warming, BSE or terrorist attacks,
his idea is perfectly applicable to world risk society. A
global public discourse does not grow out of a con-
sensus on decisions, but out of dissent over the conse-
quences of decisions. Modern risk crises are consti-
tuted by just such controversies over consequences.
Where some may see an overreaction to risk, it is also
possible to see grounds for hope. Because such risk
conflicts do indeed have an enlightenment function.
They destabilize the existing order, but the same
events can also look like a vital step towards the build-
ing of new institutions. Global risk has the power to
tear away the facades of organized irresponsibility.
Egoism, autonomy, autopoesis, self-isolation, im-
probability of translation – these are key terms which,
in sociological theory, but also in public and political
debates, distinguish modern society. The communica-
tive logic of global risk can be understood as the exact
opposite principle. Risk is the involuntary, unintended
compulsory medium of communication in a world of
irreconcilable differences, in which everyone revolves
around themselves. Hence a publicly perceived risk
compels communication between those, who do not
want to have anything to do with one another. It as-
signs obligations and costs to those who refuse them
- and who often even have current law on their side.
In other words: Risks cut through the self-absorption
of cultures, languages, religions and systems as well as
the national and international agenda of politics, they
overturn their priorities and create contexts for action
between camps, parties and quarrelling nations,
which ignore and oppose one another.
I propose that a clear distinction be made between
the philosophical and normative ideas of cosmopoli-
tanism on the one hand and the ‘impure’ actual cos-
mopolitanization in the sociological sense on the
other. The crucial point about this distinction is that
cosmopolitanism cannot, for example, only become
real deductively in a translation of the sublime princi-
ples of philosophy, but also and above all through the
back doors of global risks, unseen, unintended, en-
forced. Down through history cosmopolitanism bore
the taint of being elitist, idealistic, imperialist, capital-
ist; today, however, we see, that reality itself has be-
come cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism does not
mean - as it did for Immanuel Kant – an asset, a task,
that is to order the world. Cosmopolitanism in world
risk society opens our eyes to the uncontrollable liabil-
ities, to something that happens to us, befalls us, but
at the same time stimulates us to make border-tran-
scending new beginnings. The insight, that in the dy-
namic of world risk society we are dealing with a cos-
mopolitanization under duress, robs ‘impure’ cosmo-
politanism of much of its ethical attractiveness. If the
cosmopolitan moment of world risk society is both at
once: deformed and inevitable, then seemingly it is
not an appropriate object for sociological and politi-
cal reflections. But precisely that would be a serious
mistake. 
As important as all these arguments are, the deci-
sive question is a different one: To what extent does
the threat and shock of world risk society open up the
horizon to historic alternatives of political action? For
an answer see Power in the Global Age (Beck 2005).
Here I can only outline the basic idea.
Two premises: (1) World risk society brings a new,
historic key logic to the fore: No nation can cope with
its problems alone. (2) A realistic political alternative
in the global age is possible, which counteracts the
loss to globalized capital of the commanding power
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of state politics. The condition is, that globalization
must be decoded not as economic fate, but as a stra-
tegic game for world power. A new global domestic
politics that is already at work here and now, beyond
the national-international distinction, has become a
meta-power game, whose outcome is completely
open-ended. It is a game in which boundaries, basic
rules and basic distinctions are renegotiated - not only
those between the national and the international
spheres, but also those between global business and
the state, transnational civil society movements, supra-
national organizations and national governments and
societies. 
The strategies of action, which global risks open
up, overthrow the order of power, which has formed
in the neo-liberal capital-state coalition: global risks
empower states and civil society movements, because
they reveal new sources of legitimation and options
for action for these groups of actors; they disem-
power globalized capital on the other hand, because
the consequences of investment decisions and exter-
nalizing risks in financial markets contribute to creat-
ing global risks, destabilizing markets, globally operat-
ing banks, and activating the power of the state as
well as of that sleeping giant the consumer. Con-
versely, the goal of global civil society and its actors is
to achieve a connection between civil society and the
state, that is, to bring about a cosmopolitan form of
statehood. The forms of alliances entered into by the
neo-liberal state instrumentalize the state (and state-
theory) in order to optimize and legitimize the inter-
ests of capital world wide. Conversely the idea of a
cosmopolitan state in civil society form aims at imag-
ining and realizing a robust diversity and a post-na-
tional order. The neo-liberal agenda surrounds itself
with an aura of self-regulation and self-legitimation.
Civil society’s agenda, on the other hand, surrounds
itself with the aura of human rights, global justice and
struggles for a new grand narrative of radical-demo-
cratic globalization.
Why is this not wishful thinking, why is it an ex-
pression of a cosmopolitan realpolitik? The cosmo-
politan perspective suggests that there is a hidden link
between global risk and Immanuel Kant. It is precisely
the stark realism of the cosmopolitan imperative: ei-
ther Kant or catastrophe! either cooperate or fail!
which is also cause for hope.  
Consequences and Perspectives
It is evident, that the taken-for-granted nation-state
frame of reference – what I call ‘methodological na-
tionalism’ – prevents the social and political science
from understanding and analyzing the dynamics and
conflicts, ambivalences and ironies of world risk soci-
ety. This is also true - at least in part - of the two major
theoretical approaches and empirical schools of re-
search, which deal with risk, on the one hand in the
tradition of Mary Douglas, on the other in that of
Michel Foucault. These traditions of thought and re-
search have undoubtedly raised key questions and
produced extremely interesting detailed results as far
as understanding definitions of risk and risk policies
is concerned, work which no one can dispense with
and which will always remain an essential component
of social science risk research. Their achievement and
their evidence are to open up risk as a battle for the
redefinition of state and scientific power.
An initial defect lies in regarding risk more or less
or even exclusively as an ally, but failing to perceive it
as an unreliable ally and not at all as a potential antag-
onist, as a force hostile both to nation state power as
well as to global capital. Surprisingly the research tra-
ditions of Douglas and Foucault define their problem
in such a way, that the battle over risk always comes
down to the reproduction of the social and state or-
der of power. Because the nation state, which at-
tempts to deal with global risks in isolation, resembles
a drunk man, who on a dark night is trying to find his
lost wallet in the cone of light of a street lamp. To the
question: Did you actually lose your wallet here, he re-
plies, no, but in the light of the street lamp I can at
least look for it.
In other words, global risks are producing ‘failed
or bankrupt states’ - even in the West (last example
Greece, but maybe in the near future also Italy or
Great Britain or even the USA). The state-structure
evolving under the conditions of world risk society
could be characterized in terms of both inefficiency
and post-democratic authority. A clear distinction,
therefore, has to be made between rule and ineffi-
ciency. It is quite possible, that the end result could be
the gloomy perspective, that we have totally ineffec-
tive and authoritarian state regimes (even in the con-
text of the Western democracies). The irony here is
this: manufactured uncertainty (knowledge), insecu-
rity (welfare state) and lack of safety (violence) under-
mine and reaffirm state power beyond democratic le-
gitimacy. Given the maddening conditions of world
risk society, the older critical theory of Foucault is in
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danger of becoming simultaneously affirmative and
antiquated, along with large areas of sociology, which
have concentrated on class dynamics in the welfare
state. It underestimates and castrates the communica-
tive cosmopolitan logic and irony of global risks; con-
sequently the historic question, where politics has lost
its wallet, that is, the question of an alternative moder-
nity, is analytically excluded by the vain searching in
the cone of light of the nation state street light.
Cosmopolitan social sciences, which face up to
the challenges of global risks, must also, however,
shed its political quietism: Society and its institutions
are incapable of adequately conceptualizing risks, be-
cause they are caught up in the concepts of first na-
tion state modernity, believing in scientific certainty
and linear progress, which by now have become inap-
propriate. And it has to face the question: How can
non-Western risk societies be understood by a sociol-
ogy, which so far has taken it for granted, that its ob-
ject - Western modernity - is at once both historically
unique and universally valid?1 How is it possible to de-
cipher the internal link between risk and race, risk
and enemy image, risk and exclusion?
1 See special issue on “Varieties of Second Modernity:
Extra-European and European Perspectives”, of: British
Journal of Sociology 61(3), ed. by U. Beck and E.
Grande, September 2010 (in print).
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Population Prospects and the Challenges of Sustainability 
Hania Zlotnik1
As the world1 prepares to cope with the challenges
posed by environmental change, the implications of
the rapid population growth that started almost a cen-
tury ago and of future population trends cannot be
ignored. Between the late 1920’s and today, the popu-
lation of the world has more than tripled, passing
from 2 billion to nearly 7 billion. Except for a short
hiatus caused by the Second World War, the growth
rate of the world population accelerated between the
1920’s and the late 1960’s, passing from 0.5 per cent
per year to 2.0 per cent per year. Such acceleration
was the result of reductions in mortality, particularly
among children. Starting in the 1970’s, declining fertil-
ity in developing countries began to counteract the
reduction of mortality to produce a declining global
rate of population growth. Yet, despite the major
reductions in fertility that the majority of countries
have recorded, population growth still averages 1.2
per cent per year globally and is a high 2.4 per cent
per year in sub-Saharan Africa and 2.3 per cent in the
least developed countries (about two thirds of which
are in sub-Saharan Africa).
Because of population momentum, even if the fer-
tility of each country were to reach replacement2 level
tomorrow, the world population would still increase
to 9 billion by 2050 and, in a scenario without further
change in fertility and mortality, it would attain 10.1
billion by mid-century and still have a large potential
for continued growth. 
These population outcomes need to be borne in
mind when considering the medium variant projec-
tion (UN 2009) produced by the United Nations Pop-
ulation Division, whose results are the most often
used to indicate the likely size of the world population
by mid-century. In the medium variant, mortality is
projected to decrease in all countries and fertility lev-
els in developing countries are projected to fall below
replacement level, whereas the fertility of developed
countries is expected to recuperate somewhat from
the very low levels reached over the past decade. The
result is a population of 9.1 billion in 2050, whose an-
nual rate of change would have dropped to 0.3 per
cent by then and would therefore be well on the way
to stabilization. Nevertheless, this low growth rate is
not equally shared by all development groups. Devel-
oped countries as a whole are projected to have a de-
clining population in 2050. In sharp contrast, the pop-
ulation of the least developed countries will still be
growing at a rate of 1.1 per cent annually and the rest
of the developing world will have a population that is
nearing the end of population growth, rising annually
at a low rate of just 0.2 per cent.
According to the medium variant, nearly all the
increases in population expected from now to 2050
will occur in developing countries. Out of the addi-
tional 2.2 billion people expected to live on Earth by
2050, 48 per cent will be added to the population of
Asia and 43 per cent to that of Africa. The least devel-
oped countries, which account for just 12 per cent of
the world population today, are projected to account
for 36 per cent of the population growth expected
from now to 2050 under the medium variant.
1 The views and opinions expressed in this essay are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the United Nations.
2 Replacement-level fertility is the number of children
women should have on average to ensure that every
woman is replaced by a daughter. Because some women
die before they reach the age when they can reproduce
and more boys are born than girls, replacement-level fer-
tility is always above 2 children per woman and can be
much higher in high-mortality countries. In the scenario
whose results are cited here, replacement-level fertility is
calculated exactly for each country according to its level
of mortality.
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These trends present opportunities and chal-
lenges. The population reductions expected in devel-
oped countries as a whole can help moderate the im-
pact that high standards of living have on the
environment. Similarly, slowing population growth in
the majority of developing countries can assist in
counterbalancing the impact that accelerated eco-
nomic growth will likely have on the forces leading to
environmental change. Yet, even with slowing popula-
tion growth, India alone will account for nearly 18 per
cent of future population increases and, together with
China, Indonesia and Brazil, in order of importance,
will add 541 million inhabitants to Earth by 2050 or a
quarter of the overall projected population increase.
In the least developed countries, the rapid popula-
tion growth still expected to occur is likely to present
more challenges than opportunities. Precisely the
populations that are already most vulnerable to envi-
ronmental change because of the limited capacity and
resources they have to adapt are those most likely to
see their numbers double over the next forty years. An
Africa of 1 billion people today is very likely to be-
come the home of 2 billion by 2050. The least devel-
oped countries, whose current population is 0.9 bil-
lion, are projected to have 1.7 billion inhabitants by
mid-century.
The Sensitivity of Long-term Population 
Trends to Deviations from Zero 
Population Growth
In 2004, the United Nations Population Division pro-
duced long-range projections to 2300 to explore the
impact that deviations from replacement-level fertility
would have on the eventual size and distribution of
populations (UN 2004). The medium scenario in that
set of projections produced a world population of 8.9
billion in 2050 and a population that peaked at 9.2 bil-
lion in 2075, declined to 8.3 billion in 2175 and then
increased slowly to reach again 9.0 billion in 2300.
Underlying those changes in population size was a fer-
tility path that kept every country at below replace-
ment level for about 100 years and then returned fer-
tility to replacement level3 and maintained it there
until 2300. The population did not quite stabilize over
the projection period because mortality was projected
to keep on declining, producing therefore a sustained
but very slow population increase.
Figure PE 4.1:World population according to different scenarios, 2000-2300. Source: UN (2004).
3 Replacement-level fertility for each country was calcu-
lated according to its level of mortality. If mortality is
constant and net migration is nil, maintaining fertility at
replacement level yields eventually an unchanging popu-
lation with zero population growth.
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Two different scenarios were produced to test the
sensitivity of future population size to small but sus-
tained deviations of fertility from replacement level.
Thus, a low scenario, where fertility remained a quar-
ter of a child below that in the medium scenario,
yielded a 2300 population of just 2.3 billion, similar in
size to the global population in 1950. In contrast, a
high scenario where fertility remained a quarter of a
child higher than in the medium scenario produced a
2300 population of 36.4 billion. 
Even more telling was the scenario where fertility
was maintained constant at the level it had in 1995–
2000. Under that assumption, world population
soared to 244 billion by 2150 and 134 trillion in 2300,
indicating the unsustainable character of current fertil-
ity levels. Furthermore, all the projected population
increase occurred in the developing world, whose
population rose from 4.9 billion in 2000 to 134 tril-
lion in 2300. Africa’s population alone was projected
to rise from 0.8 billion in 2000 to 115 trillion in 2300.
In contrast, the population of developed countries as
a whole was projected to be cut in half, from 1.2 bil-
lion in 2000 to 0.6 billion in 2300. This unlikely sce-
nario served to highlight the stark regional differences
that exist today in population trends and their impli-
cations for the future.
Although none of the scenarios produced as part
of the long-term projections may actually come to
pass, their implications are clear: positive deviations
from zero population growth maintained over the
long run are unlikely to be sustainable. So far, the ma-
jor cause of the global deceleration of population
growth has been the reduction of fertility, which
dropped from nearly 5 children per woman in 1950–
1955 to 2.6 in 2005–2010. The medium variant pro-
duced in 2008 projected that global fertility would be
slightly below replacement level by 2045–2050, at 2.0
children per woman. To attain that level, fertility still
needs to decline in many countries, including in the
least developed countries, where fertility averages 4.4
children per woman, and in a number of other devel-
oping countries, especially those in South-central
Asia, Western Asia and Northern Africa, where fertil-
ity still averages just under 3 children per woman, and
in Central America, where it averages close to 2.5 chil-
dren per woman. A number of measures can be taken
to promote and facilitate the further reduction of fer-
tility, including improving information and access to
contraceptive methods (UN 2009a) and supporting
the empowerment of women through education,
equality of rights with men and women’s increased
participation in economic and social life.
The Increasing World Urbanization
With 50.5 per cent or 3.5 billion of the people on
Earth living in cities in 2010 and urban populations
growing, often at the expense of rural areas, the glo-
bal population as a whole has become more urban
than rural.4 Yet, there are major disparities in the lev-
els of urbanization among regions. Northern Amer-
ica, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and
Oceania are highly urbanized, with proportions urban
ranging from 70 per cent in Oceania to 82 per cent in
Northern America. In sharp contrast, Africa and Asia
remain mostly rural, with just 40 per cent and 42 per
cent of their respective populations living in urban set-
tlements in 2010.
A third of all urban inhabitants (1.1 billion) live in
small urban localities with populations below
100,000. Another 0.6 billion live in urban centres
with populations ranging between 100,000 and
500,000 inhabitants. In all, 52 per cent of the urban
population lives in urban centres with fewer than half
a million inhabitants. The rest live in 958 cities having
more than half a million inhabitants each in 2010,
only 53 of which have populations surpassing 5 mil-
lion. These larger cities include 21 megacities, that is,
cities with at least 10 million inhabitants, which alto-
gether account for 9 per cent of the world urban pop-
ulation (324 million).
According to current projections, the level of ur-
banization of the highly-urbanized regions is expected
to increase slowly, but a relatively rapid urbanization is
projected in both Africa and Asia. Nevertheless, by
2050 both Africa and Asia are expected to be signifi-
cantly less urbanized than the other regions, with 60
per cent and 65 per cent of their respective popula-
tions living in urban areas. All other regions, except
Oceania, are projected to be more than 84 per cent
urban in 2050. 
In 2009, 140 out of the 230 countries or areas con-
stituting the world were already more than half urban.
Over the next four decades, 66 countries or areas are
expected to reach that threshold for the first time. In
2050, only 24 countries or areas are expected to fall
4 This section draws heavily on the following United
Nations publications: UN (2009b, 2010); and on “World
Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision”, Press
Release, New York, 25 March 2010; at: <http://esa.
un.org/unpd/wup/Documents/WUP2009_Press-Release_
Final_Rev1.pdf>. All UNPD documents are accessible
at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/>.
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short from being half urban, including eight countries
in Africa, another eight in Oceania and five in Asia.
Globally, the rural population is projected to start
decreasing around 2020 and 0.56 billion fewer rural
inhabitants are expected in 2050 than today, with the
rural population projected to decline from 3.4 billion
in 2010 to 2.9 billion in 2050. Asia, having the largest
number of rural inhabitants, is expected to experience
the most sizable reduction: from 2.4 billion in 2010 to
1.8 billion in 2050. In contrast, the rural population of
Africa is expected to gain 147 million and to keep on
rising until 2040. By 2050, Africa is expected to have
0.8 billion rural inhabitants.
The slowing pace of growth and outright decline
of the rural population and the rising levels of urban-
ization are two sides of the same coin. Urbanization
results from the restructuring of economies to be-
come more productive and is an intrinsic part of the
development process. Agriculture, the major eco-
nomic activity in rural areas, is subject to diminishing
returns if, over long periods, the number of agricul-
tural workers grows more rapidly than the land avail-
able for production. When the urban productive sec-
tor can absorb the excess labour force in rural areas,
both sectors benefit. Successful economies have all ex-
perienced an acceleration of urbanization. Today,
countries having large proportions of the population
living in rural areas are more likely to be among the
least developed countries and to have lower levels of
national income per capita. Conversely, higher levels of
urbanization are associated with higher income levels. 
Because the rural population is projected to de-
crease, the urban areas of the world are expected to
absorb all the population growth expected over the
next four decades while at the same time drawing in
some of the rural population. Between 2010 and
2050, the world population is expected to increase by
2.2 billion, passing from 6.9 billion to 9.1 billion. At
the same time, the population living in urban areas is
projected to gain 2.8 billion, passing from 3.5 billion
in 2010 to 6.3 billion 2050. Asia, which is home to the
largest number of urban dwellers in the world (1.8 bil-
lion in 2010) is expected to see its urban population
increase by 1.6 billion, to reach 3.4 billion. Africa,
whose urban population is the fourth largest in the
world in 2010, following those of Europe and Latin
America and the Caribbean, is expected to see it rise
by 0.8 billion, to reach 1.2 billion in 2050, when it will
be the second largest after that of Asia.
The expected redistribution of the world’s popula-
tion between urban and rural settlements has impor-
tant implications for both economic growth and envi-
ronmental change. It is estimated that the 3.5 billion
people living in cities today occupy 3 per cent of the
Earth’s land area, while the livelihoods of today’s 3.4
billion rural dwellers depend mainly on cropland,
which accounts for 12 per cent of the world’s land
area (UN 2009c). Burdening agricultural areas with
the additional 2.2 billion people expected to live on
Earth by 2050 would be unsustainable. Cities, where
wealth, infrastructure and know-how are already con-
centrated, are in a better position to adapt to growing
populations but to do so authorities at both the local
Figure PE 4.2: The world’s cities above 1 million inhabitants. Source: UN, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009
Revision”, Press Release, New York, 25 March 2010; at: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Documents/
WUP2009_Press-Release_Final_Rev1.pdf>.
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and the national levels must address the ills that often
affect urban settlements, especially environmental
contamination stemming from traffic congestion, the
concentration of industry and inadequate waste dis-
posal systems, as well as inequities arising from the
persistent disparities among city dwellers, which
mean that poor people bear the brunt of the negative
aspects of urbanization. The expected rapid urbaniza-
tion of low-income countries, particularly those in Af-
rica and Asia, pose special challenges. Providing urban
populations with access to services, including water
and sanitation, transport and adequate housing, is
necessary if their vulnerability to the extreme weather
events associated with climate change is to be re-
duced. The concentration of population in cities gen-
erates the economies of scale that can justify improv-
ing planning for the provision of services in ways that
are consistent with better protection of the environ-
ment.
As the world becomes increasingly urban, deci-
sions taken today in cities across the world will shape
the economic, social and environmental future of hu-
mankind. Properly managed, urbanization can help in
combating poverty, inequality and environmental deg-
radation, but action to capitalize on the opportunities
it presents and to address the challenges it raises must
be prompt and sustained (UN 2009c: 46–47).
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The Climate Change Challenge and Land-
use Mitigation Options
Climate change poses great threats to many compart-
ments of the Earth System and, as a consequence, to
human societies. There is growing scientific evidence
that a rise of the global mean temperature by more
than 2 °C (as compared to pre-industrial levels) would
irreversibly harm many ecosystems and most likely ex-
ceed the adaptive capacities of many societies. In or-
der to confine global warming to maximally 2 °C, ma-
jor efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
are required. These may even include ‘negative emis-
sions’ of carbon dioxide to be achieved by the second
half of this century: carbon dioxide may have to be ac-
tively removed from the atmosphere and deposited on
land for many decades, centuries, or even millennia. 
The transformation of the energy system, steering
away from fossil fuels, will have to contribute the
lion’s share of emission reductions. However, land-use
changes are currently responsible for one third of to-
tal greenhouse gas emissions, so improved land man-
agement and productivity increases on land under cul-
tivation could significantly contribute to climate
change mitigation since soils and forests store large
amounts of carbon. 
Several techniques that would allow for negative
emissions are currently discussed: afforestation and
the restoration of peat and wetlands would be the
most easily accessible options. Other options such as
technologies for carbon capture and storage (CCS) in
the energy sector involve sequestration of carbon di-
oxide in geological formations underground. Carbon
dioxide could be directly extracted from the atmos-
phere making use of chemical reactions turning the
greenhouse gas into solid carbonates. The large-scale
application of these technologies is however still in its
infancy. The most promising mechanism to achieve
negative emissions is to fuel power plants with bio-
mass, extract carbon dioxide from the exhaust and se-
quester it underground. However, in order to draw
down a really significant amount of carbon dioxide,
enormous quantities of biomass would have to be
processed this way.
Increasing Demands on Land and the 
Need for Adaptation
In many regions, most of the available resources of
fresh water and fertile land are already being used ex-
cessively, either directly for the production of food, fi-
bre, and timber, or indirectly as carbon sinks, for wa-
ter and air purification, nature conservation, and
many other ecosystem services. This scarcity of basic
resources is amplified by a non-sustainable use, caus-
ing degradation of ecosystems and production poten-
tials. Fifteen per cent of the global land surface (about
2 billion hectares) are currently considered as being
degraded – due to overgrazing, deforestation, over-ex-
ploitation and non-sustainable agricultural practices. 
Since the year 2000, global agricultural supply has
not kept pace with an increasing demand for food
and bioenergy. The food price spike in 2007–2008
and related food riots in more than 60 countries had
many underlying causes, but increasing demand in
large emerging economies and dwindling stocks were
certainly part of them. High oil prices and subsidies
for biofuels in rich countries urged farmers around
the world to allocate land and other factor inputs to
energy crops, thus reducing the production of staple
food crops. Continuous droughts, e.g. in Australia,
added more pressure on food markets. Finally, an un-
derlying cause of stagnating productivity increase in
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agriculture is a lack of funds for research and develop-
ment.
In most countries, land prices insufficiently reflect
the growing imbalance between demand and supply
of fertile land. However, first conspicuous signs of
land shortages have emerged. Large companies and
even countries are already trying to stake their claims
globally, a process known as ‘land-grabbing’. In addi-
tion to buying food on the world market, several gov-
ernments and large companies lease or buy land
abroad, and ship the products back home. Advocates
of these deals emphasize that poor countries may gain
from access to new seeds and advanced farming prac-
tices. However, leasing land to financially powerful in-
vestors has also sparked conflict in the recent past. In
Madagascar, public hostility to a deal that would have
leased 1.3 million hectares to a South Korean com-
pany – half of the country’s arable land – contributed
to the overthrowing of the government. While foreign
investors mostly secure land to improve food security
in their home countries, an increasing number of
projects involve growing biomass for fuel production.
China has recently succeeded in leasing 2.8 million
hectares in the Congo to construct the world’s largest
palm oil plantation. 
Climate change is expected to increase these pres-
sures and further reduce land productivity in many re-
gions (chap. 1 by Brauch/Oswald Spring). The need
for climate change adaptation is evident – already to-
day. Most developing countries are located in the
lower latitudes, they are dependent on agriculture,
they will be strongly affected by climate impacts, and
they have lower adaptive capacity (chap. 49 by Adeel;
chap. 50 by Galil Hussein; chap. 51 by Arredondo/
Huber-Sannwald; chap. 63 by Bikienga). People mi-
grate from degraded to more fertile areas, from the
countryside to cities, from regions that cannot pro-
vide sufficient resources to sustain people’s liveli-
hoods to more fortunate places. The war in Sudan,
for example, has partly been blamed on the competi-
tion for water supplies and grazing lands. About 155
million people worldwide are known to be currently
displaced by environmental conflicts and natural dis-
asters (chap. 40 Guha-Sapir/Vos). This number could
significantly grow under climate change as more peo-
ple are expected to be affected by water shortages, sea
level rise, deteriorating pasture land, and crop short-
age. 
Negative climate impacts on agriculture may be re-
duced through a range of adaptation measures. Ad-
justments in production technology and soil manage-
ment, crop insurance schemes, modified agricultural
policies, and diversified international trade flows can
improve regional food availability and security of farm
incomes. Creating more options for climate change
adaptation and improving the adaptive capacity in the
agricultural sector will be crucial for improving food
security and rural development, and for preventing an
increase in global inequality in living standards in the
future (chap. 48 by Safriel; chap. 54 by García Lorca).
However, at present, these improvements are often
blocked by the lack of information, financial re-
sources and good governance in the developing
world.
The Earth’s Carrying Capacity 
Conundrum
Mismatches between the demand and supply of land
and its services already exist today. They could
increase in the future not only due to climate change
but also due to human population growth. Until the
year 2100, human population is projected by the UN
to grow up to 9–12 billion people, while already today
about 1 billion people are undernourished. Changing
lifestyles will further accelerate demand growth as
people start to consume more goods that are pro-
duced with large amounts of energy, land, and water
(such as meat) as soon as they can afford it.
The increasing competition for land and water re-
sources between production sectors, ecosystem serv-
ices, and regions raises the question of the Earth's car-
rying capacity for humans.1 The first known attempt
to answer the question of how many people the Earth
can support was undertaken in the late 17th century.
By extrapolating the population density of the Nether-
lands at that time to the global scale, Antonie van
Leeuwenhoek in 1679 calculated a maximum human
population of 13.4 billion people, which is astonish-
ingly close to current UN projections of maximum
world population. 
Estimates of the human carrying capacities since
then have varied substantially in a range of below 1 bil-
lion to more than 1 trillion people. Magnitudes reflect
surprisingly well optimistic or pessimistic contempo-
rary beliefs on the pace of technological progress and
future development of energy supply. The broad
range of possible lifestyles and accompanying usage
1 Ecologists define ‘carrying capacity’ as the population
of a given species that can be supported indefinitely in
a defined habitat without permanently damaging the
ecosystem upon which it is dependent. 
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patterns of energy, land, and water complicate a di-
rect assessment of the human carrying capacity. Esti-
mating the human carrying capacity in any serious
manner therefore requires first of all answers to a set
of crucial sub-questions: 
• Solar energy is theoretically infinitely abundant
and could be harvested to fulfil all global energy
needs. However, is it feasible given the current
state of technology? 
• It has been shown during the past ‘Green Revolu-
tion’ that agricultural productivity can be
increased by 2 per cent per year for some time, but
can this be sustained for another half a century
into the future? 
• How much land will be available for food produc-
tion, while other land-use types for forestry,
energy, infrastructure and settlements, and nature
conservation also have to be taken into account? 
• Agriculture accounts for 70 per cent of global
freshwater use. How can agricultural water use be
reduced in the future, in order to meet increasing
demands from households and industry?
Defining a realistic set of assumptions on limits to
technological change, energy generation, and the
availability of land and water is a most difficult task.
Consequently, it is more promising to undertake the
inverse exercise and, instead of aiming at an estimate
of the human carrying capacity, to ask the question:
How much land, water, agricultural productivity in-
crease, and financial resources are required to feed 9–
12 billion people in a sustainable manner, i.e. without
exhausting the planetary regeneration capacities? 
With the given competition for the scarce re-
sources of fertile land and water, higher production
on currently used areas is a necessity. Assessments
show, however, that average productivity of current
cropland needs to be increased by 70 per cent by
2050 if only population growth and changing diets
with rising income are considered. If further climate
change impacts and increasing demand for bioenergy
are taken into account, agricultural productivity may
need to be increased by 150 per cent by 2050. This
would be equivalent to an average annual growth rate
of 2.3 per cent in land productivity over the next 40
years. 
The historic development of agricultural produc-
tivity puts this challenge into perspective: The overall
increase over the period 1961–2005 was approxi-
mately 1.4 per cent per year. These growth rates could
be achieved because of large-scale application of arti-
ficially synthesized nitrogen (Haber-Bosch process)
and chemical pest control, but also improvements in
cropping methods, mechanization, and breeding.
These technological advances allowed for agricultural
production to keep pace with past population growth
and diet changes, including rising consumption of an-
imal products, which require higher inputs of nitro-
gen, water, and land per calorie produced than vege-
tal products. It is, however, questionable whether
technological innovation and further intensification
of agriculture will bring about the productivity rise
needed to feed 9–12 billion people on a planet suffer-
ing from climate change and land degradation.
Water scarcity may be technically overcome by im-
proved desalination. However, this depends on the
availability of clean energy as well as on future cost re-
ductions for desalination technologies. Aquaculture
has the potential to provide an increasing share of
world food supplies, but it is not without its own sus-
tainability challenges regarding feed and nutrient man-
agement. In other words: It seems unlikely that im-
proved management and technological change alone
will suffice to counterbalance the increasing pressure
on land and water resources. 
The Great Land-use Transformation 
Climate change and the scarcity of land and water re-
sources are global-scale challenges to humankind and
therefore require global-scale transformations in the en-
ergy and food systems. However, initiating and manag-
ing major socio-economic transitions is often impeded
by path dependencies – or so-called “QWERTY phe-
nomena”: Q-W-E-R-T-Y are the first six letters on the
upper left part of an English typing keyboard. As a mat-
ter of fact, this arrangement of symbols has become
an iconic constituent of our technical culture. Interest-
ingly, the arrangement of letters on modern computer
keyboards is by no means optimized with respect to
the frequencies of use defined by the language. In-
stead, the key configuration probably originates from
some mechanical requirements for the first typewrit-
ers built in the 19th century. Similarly, societal proc-
esses are often locked, through historic pathways,
into certain patterns, which are defined by past
knowledge and technologies and which can only be
changed through major investments and/or behav-
ioural changes. New and potentially radical ideas and
actions are needed to overcome these lock-in phe-
nomena.
Current land-use patterns have developed over
hundreds of years, largely reflecting heterogeneous
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distribution and growth of population density and
productivity of the land. From a local perspective,
land-use patterns have been well adapted and opti-
mized given local resource and market conditions and
constraints. However, the globalization of trade has
made some parts of these local multi-purpose land-
use mosaics obsolete. About 10 per cent of the total
raw production of food, fibre, and forest products is
traded around the world, and a much higher percent-
age could be allocated reasonably by the global mar-
ket. Still, land-use patterns determined by history are
largely persistent. This lock-in situation can be partly
explained by transportation costs and the inertia of
land-use patterns due to large investments required
for land conversion. However, another factor is socie-
ties’ and countries’ desire to remain largely autono-
mous with respect to their most fundamental re-
sources: food and water. 
If humankind wants to manage the climate change
challenge through a cooperative global strategy, such
heterogeneous land-use patterns for agriculture, for-
estry, energy, infrastructure, and nature conservation
(figure 1) may have to be questioned. If productivity
cannot be increased to similar levels across the globe,
due to a variety of bio-physical, social, institutional,
and economic reasons, a larger share of production
may have to be concentrated in the most productive
areas instead. Studies show that optimal spatial alloca-
tion and specialization can, in theory, strongly reduce
the area needed for agricultural production, literally
leaving room for other purposes such as bioenergy
production, afforestation for carbon storage, or na-
ture conservation (figure 2).
Figure PE 5.1: Global map showing current dominant land-use types: agriculture (including cropland, managed pasture
land and rangeland), forestry, infrastructure and settlement, unused land, and nature conservation
(protected areas as listed by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, IUCN). Areas that
are used for renewable energy generation are either included in the cropland category (in the case of
bioenergy) or are not represented in the map (in the case of e.g. solar thermal power in the deserts and
onshore/offshore wind energy production). Source: Data sets on global land-use types, i.e. built-up land,
cropland, forestry land, unused land, and grazing land were provided by Erb, Gaube, Krausmann, Plutzar,
Bondeau and Haberl (2007).a
a. Currently protected areas and restricted management areas were captured by overlaying data sets on IUCN protected
areas category I to VI, i.e. nature reserves and wilderness areas, national parks, natural monuments, habitat/species man-
agement areas, protected landscapes, and protected areas sustainable use of natural resources (UNEP-WCMC 2007).
Data sets were integrated at a spatial resolution of 5 arc minutes, i.e. 8.3 km times 8.3 km at the equator. By rule, the
land-use type bearing the maximum fraction per grid cell was defined as dominant. Built-up land which covers 10 per
cent of the grid cell at a minimum was intuitively added in order to emphasize the presence of rural and urban built-up
areas, industrial and transport facilities, as well as other urban areas. The IUCN protected area cover entered as a sep-
arate layer independent of the underlying land-use types. The map was produced by means of ArcGIS v. 9.2 and R v.
2.8.1. 
00_GEC_Hex5.book  Seite 26  Freitag, 1. Oktober 2010  12:32 12
Towards a Great Land-Use Transformation? 27
The world’s regions have heterogeneous potentials
and different land-use categories also have very heter-
ogeneous demands. Climate change will certainly re-
quire reallocating some of the land-use types on the
planetary map simply for ensuring their functionality.
There is an ongoing debate about advantages and dis-
advantages of segregating versus integrating nature
conservation and agricultural production at the local
scale. But the climate change challenge requires lifting
this discussion also to the global scale. In the future,
specific migration corridors may be needed which al-
low species to move with changing climate patterns.
Agricultural areas will be abandoned if they are de-
graded or fall dry. Settlements may also have to be
moved if droughts, heat waves, hurricanes, and floods
occur more frequently, or if sea level rise threatens to
inundate them. 
As global land-use patterns will have to adapt to
climate change, the potential for optimizing these pat-
terns by matching the different land-use categories to
the needs of heterogeneous potentials have to be con-
sidered. There are and will be regions that are espe-
cially appropriate for certain land-use types, e.g. be-
cause of their favourable climatic conditions or fertile
soils. Urban areas, for example, often spread on fer-
tile land even though they do not require them, out-
competing agricultural or forestry systems that do de-
pend on fertile soils. The Sahara region, on the other
hand, is of little use for agriculture, but is suitable for
solar power harvesting, potentially combined with de-
salination of water along the coastlines. This, how-
ever, requires large investments to install the infra-
structure for power generation and for electricity
transport to the regions with high energy demand –
such as Europe. Joint international efforts, like the re-
cently launched DESERTEC project, could lead the
way to the benefit of all. In the interest of climate mit-
igation, adaptation, and development, international
efforts are needed to harmonize the spatial patterns
of land use with the spatial patterns of potentials, be-
yond national boundaries and interests. 
Global Agricultural Commons: A 
Proposal 
‘Global Agricultural Commons’ may provide a way to
overcome the inefficient use of land resources. Under
such a scheme the most fertile areas of the planet
would be declared a global public good (albeit still
part of the national territories) and reserved for agri-
cultural production. Wealthier regions increasingly ex-
pect countries like Brazil, Indonesia, and the Congo
to refrain from large-scale deforestation or timber har-
vest and protect the global public goods and services
that tropical rainforests provide to humankind. Could
these countries in return expect other countries to put
their productive agricultural systems to the most valu-
able and yet sustainable use to feed the world? Declar-
ing the fertile soils of the Earth a common agricul-
tural good would help to frame the supranational
obligation to use them efficiently and sustainably.
The idea of conserving areas of international inter-
est is not new: the UNESCO’s ’Convention concern-
ing the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage’ and its International Union for Nature
Figure PE 5.2: Observed global agricultural land-use pattern of 1995 (left panel) versus globally optimized pattern that
would allow feeding 12 billion people with 1995 dietary habits (right panel). Agricultural areas shown in
right panel correspond to roughly one third of the area currently used for crop growing. Source: Figures
were taken without modifications from Müller, Bondeau, Lotze-Campen, Cramer and Lucht (2006).a
a. Details on data used, underlying assumptions and optimization algorithm can be found in the publication. 
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Conservation (IUCN) already provide frameworks
for the protection of areas of universal value. Intensive
but sustainable exploitation of the agricultural pro-
duction potential is, however, not yet considered a
value that deserves internationally coordinated protec-
tion.
There are of course several restrictions to the idea
of globally optimized land-use patterns and agricul-
tural commons. First of all, the ecological side effects
will have to be carefully evaluated. Land conversion
often triggers undesired secondary effects, such as
carbon emissions, degradation, or increased vulnera-
bility to climate variability. Intensive agricultural man-
agement often comprises non-sustainable treatment
of soils and water as well as spillover of nutrients and
pesticides to neighbouring ecosystems and also causes
emissions of nitrous oxide and methane, both being
very potent greenhouse gases. These systems have
high energy requirements for providing production in-
puts, like fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery. An op-
timized global land-use pattern will require more
trade and transportation between the producing and
the consuming regions. 
There are, certainly, also many political obstacles,
the most important being the lack of international
trust. The supply of fundamental resources to sustain
human livelihoods, like water, food, and energy, is
usually considered a question of national autonomy.
Not surprisingly, the most protectionist policies are
prevalent in the agricultural and energy sectors. Rely-
ing on international trade for providing a larger share
of domestic food supplies would require the develop-
ment of strong and competitive non-agricultural sec-
tors, which is an obstacle for many food-insecure
countries.
Yet, in a world that faces the risk of dangerous cli-
mate change and the enormous challenge to guaran-
tee a decent life for 9–12 billion people these political
obstacles may have to be overcome. Planet Earth, a
number of degrees Celsius warmer than today, is un-
likely – if not by all means incapable – of carrying such
a big human population. Rising up to the double chal-
lenge of climate change and population growth seems
impossible without calling into question the current
land-use pattern, which has emerged from a history
that was more or less blind to considerations of glo-
bal sustainability.
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1 Introduction: Coping with Global Environmental Change in the 
Anthropocene
Hans Günter Brauch and Úrsula Oswald Spring
1.1 Introduction and Objectives of 
the Book
This third volume of the Global Environmental and
Human Security Handbook for the Anthropocene
(GEHSHA) focuses on issues of Coping with Global
Environmental Change that are contributing to a
reconceptualization of security in the 21st century that
has evolved since the end of the Cold War and has sig-
nificantly been influenced by the globalization proc-
ess. 
1.1.1 Contextual Change from the Holocene 
to the Anthropocene
While the end of the Cold War marked the first
peaceful global transition of the structure, strategies
and policies of international politics since the French
Revolution (1789) and the Congress of Vienna (1815)
and of the Westphalian sovereignty-based system of
nation states, the transition from the Holocene pe-
riod of Earth history to the ‘Anthropocene’ is more
profound (preface essay by Crutzen). The Holocene
started with the end of the glacial period about
12,000 years ago what marked the onset of major hu-
man progress and the development of high civiliza-
tions in the Mediterranean, in China, India and in
Mesoamerica. In earth and human history a funda-
mental change has occurred since the Industrial Rev-
olution (1750) from the ‘Holocene’ to the ‘Anthro-
pocene’ due to increasing human interventions,
especially through the burning of fossil energy that
has resulted in an anthropogenic period of climate
change. The ‘Anthropocene’ concept was introduced
by Crutzen (2002) as “a new geologic epoch in which
[hu]mankind has emerged as a globally significant –
and potentially intelligent – force capable of reshaping
the face of the planet” (Clark/Crutzen/Schellnhuber
2004: 1; Ehlers/Krafft 2006; Ehlers 2008). 
The ‘Holocene’ is a period of geological transition
with a dramatic environmental change with a major
sea-level rise due to the melting of the huge ice sheets
that covered large areas in the northern hemisphere.
Bond, Kromer, Beer, Nuscheler, Evans, Showers,
Hoffmann, Lotti-Bond, Hajdas and Bonani (2001)
postulated a 1,500 year cycle throughout the
Holocene with an important contrast in hydrological
circulation patterns. These changes in climate had a
major influence on the development and collapse of
high civilizations (Fagan 2004; Diamond 2005;
Bluemel 2009: 104). The Roman Empire coincided
with the ‘Roman optimum’ while its collapse oc-
curred during a cooler period when massive people’s
migration occurred from Central Asia to Europe and
from Northern Europe to the Mediterranean (Issar/
Zohar 2004: 14, 2007: 12; 2009: 125). The second cli-
matic downturn led to the “little ice age” (Fagan
2000, 2002) that coincided with bad harvests, fam-
ines, pandemics (pest), and the Thirty Years War
(1618–1648).
The role of climate for the decline and fall of civi-
lizations has been disputed between climate determin-
ists and climate sceptics (Brown 2001). Since the
1930’s the anthropogenic model placed all blame on
human malpractice (Issar/Zohar 2003, 2007). The
neo-deterministic paradigm “emphasizes the dynamic
interaction between the natural environment … and
the human society” (Issar/Zohar 2009: 110–120).
Many neo-determinists have argued that during the
Holocene cold periods, precipitation changes and
long periods of drought triggered massive people’s
movements.1 Due to natural climate variability, longer
periods of drought and famine resulted in the sudden
collapse of several high civilizations (Diamond 2005).2
1 For an overview on the old people’s migration see:
Curta (2001), Heather (1998), Kulikowski (2007), Todd
(1996), Noble and Goffart (2006), Fouracre (2005) and
Halsall (2007).
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Since the late 19th century several authors have re-
ferred to the human intervention into nature (Marsh
1864, 1965; Stoppani 1873; Vernadsky 1926, 1998) and
the earth system that were facilitated by major popu-
lation growth (Malthus 1798; preface essay by Zlotnik)
due to technological and medical advances and the
availability of cheap fossil energy sources (Mc Neill
2000, 2009). Crutzen (2006: 13–17) pointed to the
chemical impacts of human activities during the An-
thropocene resulting in increasing air pollution, acidi-
fication of precipitation, major changes in land-use.3
Crutzen (2006: 16) concluded that the “still growing
impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere”
make it “appropriate to emphasize the central role of
[hu]mankind in geology and ecology by using the term
‘Anthropocene’ for the current ecological epoch”.
In response to the gradual understanding of the
anthropogenic contribution to global environmental
change (GEC) and climate change in the Anthro-
pocene the ‘sustainable development’ (Brundtland
1987) concept was adopted in Rio de Janeiro (1992) at
the United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development (UNCED) and became a key policy
goal of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Millen-
nium Report (2000), and at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg
(2002) where “the need for harnessing science and
technology in support of efforts to achieve the goal of
environmentally sustainable human development in
the Anthropocene was generally recognized” (Clark/
Crutzen/Schellnhuber 2004: 3). 
Crutzen (2006: 17) argues that as humankind “will
remain a major geological force for many millennia” it
is necessary “to develop a world-wide accepted strat-
egy leading to sustainability of ecosystems against hu-
man induced stresses” what will be “one of the great-
est tasks of [hu]mankind, requiring intensive research
efforts and wise application of the knowledge”. 
This fundamental change in earth and human his-
tory provides the third causal chain for a reconceptu-
alization of the security. The societal and political im-
pacts of this far more severe global change than the
end of the Cold War is gradually being understood by
policy-makers and international relations and security
specialists who have launched a process of the securi-
tization of the causes, effects, impacts and societal
outcomes of global environmental change (Brauch
2009_4; Brauch/Oswald Spring 2009; Oswald
Spring/Brauch 2009, 2009a).
During the 21st century, the causal relationship
between the causes and severe societal outcomes of
GEC and climate change may result in environmen-
tally-induced massive and forced people’s movements,
hunger- and famine-induced protests and small-scale
societal violence, and possibly also in violent conflicts
within and between countries that may pose multiple
security dangers that have increasingly been addressed
by governments and international organizations. The
causal linkages and possible extreme and sometimes
fatal societal outcomes have been discussed from four
perspectives: 
1. Determinists have claimed that climate change
will lead to wars during the twenty-first century.
This argument has been made by scientists (e.g.
Welzer 2008; Leggewie/Welzer 2009; Lee 2009),
humanitarian organizations, and NGOs and a few
governments.
2. Empiricists have stressed (Dalby/Brauch/Oswald
2009; Oswald/Brauch/Dalby, 2009) that environ-
mental stress and climate change have contributed
to forced migration and small scale violence (Kahl
2003, 2006). They analysed the securitization of
climate change impacts (Brauch 2009; Scheffran
2010, chap. 42; Scheffran/Brozska/Brauch/Link/
Schilling forthcoming) and reviewed conflict con-
stellations triggered by climate change (WBGU
2008). 
3. Sceptics have pointed to a lack of evidence in the
peer-reviewed, quantitative literature on the link-
age between climate change and wars (Gleditsch/
Nordas 2009; Breitmeir 2009). 
4 Deniers have challenged both the anthropogenic
climate change (Lomborg 22009, 2004) and the
linkages between climate change and possible con-
flicts posing security threats. For different reasons
many governments expressed this view within the
UN context. 
2 The urban Late Uruk society in Mesopotamia that sud-
denly collapsed at about 5200–5000 BP due to a short
but severe drought (Weiss/Bradley 2001). The collapse
of the Mycenaean Kingdom, the Hittite Empire in Ana-
tolia and of the Egyptian Empire (3206–3150 BP) were
due to a persisting drought (Drew 1977; Weiss 1982).
Between 810 and 910 AD, several mega-droughts
occurred in the Yucatán Peninsula and in the Petén
Basin that resulted in land degradation (Coe 1999: 26–
27; Braswell 1990) and the collapse of the Mayan civili-
zation (Demarest 2004; Sabloff 1990; Gill 2000). In
China, the decline of the Tang (850–940), the Yuan
(1340–1360); and late Ming period (1580–1640) were all
related to a reduction of the monsoon and to severe
droughts. 
3 Vitousek/Dantonio/Loope/Westbrooks 1996; preface
essay by Müller/Lotze-Campen/Huber/Popp/Svirejeva-
Hopkins/Krause/Schellnhuber
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While future climatic scenarios can be simulated and
socio-economic trends can be projected, specific
events (Gaddis 1992–1993), such as climate conflicts
and wars as the outcome of decisions of future policy-
makers cannot be predicted, rather several ‘conflict
constellations’ can be foreseen (WBGU 2007, 2008;
Bauer 2009, chap. 41) that may possibly escalate into
violence. 
1.1.2 Structure of the Environmental Security 
Handbook 
A key goal of this multidisciplinary and international
‘Global Environmental and Human Security Hand-
book for the Anthropocene’ (GEHSHA) is to concep-
tually map the manifold reconceptualizations of secu-
rity that have been observed, analysed, assessed and
interpreted by scientists from different disciplines pri-
marily since 1990. 
While many dangers that were influenced or trig-
gered by the human-nature interface have affected hu-
mankind for millennia, only during the past two dec-
ades have they been socially constructed as posing
severe security dangers and concerns for the liveli-
hoods and survival of billions of people and, if busi-
ness as usual trends continue unabated, in the very
worst case even for the human species. Since 2007
they have increasingly emerged in the social discourse
as new security concerns that may pose multiple soft
security issues during the 21st century.
While the impacts of a large nuclear war or the re-
sult of a possible ‘nuclear winter’ (Crutzen/Birks
1982; Turco/Toon/Ackerman/Pollack/Sagan 1983;
Robock/Oman/Stenchikov 2007) have been dis-
cussed by natural scientists and strategic security ana-
lysts during the Cold War as major threats to the lives
of millions of people, the new security threats posed
by GEC are fundamentally different. These threats are
not posed by ‘them’, the other social system, the com-
peting military alliance or political and economic
bloc, nor is it posed by an ‘axis of evil’ and by ‘rogue
states’, but by us, by our lifestyle, especially by the
adored and imitated ‘American way of life’ of consum-
erism – that has since World War II been pursued as a
goal by the middle and upper classes around the
globe – without taking the environmental externalities
into account. If ‘we’ are the threat causing the multi-
ple global environmental changes, then the military
strategies, policies and means based on the mindsets
of the Cold War have become totally obsolete for cop-
ing with this new threat in the Anthropocene.
Of the two previous volumes of the GEHSHA the
first on Globalization and Environmental Challenges
analysed the conceptual response primarily to the first
two causes of the end of the Cold War and of globali-
zation, while the second on Facing Global Environ-
mental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy,
Food, Health and Water Security Concepts reviewed
the third cause and several of the new sectoral secu-
rity concepts that have been used by international or-
ganizations to legitimate their activities in terms of dif-
ferent referents, i.e. of human, national and interna-
tional security. This third volume on Coping with
Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Secu-
rity – Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
moves a step further by addressing strategies, policies
and measures, as well as goals and means for dealing
with these manifold new security ‘threats, challenges,
vulnerabilities and risks’ (chap. 2 by Brauch) in a
proactive manner what requires forward-looking and
policy-relevant research, anticipatory learning and pol-
icy-makers with a vision, a sense of responsibility and
courage to implement many of the unpopular meas-
ures that challenge fundamental features of our life-
styles and ways of life.
These three volumes of the GEHSHA aim to
achieve these three scientific goals: a) to map the
North-South scientific debate on reconceptualizing se-
curity; b) to document a multidisciplinary debate and
learning; and c) to offer a dialogue between academia
and policy-makers in international organizations, na-
tional governments and between academia and non-
governmental actors in civil society and in social
movements on security concepts. These three vol-
umes focus on the conceptual thinking on a wide no-
tion of security in all parts of the world that has often
been used to legitimate the allocation of public and
private resources and to justify the use of force both
to ‘protect’ and to ‘kill’ people in the realization of a
major value. 
1.1.3 Three Stages of Addressing Global 
Environmental Change
Three stages of addressing Global Environmental
Change (GEC) can be distinguished: 
1. The emergence as a new interdisciplinary scien-
tific field of study since the 1970’s and 1980’s that
has focused on climate change, desertification,
water and biodiversity. Since the 1990’s global
change scientific networks, programmes (IGBP,
IHDP, DIVERSITAS, WCRP), and projects as well
as policy-focused scientific “epistemic communi-
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ties” (Haas 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993) as the IPCC
(Bolin 2007) have evolved that assess and interpret
scientific research results, and explain them to the
global policy community and via the media to a
global attentive public (scientific agenda setting or
scientization).
2. The development of a new major policy field of
international (environment) policy since the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 has resulted in
new forms of international governance (climate
change, biodiversity, desertification, water re-
gimes) that have moved to the centre of political
concerns (politicization)4 through major global
governmental conferences in the framework of
the annual conference of parties (COPs) of UN-
FCCC,5 CBD,6 UNCCD,7 and the triennial World
Water Fora.8 
3 Since the early 21st century this process of politici-
zation has been complemented by a process of
declaring selected global challenges (especially cli-
mate change) as political issues of ‘utmost impor-
tance’ that ‘require extraordinary means’ (Wæver
1995, 2008), and by addressing these global dan-
gers and concerns as key security issues (securiti-
zation).
The year 2007 has been a turning point in this process
of securitization of questions of global environmental
change, and especially of climate change (Brauch
2009a) when the highest national policy-makers (G-8,
European Council) and high-level fora (UN Security
Council) and officials of international organizations
(UN Secretary-General 2009) addressed global warm-
ing (in relationship with desertification and water
scarcity) as key political and security issues that may
lead to internal displacements, forced distress migra-
tion, as well as crises and conflicts. This emerging
securitization of GEC focuses on the environmental
dimension of security and on the complex interaction
between human beings and humankind as causes, trig-
gers, and victims of the societal consequences of this
process.
On 11 June 2009, the UN General Assembly
adopted the first resolution on “Climate change and
its possible security implications” (A63/281) that invi-
ted the organs of the UN “to intensify their efforts in
considering and addressing climate change, including
its possible security implications” requesting “the Se-
cretary-General to submit a comprehensive report …
on the possible security implications of climate
change”. In his report (A/64/350 of 11 September
2009) Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon identified five
channels through which climate change could affect
security:
a) Vulnerability: Climate change threatens food secu-
rity and human health, and increases human expo-
sure to extreme events.
b) Development: If climate change results in slowing
down or reversing the development process, this
will exacerbate vulnerability and could undermine
the capacity of states to maintain stability.
c) Coping and security: Migration, competition over
natural resources and other coping responses of
households and communities faced with climate-
related threats could increase the risk of domestic
conflict as well as have international repercus-
sions.
d) Statelessness: There are implications for rights,
security, and sovereignty of the loss of statehood
because of the disappearance of territory.
e.) International conflict: There may be implications
for international cooperation from climate
change’s impact on shared or undemarcated inter-
national resources (A/64/350: 1).9
4 An extensive scientific and political literature is available
on these issues that have contributed to the process of
politicization especially of climate change issues (Dessler/
Parson 2006, 2008).
5 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 at the Earth Summit and
entered into force on 21 March 1994; its Kyoto Protocol
(1997) entered into force on 16 February 2005 with the
ratification by Russia and it will expire in 2012. Until
April 2008 the USA and Turkey did not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. See the documentation at: <http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/items/2877.php>.
6 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was
signed in 1992 at the Earth Summit and until April 2008
it was ratified by 187 countries. Its Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety was adopted in 2000 and entered into
force in 2003, and by April 2008 147 countries had
deposited their ratification. The USA did so far neither
sign nor ratify this protocol. See the documentation at:
<http://www.cbd.int/>.
7 The UNCCD was signed in 1994 and entered into force
on 26 December 1996. As of March 2002 over 179 coun-
tries were parties. See the documentation at: <http://
www.unccd.int/>. 
8 The first five world water fora occurred in Marrakesh (I:
1997), The Hague (II: 2000), Kyoto (III: 2003), Mexico
City (IV: 2006) and Istanbul (V: 2009); the sixth is
scheduled for 2012 in Marseilles.
9 See at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N09/509/46/PDF/N0950946.pdf?OpenElement>.
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The report points to views interpreting climate
change as a ‘threat multiplier’ and identifies several
‘threat minimizers’, such as “conditions or actions
that are desirable in their own right but also help lo-
wer the risk of climate-related insecurity”, which
“include climate mitigation and adaptation, economic
development, democratic governance and strong local
and national institutions, international cooperation,
preventive diplomacy and mediation, timely availabi-
lity of information and increased support for research
and analysis to improve the understanding of linkages
between climate change and security”. With the goal
“to bolster these threat minimizers”, the report also
“identifies a set of emerging climate change related
threats … that appear highly likely, are large in magni-
tude, may unfold relatively swiftly, and are unprece-
dented in nature, including: loss of territory, state-
lessness and increased numbers of displaced persons;
stress on shared international water resources, e.g.
with the melting of glaciers; and disputes surrounding
the opening of the Arctic region to resource exploita-
tion and trade”. 
The report which focuses on “the mutual interde-
pendence between the security of individuals and
communities and the security of nation states” is
based on the response of governments and regional
organizations10 and a literature review that distinguis-
hes among five groups of threats to a) human well-
being, b) to economic development, c) from uncoor-
dinated coping, d) of loss of territory and state-
lessness, and e) to international cooperation in mana-
ging shared resources. A UNEP study (2007)11
emphasized “that the potential consequences of cli-
mate change for water availability, food security, pre-
valence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population
distribution may aggravate existing tensions and gene-
rate new conflicts” (cited in UN-SG, A/64/350: 20).
With regard to responding and preventing climate
change-induced emerging security threats the report
referred to the following policy responses: a) mitiga-
tion, b) adaptation, c) economic growth and sustaina-
ble development, d) effective governance mechanisms
and institutions, e) information for decision-making
and risk management, and f) reinforcing international
cooperation. The report pointed also to the need for
the international capacity “to anticipate and prepare
itself to address a number of largely unprecedented
challenges posed by climate change for which existing
mechanisms may be inadequate”, by pointing specifi-
cally to climate-induced displaced persons and mi-
grants, to the “statelessness of citizens of submerged
island nations”, water-scarcity and the increased com-
petition “over newly accessible Arctic natural re-
sources and trade routes”. Among the states’ respon-
ses only those of the present two major contributors,
of the United States and the People’s Republic of
China, as well as the primary victims, the small islands
developing countries, will be briefly referred to. 
While the previous US administration of George
W. Bush (2001–2009) doubted the existence of an an-
thropogenic climate change, this position changed
prior to the Obama Administration when the U.S. Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate on Security and Climate
Change (2008)12 claimed “that no country will be im-
mune to the effects of climate change” and that most
“developing states that will potentially suffer from ad-
verse impacts to economic security are in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast
Asia”, and that the possible “spillover – from poten-
tially increased migration and water-related disputes –
could have a harmful global impact”.13 In 2008, Tho-
mas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelli-
gence Council of the United States, summarized the
key findings of the secret report
We judge global climate change will have wide-ranging
implications for US national security interests over the
next 20 years. Although the United States will be less
affected and is better equipped than most nations to
deal with climate change, and may even see a benefit
owing to increases in agriculture productivity, infrastruc-
ture repair and replacement will be costly. We judge that
the most significant impact for the United States will be
indirect and result from climate-driven effects on many
other countries and their potential to seriously affect US
national security interests. We assess that climate change
alone is unlikely to trigger state failure in any state out
to 2030, but the impacts will worsen existing problems
– such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degra-
dation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institu-
tions. Climate change could threaten domestic stability
in some states, potentially contributing to intra- or, less
likely, interstate conflict, particularly over access to
increasingly scarce water resources. We judge that eco-
nomic migrants will perceive additional reasons to
10 See the statements by Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Brazil, China, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia,
Italy, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico,
Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, New Zealand, Oman,
Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Seychelles, Solomon Islands,
Tuvalu, USA, European Union and the Pacific Small
Island Developing States; at: <http://www.un.org/esa/
dsd/resources/res_docugaecos_64.shtml>.
11 UNEP, 2007: Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental
Assessment (Geneva: UNEP).
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migrate because of harsh climates, both within nations
and from disadvantaged to richer countries.
The US submission to the above report of the UNSG
(A/64/350) pointed to many security dangers due to
i) agricultural production at risk, and ii) international
migration that will also have severe implications for
the US due to an increase of humanitarian emergen-
cies. The US report specifically pointed to a lack of
resolution to analyse the security implications at the
country level and it pointed to a need for “better in-
formation on physical, agricultural, economic, social,
and political impacts from climate change at country
and regional levels”, what may “also facilitate adapta-
tion efforts”. It argued that 
the security elements of climate change are best under-
stood and addressed in the context of pre-existing
social, political, and environmental conditions. … Addi-
tional analysis is required to determine the world-wide
potential vulnerability to storm tracks and severe
weather. … In addition, detailed agriculture vulnerability
should be studied; this would include anticipated
changes in temperature, precipitation levels and pat-
terns (US-CCIS 2009: 8–9).14
The most recent issue of the CIA’s: Global Trends
2025: A Transformed World (20 November 2008) ar-
gued that “Climate Change is expected to exacerbate
resource scarcity” (NIC 2008: viii) and in one of its
four scenarios on October Surprise it illustrated the
potential impact of inattention to climate change
(NIC 2008: 57–59). This report concluded on climate
change:
Climate change is unlikely to trigger interstate war, but
it could lead to increasingly heated interstate recrimina-
tions and possibly to low-level armed conflicts. With
water becoming scarcer in several regions, cooperation
over changing water resources is likely to be increasingly
difficult within and between states, straining regional
relations. Such regions include the Himalayan region,
which feeds the major rivers of China, Pakistan, India,
and Bangladesh; Israel-Palestinian Territories; along the
Jordan River (Israel-Jordan) and the Fergana Valley of
Central Asia. Such dire scenarios are not inevitable even
with worse-than-anticipated climate change impacts,
however. Economic development, the spread of new
technologies, and robust new mechanisms for multilat-
eral cooperation to deal with climate change may foster
greater global collaboration (NIC 2008: 66, 68).
In contrast, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) re-
ferred to the fundamental differences between cli-
mate change and security, treating climate change as
an issue of sustainable development where developed
countries should take the primary responsibility while
developing countries “should improve their capacity
to address climate change”, and address it in the
“framework of sustainable development”.15 However,
this claim ignores that the PRC has in 2007/2008
12 United States House Permanent Select Committee Intel-
ligence, House Select Committee on Energy Indepen-
dence and Global Warming, 25 June 2008; National
Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Impli-
cations of Global Climate Change to 2030 Statement
for the Record of Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director
of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of
the National Intelligence Council of the United States;
see at: <http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080625_
testimony.pdf>. While this report is ‘secret’, Mr. Fingar
described the process as follows: “We began our effort
following a National Intelligence Priorities Framework
review in 2006. ... Following draft Congressional lan-
guage in the spring of 2007, we elevated the level of our
effort to a National Intelligence Assessment (NIA),
developed terms of reference, and initiated the study
(emphasis added, the authors).” He noted the “funda-
mentally different kind of analytical methodology” and
that the NIC “depended upon open sources and greatly
leveraged outside expertise. Since the Intelligence Com-
munity does not conduct climate research, we began
our effort by looking for other US government entities
that were experts in this area”. Its primary sources was
the IPCC’s (2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) Fourth
Assessment Report and “other peer-reviewed analyses
and contracted research”. Its referent object was a
broad definition of US national security, especially its
impacts on “US homeland, a US economic partner, or a
US ally. We also focused on the potential for humanita-
rian disaster, such that the response would consume US
resources. We then considered if the result would
degrade or enhance one of the elements of national
power (Geopolitical, Military, Economic, or Social
Cohesion), and if the degradation or enhancement,
even if temporary, would be significant. In the end, we
reported on key effects that we judged would meet this
threshold.”
13 After the publication in 2008 of the National Intelli-
gence Assessment on the National Security Implications
of Global Climate Change to 2030 the US National
Intelligence Council (NIC) explored in greater detail
the national security implications of climate change in
six countries or regions of the world: India, China, Rus-
sia, North Africa, Mexico and the Caribbean, and
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island States. On each of
these six countries or regions detailed research and con-
ference reports have been published. All these reports
may be accessed at: <http://www.dni.gov/nic/
special_climate 2030.html>.
14 US Department of State, 2009: “Submission of the
United States of America on the Security Implications
of Climate Change”; at: <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/
resources/res_docugaecos_64.shtml>.
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overtaken the USA as the major producer of CO2,
even though its per capita contribution to global
warning is still less than ¼ of each American con-
sumer.
In contrast, in their submission the Pacific Small
Island Developing States (PSIDS) pointed to the bio-
physical factors (rising sea levels, changing weather
patterns and natural disasters, soil erosion, loss of
coral reefs) that could have security implications for
food (fisheries, agriculture) and water security, public
health, physical and social infrastructure, the loss of
lives and livelihoods, migration (internal, external),
loss of islands, territorial integrity, sovereignty, legal
rights, conflict and unrest, as well as for socio-cultural
impacts. The PSDIS concluded that the above factors
either already have security implications or are likely to
become threats to national security as well as to interna-
tional peace and security. ... While the[se] factors … can
cause conflict directly, the combination of the threats
stemming from climate change impacts … will create
risks to national and regional security as well as to inter-
national peace and security. … Climate change … has the
potential to cause multiple problems simultaneously and
erode already fragile conditions. ... The combination of
increased disease … and migration will continue to esca-
late into humanitarian crises that will strain government
resources around the globe and especially within the
Pacific. In the Solomon Islands, the combination of var-
ious adverse impacts of climate change led to armed
conflict. … These elements all lead to increased human-
itarian crises.16
The PSIDS see the effects of climate change as a di-
rect threat to their national security and survival. In
their assessment “the security threats posed by climate
changes are … no longer a possibility but a reality”.
They call on the UN “to keep track of the growing se-
curity implications of climate change”, and to consi-
der urgently the “immediate actions which can reduce
security implications of climate change, including
long-term security issues” (PSIDS 2009: 14). 
A study of the European Commission and the
Council on “Climate Change and International Secu-
rity” (14 March 2008) suggested detailed policy rec-
ommendations especially for the US, China and India
and on the implications of its long-term relations with
Russia. The paper recommended regarding an im-
provement of the analytical capabilities of the EU:
A first step to address the impact of climate change on
international security should be to build up knowledge
and assess the EU’s own capacities, followed by an
improvement in the prevention of, and preparedness for
early responses to, disasters and conflicts. Financial
implications for such responses should be identified and
also be considered in the EU’s budget review.
On the international level the EU plans to take over a
multilateral leadership role with regard to furthering
climate security.17 The Report on the “Implementa-
tion of the European Security Strategy - Providing
Security in a Changing World” of 11 December 2008
noted that the EU’s European Security Strategy - A
Secure Europe in a Better World approved in Decem-
ber 2003: already identified the security implications
of climate change. 
Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. ... Natu-
ral disasters, environmental degradation and competi-
tion for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situ-
ations of poverty and population growth, with
humanitarian, health, political and security conse-
quences, including greater migration. Climate change
can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime
zones and resources previously inaccessible. We have
enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis manage-
ment, but need to improve analysis and early warning
capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step
up our work with countries most at risk by strengthen-
ing their capacity to cope. International co-operation,
with the UN and regional organisations, will be essen-
tial.
For the EU Presidency, the Swedish Foreign Ministry
submitted many specific proposals for dealing with
climate change as a security issue at the UN.18 At the
request of the DG External Relations of the European
Commission, as part of the EU Roadmap process on
climate change and international security, a survey of
studies on the regional security implications of cli-
mate change was prepared which summarizes the
recommendations on awareness raising, further
research, stakeholder dialogue, capacity building, pol-
icy priorities, priority regions and international system15 PR of China, 2009; at: <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/
resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/China_CCIS.pdf>.
16 PSDIS, 2009: “Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Feder-
ated States of), Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu:
Views on the Possible Security Implications of Climate
Change to be included in the report of the Secretary-
General to the 64th
 
Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly”: 12; at: <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/
resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/PSIDS_CCIS.pdf>.
17 For a summary of key proposals see Brauch (2009a: 91–
93). 
18 On behalf of the EU Presidency, Sweden summarized
the EU position and activities; at: <http://www.un.org/
esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/EU_CCIS.
pdf>.
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development (Maas/Tänzler 2009). Several regional
scenarios focusing on sub-regions in Central America,
in Southwest and Southeast Asia as well as in the
Indian-Pacific region were completed by December
2009. On 8 December 2009 the Council of the Euro-
pean Union adopted conclusions on “climate change
and security” (box 1.1).  
But also other regions, besides the most severely
affected small developing island states (SIDS) have
addressed the security relevance and impacts of cli-
mate Change. On 21 February 2010, the Government
of Mexico and the Member States of the Caribbean
(CARICOM), in a summit at Riviera Maya, Quintana
Roo also addressed the danger of climate change in
their “Climate Change Declaration”  (box 1.2).
Since 2007, this emerging UN debate and the con-
siderations of the European Union as well as many
other regional bodies, such as the PSIDS and of CAR-
ICOM, offer a political context for the securitization
of climate change, even though the latter did not refer
specifically to the ‘security’ threat posed by climate
change. 
1.2 Three Debates on GEC, Security 
and Disasters
This book goes a step further by analysing the syner-
gies and linkages between three scientific ‘epistemic
communities’ focusing on global environmental
change (1.2.1), security (1.2.2), natural hazards and
Box 1.1: Excerpts from the Council conclusions on climate change and security adopted at its 2985th Foreign
Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 December 2009. Source: Council of the European Union; Press
Release 17218/09 (Presse 371; at: <http://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/111833.pdf>. 
1. The Council endorsed the Joint Progress Report and
Follow-up Recommendations on Climate Change and
International Security (CCIS) as a follow-up to the
Joint Paper in March 2008 …, the report of the imple-
mentation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) …,
and the report on the implementation of the Joint
Paper presented to the Council in December 2008.
2. The Council stated that climate change and its interna-
tional security implications are part of EU’s wider
agenda for climate, energy and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy ... This adds an incentive to
strengthen EU’s comprehensive efforts to reduce emis-
sions and to increase its energy security.
3. The Council underlined the possible international
security implications of climate change, and the poten-
tial risk for increased natural disasters and conflicts
over scarcer resources, its effect on migration and state
and regional instability, which will add additional
stress on the increasingly interdependent global system
and structures. …
4. The Council concluded that more vulnerable parts of
human society in developing countries and emerging
economies will be adversely affected, and will need
our support, but developed countries will also suffer.
Adaptation to climate change, sound policies on dis-
placement, migration and conflict prevention are the
most effective ways of dealing with the international
security implications of climate change. We will
address these issues in a spirit of partnership between
developed and developing countries and confirm our
commitment to take bold action on climate change
mitigation in order to limit temperature increases to
below a threshold of 2°C ... An ambitious and compre-
hensive international agreement (UNFCCC) will be an
important factor in preventing and reducing the secu-
rity implications of climate change.
5. The Council welcomed that the UN has taken a lead-
ing role on CCIS demonstrated by the UN General
Assembly resolution A/63/281 of June 2009, … fol-
lowed by the Secretary-General’s report A/64/350 on
Climate Change and its possible Security Implications
of September which was discussed in the UN General
Assembly in November this year. The Council …
looked forward to further debates in the UN Security
Council ... The EU stands ready to support this global
endeavour. …
6. The Council noted … that considerable progress has
been made to enhance EU capacities for early warning,
analysis and response to climate-induced international
security implications and to foster international coop-
eration with the aim to create dialogue, common
awareness, share analysis and cooperatively address
the challenges in all relevant existing fora, including
the UN.
7. The Council supported the recommendations in the
Progress Report; to promote EU multilateral leader-
ship in cooperation with the UN and third parties,
reinforce the EU’s institutional capacity to deal with
CCIS in the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty,
include security aspects in climate change in EU devel-
opment assistance, build knowledge, hone and
sharpen the EU’s crisis management capabilities rele-
vant to dealing with CCIS and to follow-up the
implementation through a report to the Council dur-
ing the latter part of 2010. 
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societal disasters (1.2.3) that are pursued by different
scientific disciplines, as well as by different national
and international institutions. 
1.2.1 Focus on GEC: Approaches from the 
Natural Sciences 
In the introduction to the previous volume the evolu-
tion of GEC research has been reviewed in detail
(Brauch 2009a) that encompass “a full range of glo-
bally significant issues relating to both natural and hu-
man-induced changes in the Earth’s environment, as
well as their socio-economic drivers”. According to
Munn (2002: xi) “changes greater than humankind
has experienced in its history are in progress and are
likely to accelerate”. Dealing with future environmen-
tal trajectories requires more than a prediction of a
single future path. It requires to “map a broad range
of future environmental trajectories” that may con-
firm “that the changes of the 21st century could be far
greater than experienced in the last several millennia”
(Munn 2002: xii). Scientists, but also decision-makers
and administrators are challenged to think the un-
thinkable; to minimize ‘surprise’ should nature mani-
fest itself. 
Since the 1990’s this evolving research field has
been advanced and coordinated by the International
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP, chap. 77 by
Noone/Nobre/Seitzinger), the International Human
Dimensions Programme (IHDP, chap. 75 by von
Falkenhayn/Rechkemmer/Young), the World Climate
Research Programme (WCRP, chap. 78 by Church/
Asrar/Busalacchi/Arndt), DIVERSITAS (chap. 76 by
Walther/Larigauderie/Loreau) and by the Earth Sys-
tems Science Partnership (ESSP, chap. 74 by Lee-
mans/Rice/Henderson-Sellers/Noone) that will be
addressed in this book.19 However, in the rapidly
growing multidisciplinary research programmes on
Earth System Science (ESA) the security dimension
that has been addressed by the UN Security Council,
the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and on a
regional level by the European Commission and the
European Council as well as by many countries, has
Box 1.2: Excerpts from the Climate Change Declaration adapted by the Heads of State and Government of Mexico
and the Member States of the Caribbean (CARICOM), Riviera Maya, Quintana Roo on 21 February 2010.
Source: at: <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/en/ press/?contenido=53294>.
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of Mexico
and the Member States of the Caribbean (CARI-
COM)… confirm our commitment to reinforcing
cooperation to deal with the threat of climate change
through joint efforts by our nations.
2. We express our concern over the scientific evidence
showing that climate change induced by humans is
worse than predicted and that the impacts of climate
change we are already experiencing in our region will
intensify.
3. Since the Caribbean is a highly vulnerable region to the
harmful effects of climate change, we are determined
to strengthen our mitigation and adaptation policies
with the support of the international community to
cope with this serious threat. We call for an increase in
cooperation in our region to achieve understanding
and adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change
and in this respect, we will ask for the establishment of
collaboration links between the Caribbean Commu-
nity’s Center for Climate Change (CCCCC) and the
Government of Mexico.
4. Our region widely acknowledges the fact that the
development of mitigation actions will reduce the
long-term costs and effects of the climate phenome-
non. In this respect, we have been concerned to note 
that ever year, the continuous increase in global emis-
sions reduces the possibilities of stabilizing the average
global temperature and at the same time, increases the
costs associated with this stabilization.
5. We stress the need to continue negotiations within the
United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate
Change and the Bali Action Plan and we urge all the
states to become constructively involved in the negotia-
tions and to build on the results achieved in Copenhagen.
6. We regard the Copenhagen Agreement as a significant
step towards the implementation of the Bali Action
Plan and express our interest in ensuring that the
understanding reached over certain crucial elements
will facilitate the negotiations underway at the Con-
vention.
7. We also welcome the fact that our region will host the
16
th Conference of the Parties to the Convention
(COP 16) and the 6th Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol (CMP 6) and we pledge to collaborate
and support the Mexican Government to ensure the
adoption of a broad, ambitious, effective agreement
that will meet the challenges and needs of mankind,
particularly the most vulnerable sectors. CARICOM
and Mexico agree over the importance of ensuring
that the COP 16 results are legally binding.
19 The early activities of these four programmes until 2001
are covered in the Encyclopedia of Global Environ-
mental Change (Munn 2002); Diversitas (Prance 2002:
268–271); IGBP (McCarthy 2002: 350–351; Steffen
2002: 351–357); IHDP (IV: Shaw 2002: 245); Perry
(2002: 753–754).
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so far only been addressed by the Global Environ-
mental Change and Human Security (GECHS)
project within IHDP (Barnett/Matthew/O’Brien
2008) that has come to an end with the synthesis con-
ference in June 2009.20 
1.2.2 Focus on Security: Approaches of the 
Social Sciences 
The narrow classical security approach inspired by a
Hobbesian obsession is bound to fail in addressing
these new security dangers, as are the security strate-
gies, policies and measures that are guided by the
power-centred worldviews of policy analysts and ad-
visers and the mindsets of policy-makers that have
been influenced by the Cold War experience. The
multiple new security dangers posed by the impli-
cations of GEC, especially by incremental or linear cli-
mate change projections and possible nonlinear tip-
ping points (Lenton/Held/Kriegler/Hall/Lucht/
Ramstorf/Schellnhuber 2008) in the climate system,
have increasingly been perceived and socially con-
structed as security concerns since the turn of the mil-
lennium.
While the debate on the reconceptualization of se-
curity was initially focused backward by addressing
the security consequences of the Cold War and the
impacts of globalization adding new non-state actors
(terrorists and organized crime), the new security
agenda of the Anthropocene (Dalby 2009; Brauch/
Oswald Spring 2009a) addresses fundamentally differ-
ent objective security dangers that threaten first the
lives, livelihoods and survival of human beings in small
islands states, in coastal regions and river deltas, but
also those that are seriously affected by the increasing
intensity of climate-induced natural hazards (heat-
waves, droughts, forest fires as well as by storms,
floods and landslides).
Thus, the focus of the new environmental security
studies will have to shift from environmental scarcity,
degradation and stress during the first three research
stages both to the complex causes and the manifold
natural implications and the societal outcomes posed
by GEC during the Anthropocene era of earth and hu-
man history. Wæver’s theory (1995, 2008a) of securiti-
zation as well as Beck’s (2007, 2008, preface essay)
theory of international risk society offer two different
perspectives for dealing with the security impacts of
GEC. 
While Wæver’s theory offers an approach for ana-
lysing policy declarations by policy-makers and repre-
sentatives of international organizations that have
declared climate change as well as water, soil, food
and health as issues of ‘utmost importance’, Beck’s
(1986, 1992, 1999, 2007, 2007a) international risk soci-
ety points to a new quality of risk against which tradi-
tional insurance efforts do not apply any longer.
1.2.3 Focus on Natural Hazards and Societal 
Disasters 
Natural hazards and human-induced societal disasters
existed throughout earth and human history due to
the natural variability in climate and extreme weather
events, causing in the past mass migrations, multiple
conflicts and even the declines of civilizations due to
the natural variations of the climate during the
Holocene age of earth history (see 1.1.1). The new
challenges in the Anthropocene have been an increase
in the number and especially in the intensity of natu-
ral hazards (chap. 40 by Guha-Sapir/Vos) that have af-
fected more people due to the rapid increase in pop-
ulations often living in urban conglomerates. Many of
these natural hazards and societal disasters have fur-
ther increased the social vulnerability of the affected
people and thus posed dangers for human, national
and international security. 
The hazard impact depends on the degree of
social vulnerability of the affected people and on the
coping capacities of the states. Therefore the societal
impacts are the most severe in the poorest countries
with limited financial and administrative capabilities
and resilience. Some developing countries (e.g. Cuba)
have often been more effective in coping with the
societal impacts of hurricanes, as the case of Hurri-
cane Katrina has illustrated for the United States. 
1.3 Coping with GEC and Hazards 
with Adaptation, Mitigation and 
Resilience Building 
Three different modes for ‘coping’ with the causes of
GEC, including global climate change and desertifica-
tion and land degradation, and with the societal im-
pacts of hazards, e.g. of droughts and subsequent
storms and flooding, have been distinguished in the
GEC and hazard communities to adapt to, to mitigate
against, and to build resilience. The ‘coping’ con-
20 On GECHS, see at: <http://www.gechs.org/>; on its
synthesis conference in 2009, at: <http://www.gechs.
org/synthesis-conference/>.
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cept21 has been widely used in psychology.22 It has
later been taken up by the global change community
(including climate change)23 and hazards (Mitchell
1995; Ammann/Dannenmann/Vulliet 2006) and also
applied by the security community.24 In this book the
concept of ‘coping’ embraces the three concepts of
adaptation25, mitigation26 and resilience building.27
Mitigation strategies can reduce ecosystem vulnerability,
and adaptation strategies can increase ecological resil-
ience to climate and landscape change. Mitigation strat-
egies are actions to prevent, reduce, or slow climate
and/or landscape change. Adaptation strategies are
actions to counteract the adverse consequences of cli-
mate and landscape change. Natural resource managers
can use both strategies to reduce adverse ecosystem
effects of climate and landscape change.28
An early IPCC (1995) glossary did not offer any defi-
nition for coping, adaptation, mitigation and resil-
ience.29 But later IPCC assessment reports, and espe-
cially the fourth of 2007, gave detailed definitions of
adaptation and mitigation that differed among the
working groups. The term ‘coping’ was not defined
by the IPCC (2007, 2007a, 2007b).
The IPCC’s second working group (2007a: 869)
used adaptation as: “adjustment in natural or human
systems in response to actual or expected climatic sti-
muli or their effects, which moderates harm or ex-
ploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adap-
tation can be distinguished, including anticipatory,
autonomous and planned adaptation”. It referred to
anticipatory adaptation as “adaptation that takes
place before impacts of climate change are observed”
that is also “referred to as proactive adaptation”. In
contrast, autonomous adaptation “does not consti-
tute a conscious response to climatic stimuli but is
triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and
by market or welfare changes in human systems, also
referred to as spontaneous adaptation”. Finally, plan-
ned adaptation “is the result of a deliberate policy de-
cision, based on an awareness that conditions have
changed or are about to change and that action is re-
quired to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired
state”. 
The IPCC’s third working group (2007b: 809) de-
fined adaptation: as “Initiatives and measures to re-
duce the vulnerability of natural and human systems
against actual or expected climate change effects.”
This working group also distinguished among “antici-
patory and reactive, private and public, and autono-
mous and planned” adaptation by referring to “raising
river or coastal dikes, the substitution of more tempe-
rature shock resistant plants for sensitive ones, etc”.
According to the IPCC adaptive capacity refers to
21 According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus
(2001: 160) the verb cope (coping) refers to: manage,
deal effectively or contend, get by, survive, win through,
endure. The Chambers Dictionary (2001) refers i.a. to
these meanings: to contend, deal with successfully, to
encounter, meet, to match.
22 In psychology, according to Ray, Lindop and Gibson
1982): “Coping is action directed at the resolution or
mitigation of a problematic situation. There are a
number of ways in which this may be attempted, and a
number of ways of classifying coping strategies. This
paper presents a simple schema of six coping themes,
ordered in terms of their defensiveness and the degree
of attempted personal control which they imply. They
comprise rejection, control, resignation, dependency,
avoidance and minimization, and characterize the mean-
ing or qualitative ‘style’ of the individual’s response,
rather than the formal characteristics of the strategies
employed.” Alan, Lazarus and Reevy (2007) in five chap-
ters introduce the coping concept as used in psychology
and offer four more chapters with examples of coping
with stress and disease.
23  Easterling, William E.; Hurd, Brian H.; Smith, Joel B.,
2004: “Coping with global climate change: the role of
adaptation in the United States”, in: Pew Center on Glo-
bal Climate Change (June); at: <http://www.pewtrusts.
org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_
warming/pew_climate_0704.pdf >.
24 In May 2009 the 8th Security Forum held in Geneva
addressed as the conference theme: “Coping with glo-
bal change”; see at: <http://www.8isf.ethz.ch/index.cfm>.
25 According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus
(2001: 9) the verb ‘adapt’ refers to: “fit, adjust, alter,
make suitable, modify, adjust to new conditions”. The
Chambers Dictionary (2001: 17) refers to ‘adaptation’
as: “the fact, act, process, or result of adapting”.
26 According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus
(2001: 479) the verb ‘mitigate’ means: “make less intense
or severe”. The Chambers Dictionary (2001: 1032)
refers to ‘mitigate’ as: “to mollify, appease; to make
more easily borne, to lessen the severity, violence or evil
of; temper”.
27 According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus
(2001: 645) the adjective ‘resilient’ means: “resuming
original form after compression etc., readily recovering
from setback”. The Chambers Dictionary (2001) refers
i.a. to ‘resilient’ as: “recoiling, rebounding, able to
recover form and position elastically, able to withstand
shock, suffering, disappointment, etc.”
28 Tony Prato and Dan Fagre: “Coping with Climate
Change – An ActionBioscience.org original article”; at:
<http://www.actionbioscience.org/environment/prato_
fagre.html>.
29 IPCC, 1995; at: <http://www1.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/
ipcc-glossary.pdf>.
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“the whole of capabilities, resources and institutions
of a country or region to implement effective adapta-
tion measures”.
The IPCC’s first working group (2007: 949) re-
ferred to mitigation as “a human intervention to re-
duce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse
gases”. Its second working group (IPCC 2007a: 878)
defined mitigation as: “an anthropogenic intervention
to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate sy-
stem; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas
sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas
sinks”. Its third working group (IPCC 2007b: 818) un-
derstood mitigation as: “technological change and
substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions
per unit of output. Although several social, economic
and technological policies would produce an emission
reduction, with respect to climate change, mitigation
means implementing policies to reduce GHG emissi-
ons and enhance sinks”. In the IPCC’s understanding,
mitigative capacity “is a country’s ability to reduce an-
thropogenic GHG emissions or to enhance natural
sinks, where ability refers to skills, competencies, fit-
ness and proficiencies that a country has attained and
depends on technology, institutions, wealth, equity,
infrastructure and information. Mitigative capacity is
rooted in a country’s sustainable development path”.
But only the IPCC’s second working group
(2007a: 880) defined resilience as: “The ability of a
social or ecological system to absorb disturbances
while retaining the same basic structure and ways of
functioning, the capacity for self-organization, and the
capacity to adapt to stress and change.” 
1.3.1 Phases of Scientization, Politicization 
and Securitization
Three phases of dealing with environmental and GEC
issues may be distinguished of scientization, politiciza-
tion and securitization.
1.3.1.1 Scientization 
During the first phase the scientific issues related to
GEC are gradually being addressed, framed, ex-
plained, and understood and communicated to the
public at large via the media and perceived as issues of
public importance that require a policy response. Al-
though environmental (Thoreau 1854; Vernadsky
1926; Carson 1962), ecological (Haeckel 1866, 1870)
and climate issues (Baron Jean-Baptiste Fourier in
1823; John Tyndall in 1860; Svante Arrhenius 1896;
Roger Revelle and Hans Suess in the 1950’s and
1960’s)30 have been addressed by a few natural scien-
tists already in the late 18th century (Malthus 1798), a
wider scientization of environmental problems and
the emergence of environmental science (Chauhan
2008), of university departments and research insti-
tutes primarily in the natural sciences evolved since
the 1960’s and in the social sciences one or two dec-
ades later. Issues of global environmental change and
climate change were increasingly addressed since the
early 1970’s. 
Major scientific centres on climate change re-
search have emerged since the late 1980’s (besides
many university centres, e.g. the Tyndall Centre, UK;
Potsdam Institute on Climate Change Impact Re-
search (PIK), Germany; Cicero Institute, Norway) and
international scientific programmes on GEC evolved
since the 1980’s that were coordinated by the World
Climate Research Programme (WCRP) and the
establishment of the IPCC (1988). During this first
stage of this scientization of global environmental
and climate issues scientists put new scientific ques-
tions and political issues on the national and interna-
tional scientific and political agendas humankind has
been facing in the Anthropocene, especially since the
late 1950’s.
1.3.1.2 Politicization 
While nature conservation organizations emerged
since the 19th century focusing on wildlife management,
water, soil conservation and sustainable forestry, major
environmental NGOs were founded since the 1960’s
(e.g. WWF, 1961; Greenpeace, 1969), the first national
environmental agencies (US-EPA, 1970) and ministries
were established since the 1970’s. The first global en-
vironmental conference of states took place in 1972 in
Stockholm that established UNEP as the key agency
within the UN system. In 1987 the World Commission
on Environment and Development introduced the
sustainability concept as a guiding scientific and polit-
ical goal. The Rio Summit (1992) of the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) adopted the biodiversity (CBD) and cli-
mate change (UNFCCC) conventions and a mandate
for the negotiation of a convention to combat deser-
tification (UNCCD) that was adopted in 1994. 
The Berlin Mandate (1995) that was approved at
the first conference of parties (COP 1) launched a
negotiation process that resulted in 1997 at COP 3 in
30 These historical references were brought to our atten-
tion by Sarina Keller, in a term paper at the Free Univer-
sity of Berlin (2010) based on Alfsen/Skodvin (1989),
Bolin (2007); Luhmann (2009).
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the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol that will expire in
2012. As COP 15 in Copenhagen (2009) failed to
accept a new legally binding accord, in January 2010
the future of the climate change regime has become
uncertain and it is uncertain whether and when a new
legally binding regime will be adopted. During this
second phase of the gradual politicization of GEC
and global climate change issues many political initia-
tives were launched for ‘responding’ to and ‘coping’
with the causes and societal impacts of GEC and nat-
ural hazards. 
Within this global climate change regime multiple
declaratory and legally binding initiatives were ap-
proved by international organizations and partly im-
plemented by nation states for coping with the an-
thropogenic causes, physical effects and societal
impacts and outcomes by adapting to and mitigating
against climate change. The third working group of
the IPCC (1990, 1995, 2001, 2007) has assessed the
state of the knowledge and of government plans and
implementing activities. However, since UNFCC
(1995) and the Kyoto Protocol (16 February 2005) en-
tered into force only few governments have so far
fully complied with their declaratory aims and their le-
gally binding commitments under the Kyoto Proto-
col.31
1.3.1.3 Securitization
During the third stage – referred to above – some sci-
entists, governments and international organizations
have declared climate change as an existential political
issue of utmost importance that require extraordinary
political measures. The securitization of GEC by
policy-makers and the relationship of climate change,
desertification and water scarcity and degradation for
human, national and international security are ad-
dressed in this book. 
1.3.2 Coping with GEC 
In the global environmental and climate change com-
munity three mayor schools or approaches prevail: 
1. The climate change community focuses on physi-
cal outcomes and characteristics of vulnerability.
Their vision of vulnerability “is the degree to
which a system is susceptible to, and unable to
cope with, adverse effects of climate change,
including climate variability and extremes. Vulner-
ability is a function of the character, magnitude,
and rate of climate change and variation to which
a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive
capacity” (IPCC 2007a: 883).
2. The disaster risk reduction (DRR) and hazard-
related research approach deals with human
responses. The DRR distinguishes different physi-
cal, social, cultural and psychological vulnerability
features. Cutter (1996) identified three distinct
sources of vulnerability: (a) as risk of exposure to
hazards (e.g. for settlements in flood plains and
river basins), (b) as a capability for social response
(e.g. exit road systems or insurance), and (c) as an
attribute of places (e.g. vulnerability of coastlines
or river basins to floods). Vulnerability is related
to one or several hazards, while climate change
results in multiple hazards that may trigger societal
outcomes. 
3. The sustainable development research commu-
nity centres on societal characteristics that make
people vulnerable. These scholars examine pov-
erty and capacity-building and for them vulnerabil-
ity is a lack of capabilities or ‘capitals’ (Sen 2000)
preventing them to cope with, to mitigate against
or to adapt to climate change processes. Kofi An-
nan (2005) included in this approach elements of
governance, institution-building and a legal frame-
work. This community points to a vicious circle of
vulnerability, where poverty creates the inability of
people to cope with or to recover from hazards or
situations that disrupt their life (e.g. through ill-
ness). Any of these processes represent an imme-
diate threat for their livelihood and survival that
are beyond their control. Besides by rapid onset
hazards and the increase of food prices or the al-
teration of market structures, the most vulnerable
31 For an overview of the compliance with the Kyoto Pro-
tocol see at: <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/com-
pliance/items/2875.php>. See also: UNFCC, 2009:
“National greenhouse gas inventory data for the period
1990–2007”, FCCC/SBI/2009/12 (12 October 2009);
at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbi/eng/12.
pdf>. Among the 41 annex I countries with reduction
obligations under the UNFCCC between 1990 and
2007 without land-use changes and forestry 23 countries
should have decreases in emission reductions by more
than 1 per cent, while 18 countries showed increases
above 1 per cent. Russia reduced its emissions by 35.9
per cent, the 27 EU countries by 4.3 percent (among
them Germany by 21.3 per cent, the UK by 17.3 per cent,
France by 5.3 per cent) while Japan increased its GHG
emissions by 8.2 per cent; the USA by 16.8 per cent,
Canada by 26.2 per cent and Australia by 30.0 per cent
and Spain by 53.5 per cent and Turkey by 119.1 per cent
(UNFCCC 2009: 16). These data slightly differ if land-
use changes and forestry are included (UNFCCC 2009:
17).
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people are further affected by middle-range proc-
esses such as land degradation, desertification,
lower precipitation and sea-level rise. Indirect
processes of climate change are related to lower
ecosystem services, economic crises and unem-
ployment in developed countries. This often leads
to rural-urban migration where these people find
some social protection (subsidies, food support)
or to international migration to OECD countries.
Strahm and Oswald Spring (1990) and Richards
(2000, 2001) and others have argued that vulnera-
bility is caused by industrialization and its pollut-
ing activities along with the present consumption
model that have harmed poor countries. 
1.3.3 Mitigation Against GEC 
These three approaches create different concepts of
mitigation: 
1. In the climate change and natural hazard commu-
nities mitigation involves the reduction of the con-
centration of greenhouse gases, either by reducing
their sources (by geo-engineering, solar radiation
management, seeding oceans with iron, etc.) or by
increasing their sinks (by carbon capture and stor-
age, bio-sequestration, elimination of waste meth-
ane). These processes are technologically specific
(e.g. fluorescent light bulbs, geothermal and pollu-
tion reduction), industry-related (e.g. public pri-
vate partnerships in the oil or petrochemical in-
dustry, bus and public transportation) and system-
wide (such as the reduction of GHG in urban ar-
eas, recycling of waste, public transport systems,
district heating systems, etc.).
2. The hazard and DRR community emphasizes
three simultaneous mitigation processes: a) infra-
structure for protective measures (sea walls, levees,
dams for water regulation and irrigation, restora-
tion of damaged ecosystems such as mangroves,
coral reefs, seagrass and forests). City planners are
modelling the risks in cooperation with citizens
from megacities and urban agencies to develop a
coordinated approach for protecting vulnerable
people, roads, tunnels, water supplies, energy and
transportation systems, sewage and water treat-
ment plants and industries with hazardous materi-
als. 
a) insurance and micro-insurance and the estab-
lishment of escape routes to reduce human
harm and permit a fast recovery after an
extreme event;
b) early warning, preventive evacuation, urban
and landscape planning, civil protection laws,
disaster funds, etc.; 
c) education and training on DRR and disaster
management. 
3. The sustainable development research community
integrates the socio-economic processes with net-
work building, reinforcement of capacities and the
combined use of different capitals (natural, eco-
nomic, societal and cultural), to create circles of
virtuous development processes. This community
has proposed carbon emissions trading, sustaina-
ble land and forest management, carbon taxes, fi-
nancial and technological transfer from industrial-
ized to affected poor countries. They have
combined the preventive disaster management
with proactive development processes to enhance
the capability of the people for resisting extreme
events and dealing with multiple socio-natural haz-
ards. They have promoted population control,
healthcare for children and mothers, preventive
health services (by vaccination and campaigns
against HIV-AIDS) and food supply for the hun-
gry. Their interest has focused on sustainable con-
sumption patterns, small-scale and self-sufficient
agriculture and micro-credits for livelihood im-
provements in the framework of an economy of
solidarity (Cadena 2009) or informal economic
activities. This community has supported educa-
tion from the kindergarten onward (Van Dijk
2009), survival strategies adapted to scarce re-
sources, and fair trade to reduce the negative im-
pacts of a collapse or a sudden increase of prices.
1.3.4 Adaptation to GEC 
On adaptation these three schools propose different
ways to deal with GEC: 
1. For many researchers in the climate change com-
munity the adaptation concept had a traitorous
connotation. They initially believed that this con-
cept would undermine the urgency to mitigate
against the threat of global warming by signifi-
cantly reducing GHG emissions. Therefore, adap-
tation was for quitters. Based on systematic meas-
urements of GHG and their significant increase
during the past decade, this school argued that
mitigation alone would not resolve climate related
threats. Therefore, the climate change and natural
hazard communities have suggested different proc-
esses of adaptation to climate change with regard
to data collection and scenario development.
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Despite improved meteorological data and mid-
term weather forecasts it is still impossible to pre-
dict for farmers, the people, and insurance compa-
nies which regions will become wetter or drier. So
far there is little agreement how these trends will
affect the annual or seasonal rainfall patterns and
the growing season to determine yield productiv-
ity. Furthermore, glaciers are retreating what will
lead to increased temporal floods but throughout
the year to a decline in water resources for rain-fed
agriculture and urban development. This will
affect large populations in China, in South and
East Asia but also in the Andes in South America
and the land around Kilimanjaro in Africa. Thus,
scientists must develop and share knowledge on
land-use, forestry and agriculture (by developing
drought- and saline-resistant crops) and develop
scenarios for dealing not only with linear, but also
with chaotic impacts of climate change. Adapta-
tion should also address negative societal out-
comes. More intensive floods from storm surges
require complex and expensive solutions for pro-
tecting home, people, sanitation, communication
and transportation infrastructures.32 
2. According to the DRR and hazard community ad-
aptation requires: a) assessing risk and reducing
vulnerability of the affected people; b) adaptation
planning at the national and regional level to re-
duce the impacts of climate change; c) a more re-
silient infrastructure; d) broader disaster relief and
preparedness measures; e) new agricultural tech-
nologies and practices of land management and
productive processes to counter the increased cli-
mate risks; f) conservation and restoration proc-
esses to maintain the environmental services. Ad-
aptation planning at the local, state, and national
levels may reduce the damage caused by climate
change, as well as the long-term costs of respond-
ing to climate-related impacts. It is estimated that
by 2030 about 60 per cent of the world’s popula-
tion will live in flood-prone coastal areas. This re-
quires conserving and restoring mangroves to
counter the flooding of agricultural land and hu-
man settlements. This will also protect deltas from
washing away. Bangladesh and other highly af-
fected countries are also reforesting in the upland
to prevent downstream erosion. Low lying islands
are creating natural buffer zones for human settle-
ments to adapt to rising seas.
3. The sustainable development community argues
that strategies for coping with the impacts of a
warmer world will be complex and expensive.
Adaptation strategies must:
a) Deal simultaneously with poverty alleviation,
high population growth and job creation for
young people. This is further reinforced by nat-
ural events in countries with low human devel-
opment, few trained people and the lowest
capacity to cope with the high impact of cli-
mate-related disasters. 
b) The expected increase of diseases due to cli-
mate change, above all in the sensitive regions
due to flooding and sea-level rise, may also
contaminate water supplies and intensify the
vicious circle of poverty, diseases, ignorance
and disasters. 
c) Biodiversity and recovery of affected ecosys-
tems is a local adaptation strategy that creates
for most marginal people a potential to charge
for environmental services, thus reducing the
negative impacts of extreme events. 
d) Early adjustment to increasing climate threats
permits a better adaptation, making people
resilient to possible changes and new threats,
taking cultural, economic, and political differ-
ences into account. 
e) Traditional societies with a greater integration
with nature adapt more easily to a warmer en-
vironment (e.g. Myanmar) than cultures driven
by the extraction of oil and minerals (e.g.
Peru), thus adaptation strategies must be car-
bon neutral. 
f) Oxfam (2009) pointed to “three major chal-
lenges that climate change brings to bear on
rural communities: undermined sustainability
of current livelihood strategies; increased pres-
sure on already depleted natural resource
bases; and increased disaster risk from climate
hazards. Effective adaptation must therefore
bring together sustainable livelihoods, natural
resource management, and disaster risk reduc-
tion approaches to secure and enhance assets
within the analysis of climate change”, includ-
ing the reduction of social vulnerability and
DRR. 
g) Sustainable energy and energy efficiency are
crucial for the adaptation process to climate
change including incentives for the private sec-
32 New York City, Mumbai, Calcutta, Lagos, Buenos Aires,
Bangkok and other megacities are only a few metres
above sea level and they must develop adaptation plans
for sea-level rises and for increased tidal and storm
surges.
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tor, the elimination of counterproductive subsi-
dies (e.g. in water-intensive crops), and the pro-
tection of land-use, ownership and guarantee
of the social security for the most vulnerable
people. 
1.3.5 Protection, Empowerment and 
Resilience Building 
The concept of resilience has been used differently by
authors and scientific communities. It was critiqued
for emphasizing systems stability over change and thus
reducing DRR with preventive measures. Wisner,
Blaikie, Cannon and Davis (2004) use resilience as a
continuous learning process to improve the capacity
for handling hazards and to reduce risk by empower-
ing communities to make better decisions on dealing
with hazards. Resilience may also be linked to vulner-
ability (Manyena 2006) and adaptation capacity. Resil-
ience is understood to have inherent functions in nor-
mal times and to be adaptive during extreme events
and disasters. This is related to infrastructure, institu-
tions and social, cultural or economic systems.
1. Climate experts defined resilience as the “ability
of a social or ecological system to absorb distur-
bances while retaining the same basic structure
and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-
organization, and the capacity to adapt to stress
and change” (IPCC 2007a: 880). 
2. “Determining whether resilience is an outcome or
a process is an important step toward its applica-
tion to disaster reduction. When compared to the
global change perspective, hazards researchers of-
ten embed adaptive capacity or mitigation within
resilience” (Cutter/Barnes/Berry/Burton 2008:
600). According to researchers working on haz-
ards, resilience focuses on technical and social sys-
tems, where preventive DRR helps to cope with
and minimize the potential disaster impacts
through early warning, evacuation and post-event
processes (Bruneau 2006; Tierney/Bruneau 2007).
The Hyogo Framework for Action stressed the
need to build resilient communities through inte-
grated disaster prevention, mitigation, prepared-
ness and vulnerability reduction, where the local
capacity is increased for dealing better with haz-
ards. In this framework DRR is integrated into
early warning, the response, recovery, and recon-
struction process in case of a disaster.
3 The research community dealing with resilience
and sustainable development goals includes hu-
man rights and basic human needs. The human se-
curity approach (UNDP 1994) was the starting
point for combining human capitals (social, eco-
nomic, political and cultural) with protection and
empowerment (Ogata/Sen 2003) and resilience-
building in regions threatened by climate impacts
(UNEP, FAO, Oxfam, Greenpeace, etc.). This
community defined the resilience process as the
ability to “tolerate – and overcome – damage, di-
minished productivity, and reduced quality of life
from an extreme event without significant outside
assistance’’ (Mileti/Mileti 1999: 4). Within the
context of natural disasters, this community rede-
fined the sustainability approach as the necessity
of a systems’ change, including risk factors not
only from natural extreme events, but also from
the complex interrelationship with human factors,
such as chaotic urbanization, livelihood loss, eco-
nomic crises, environmentally forced migration,
unstable governments and the linkage among sev-
eral factors. Particularly a high exposure is related
to the distribution and access to land, water and
productive means that are crucial to reinforce the
livelihood at the local level or to expel people
when their survival is at risk.
Social safety networks are crucial to prevent, sup-
port, and recover from extreme hydro-meteorolog-
ical events. In facing climate change the sustaina-
ble research and action community emphasizes to
conserve and restore the natural capital, while the
cultural, economic and political capitals are ori-
ented at resilience-building, sustainable agriculture
and dignified livelihood. Social movements have
analysed the inefficiency of agribusiness, pollution
and agricultural subsidies that have increased hun-
ger worldwide due to speculation with food prices
and the use of basic grains for biofuel. Their adap-
tation strategies start at the local level with the re-
covery of environmentally damaged ecosystems
and the improvement of environmental services.
FAO (2009) adopted the food sovereignty concept
of Vía Campesina as a holistic approach for in-
creasingly insecure situations. In this approach
hazard-prone countries in the South that are ex-
posed to risk are concentrating their technical,
economic and human capitals on efficient DRR
and CCA processes, where bottom-up initiatives,
disaster organizations and international bodies col-
laborate. The reduction of social vulnerability re-
quires democratic structures, norms and laws, disas-
ter funds, but also bottom-up resilience-building. 
The three research communities agree that the greater
the level of risk of a country or community and the
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greater the resilience is, the better the DRR and the
lower the negative impact of an extreme event will be.
This permits a more rapid recovery, but also a better
preparedness and rebuilding processes. As global envi-
ronmental change is an increasing risk and not only a
hazard but also a vulnerable and exposure compo-
nent, the combined economic, energy and food crises
may threaten sustainability in a larger and in the
extreme case at global scale (see the present financial
crisis). 
Thus, significant financial resources are required,
and until new sources are available, most of them
must be diverted from existing development pro-
grammes what again affects the highly vulnerable re-
gions and social groups. Oxfam (2009) estimates that
sustainable climate change programmes with resil-
ience-building require about 40 billion/year, while the
World Bank estimates that financial needs would be
four times higher if adaptation and mitigation proc-
esses are included.
This also requires institutional arrangements,
above all in the water, agriculture and productive
structure, with an increasing coordination among dif-
ferent sectors and levels for DRM with participatory
community involvement in decision-making and edu-
cational programmes. Safety nets for disaster-stricken
households and strengthened disaster preparedness
may substantially reduce the disaster costs with early
warning, improved hydro-meteorological services, and
weather prediction. These safety nets also develop
self-sustaining bodies of expertise in remote and mar-
ginalized regions. Women are not only the world’s
poorest and most vulnerable persons, but their social
representations are also able to consolidate and sup-
port countries and communities prior, during, and af-
ter a disaster (Oswald 2006). Building on existing and
past experiences of a proactive and constructive dy-
namics among top-down and bottom-up efforts may
open a potential to reduce human and economic
costs in a world increasingly threatened by GEC. 
1.4 Dialogue Among Three Scientific 
Epistemic Communities on 
Global Change, Security and 
Disaster 
The 95 chapters in this book bring together authors
from these three research communities (1.3.2–1.3.4)
and from three distinct scientific research areas and
many different scientific disciplines in the natural and
social sciences, including teams of authors reflecting
multi- and interdisciplinary approaches (table 1.1).
1.4.1 Security Community
Of these three scientific communities the security re-
search community has evolved since the end of the
Second World War as two competing research pro-
grammes: on the one hand as war, national, interna-
tional and global security or strategic studies, and on
the other as peace science, studies or research. Since
the late 19th century, issues of external and internal se-
curity, and the activities of the military, diplomacy and
of the police have been reviewed by historians and
lawyers, the state sciences and especially since the late
1940’s by international relations scholars, and as a re-
sponse to the Cold War, since the late 1950’s by peace
researchers. 
In 1958, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) was set up in London, and in 1959 the
International Peace Research Institute in Oslo
(PRIO), and in 1966 the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) were established.
Since then numerous security policy think tanks and
scientific research institutes as well as peace research
institutes and programmes and scientific journals have
emerged and several controversial methodological
and policy-focused controversies have taken place be-
curity community (Albrecht/Brauch 2008, 2009). This
wide-ranging security community pursued different
tasks to analyse, assess, critique or legitimize specific
security policies and decisions. 
With the reconceptualization of security since
sic policy and military dimensions to include the eco-
nomic, societal and environmental dimensions and
the range of referent objects or actors have deepened
from state-centred perspectives of national, interna-
tional and global security to human- or people-centred
approaches of human and gender security. This wid-
ening and deepening of the security concept since
1990 has been conceptually mapped in the previous
two volumes of this GEHSHA. Furthermore, many
international organizations have sectorialized the
security concept by linking it to their key mission of
energy (IEA), food (FAO, WFP), health (WHO),
water (UNEP, UNU) and more recently to climate
(UNSC, UNGA, UNSG, EU, PSIDS)
The security repercussions of GEC, especially of
climate change and of natural hazards as well as of
societal disasters are gradually being addressed since
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the early 21st century (chap. 42 by Scheffran; chap. 41
by Bauer) by security specialists from both security
studies (Schwartz/Randall 2003; Campbell/Lennon/
Smith 2007) and peace research (Gleditsch/Nordas
2009; Brauch 2009a). Besides, the social sciences,
policy think tanks33, NGOs (Brown/Crawford 2008)
and the US intelligence and military community have
addressed the climate change and security linkage.34
Table 1.1: Three epistemic communities focusing on global environmental change, natural hazards and security.
Source: Developed by the authors.
Epistemic community 
(research area)



















Secondary disciplines • History, law, economics, 
ecology
• natural sciences, engineer-
ing, IT














Research programmes • War, security or strategic 
studies
• peace studies, science or 
research
• Natural hazard research 
(drought, (tropical) storms, 
floods)
• Global environmental 
change
• ESS or ESA
• geoecology
Scientific Institutes
(no university departments, 
institutes)
• RAND, IISS
• PRIO, SIPRI, ISFH, PRIF
• Natural Hazards Centre 
(UC, Boulder)
• UCL Hazard Research 
Centre
• Centre for Natural Hazard 
Research
• Tyndall Centre 
• MPI for Climatology
• PIK
• Cicero 




• IISS (members) 
• ISA (members)
• IPRA, CLAIP etc.
• Provention Consor-tium • WCRP, IGBP, IHDP, 
DIVERSITAS, ESSP
Science Assessment • none • none • IPCC
Scientific transfer (political 
regimes & organizations)
• UNSC, OAS, OSCE, AU, 
Arab League
• UNOCHA, ECHO • UNFCC
• UNCBD
• UNCCD
Theory • Securitization • Object of analysis • Object of analysis
Spatial component • National sovereignty
• National territory
• Beyond: globalization
• Transnational impact • Geography & geosciences







Integrative concept  Political geoecology 
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Climate change impacts on international, national
and human security have also increasingly been
addressed by think tanks, NGOs and scholars in
Asia35 (chap. 87 by Yu/Smith; chap. 88 by Ohta; chap.
89 by Kanie), Africa36, Latin America37 and in the
Middle East38. 
1.4.2 Natural Hazard and Disaster 
Community
The natural hazard community is much older and
goes back to the early high civilizations when various
water saving technologies were developed to cope
with the effects of drought and to reduce the impacts
of floods and inundation. Since the 1930’s, hazards
were not any longer perceived as pure engineering
problems but increasingly analysed as societal issues
that were influenced by societal preferences and re-
source allocations. The practical applications of this
community comprises three main activities of emer-
gency management: a) of civil defence,39 b) disaster
relief,40 and c) disaster risk reduction (DRR).41 
Within the UN System, the International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR)42 has been a ma-
jor coordinator of the many stakeholders involved in
DRR, besides the ProVention Consortium43 that is co-
ordinated by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society
in Geneva. In the European Union, the DG Environ-
ment has been responsible for the coordination
within the EU44, while within the DG Development
its European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)45
has become a key actor and source of financial sup-
port for UNOCHA. Besides, the World Bank, UNDP
and UNEP, the International Red Cross as well as hu-
manitarian organizations have become major actors in
33 Since mid 2008, US security think tanks published
reports on climate change and security; e.g. Congres-
sional Budget Office (2009); U.S. Global Change
Research Program (2009); Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (2009); Strategic Studies Institute
(Parsons 2009); Pew Center on Global Climate Change
(2009); and the American Security Project (2009); for
web links see at: <http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/
5093>.
34 In September 2009, the CIA set up a “Climate Change
and National Security Center”; at: <https://www.cia.
gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/center-
on-climate-change-and-national-security.html>.
35 There are many reports on the impact of climate change
on national, food and energy security in India, see:
IDSA Working Group on Security Implications of
Climate Change (2009); Nitin Desai, an adviser to the
Prime Minister of India: “When Things Hot Up”, in:
Times of India, 29 September 2009, at: <http://
timesofindia.Indiatimes.com/opinion/edit-page/Top-Arti-
cle-When-Things-Hot-Up/articleshow/5065540.cms>; see:
The RSIS Centre for NTS Studies Conference on Cli-
mate Insecurities, Human Security and Social Resil-
ience, 27–28 August 2009, Four Seasons Hotel,
Singapore; at: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/Events/Cli-
mate_change_conf. html>; Zhang, Zhang, Lee and He
(2007); Zhan, Brecke, Lee, He and Zhan (2007).
36 See: Oli and Crawford (March 2009); Leonie Joubert:
“Africa: Climate Change ‘Is a Security Issue’”, in: allAf-
rica.com (28 August 2009); at: <http://allafrica.com/
stories/200908310376.html>; IRIN: “AFRICA: Climate
change and conflicts” (23 February 2009); at: <http://
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx? Report Id=83096>;
Brown, Crawford (24 March 2008); Brown, Hammil
and McLeman (2008); Brown, Hammil and Crawford
(2007); Hendrix, Glaser (2007): Swatuk (2007).
37 There are a few reports on the impact of climate change
on food, energy and national security in Latin America:
e.g. by the Centro Mario Molina; Fetzek (October
2009), at: <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
Mexico_CC_Text_-_English.pdf>; “Investigadores británi-
cos hablan sobre cambio climático y seguridad”, in:
Excélsior (13 July 2009), at: <http://ukinmexico.fco.gov.
uk/es/newsroom/?view=News&id=20563860>; Emilio
Sempris: “Climate Change and Freshwater in Latin Ame-




tainerList=true>; DFID: Climate Change in Latin Ame-
rica, at: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publica-
tions/climatechange/12LatinAmerica.pdf>.
38 Freimuth, Bromberg, Mehyar and al Khateeb (2007);
Brauch (2007); Brown and Crawford (2009).
39 In most countries the ministries for interior are respon-
sible for civil defence functions. In the USA, the civil
defence function was developed in the 1950’s to cope
with the threat of a nuclear war; in the 1980’s the new
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) focu-
sed “almost exclusively on nuclear attack and continuity
of government planning”; in the 1990’s “FEMA adopted
an all-hazards approach to disaster man-agement … for
natural hazards preparedness and mitigation programs”.
During the administration of G.W. Bush “at the federal
level, funding for traditional natural and technological
hazard programs at FEMA have been cut significantly,
and funding for hazard mitigation programs such as Pro-
ject Impact have been cut completely”, (see: George
Haddow: “The Challenges of Emergency Management
Planning in 2005”; at: <http://www.disaster-resource.
com/articles/05p_056.shtml>.
40 Primarily international organizations and humanitarian
NGOs are responsible for the implementation of the
disaster relief programmes.
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political efforts of disaster relief and disaster risk re-
duction. 
The impacts of hazards have been intensively
discussed and analysed in many scientific contribu-
tions and UN reports in the context of food, water,
health and human security (Seck 2007).46 While in the
USA hazards were addressed in the context of home-
land security, since the mid 2000’s climate change
impacts were discussed in a security context (BMU
2002; WBGU 2008). The security impacts of natural
hazards within the EU context have been interpreted
as “functional security” (Ekengren 2009). From the
perspective of many analysts and third world coun-
tries hazards pose major threats to their national secu-
rity and for the human security of their citizens.
1.4.3 Global Change Community
The origins of the scientific global change community
can be traced back to the 1970’s in the aftermath of
the Stockholm Conference (1972) on the Environ-
ment and Development that put the environment on
the international institutional agenda with the estab-
lishment of UNEP, but it took another two decades
until the four international global change pro-
grammes gradually evolved after the Rio Earth Sum-
mit. Increasingly climate change institutes with a pri-
mary focus on the natural sciences address security
implications of climate change (Tyndall Centre47;
Hamburg ClimateCampus48).
1.4.4 Towards a New Interdisciplinary 
Epistemic Community
These three distinct scientific communities have for
many decades coexisted in parallel with a limited
intellectual contact, debate and exchange. The disci-
plinary boundaries of these three scientific communi-
ties are gradually eroding but the emergence of an
inter-, multi- and transdisciplinary epistemic commu-
nity (Oswald Spring/Brauch 2008) has so far
remained an ambitious scientific goal as – besides the
initiatives referred to above – both the GEC and the
hazard community have so far resisted to consider
their issue areas in terms of theoretical approaches of
security and peace studies.
In chap. 94 Brauch, Dalby and Oswald Spring sug-
gest a new multi- and interdisciplinary scientific ap-
proach of a ‘political geoecology’ that fundamentally
41 The DDR term refers to techniques for preventing or
minimizing the effects of disasters and has been
adopted by the United Nations <http://www.unisdr.
org/>. In the political realm, within the framework of
UN/ISDR a Global Platform for DRR was set up that
held so far two sessions. For the proceedings of the sec-
ond session see at: <http://www.prevention-web.net/
files/section/193_GPProceedingsFINAL. pdf>. Its list of
participants offers a good overview of the many stake-
holders involved in DRR activities.
42 On UN/ISDR’s mission, see at: <http://www.unisdr.
org/eng/un-isdr/secre-functions-responsibilities-eng.htm>.
It is a system of partnerships with the overall objective
to generate and support a global disaster risk reduction
movement to implement HFA. Its Inter-Agency Group
is to enhance “joint work programming among … FAO,
IFRC, ILO, OCHA, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNICEF,
WFP, WHO, WMO and the World Bank … and to
improve coherence.”
43 For details at: <http://www.proventionconsortium.org>.
44 Within the DG Environment, in the Directorate A:
Legal Affairs & Civil Protection, two units deal with nat-
ural hazards: A3. Civil Protection - disaster response and
A4. Civil Protection - prevention and preparedness¸ see at:
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/environment/directory. htm>.
45 ECHO is made up of two directorates. The first is
operations-oriented, organized geographically and
thematically, and the second is dedicated to operational
support; at: <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm>
and on disaster response at: <http://ec.europa.eu/
echo/aid/dipecho_en.htm>. From 2005 to 2008 the
total funding of ECHO has increased from €631 to €884
million. In 2009, €571 million were spent for humanitar-
ian aid, €280 million for food aid, €34 million for disas-
ter preparedness and €9 million for support expenditure.
46 Papa Seck: “Links between Natural Disasters, Humani-
tarian Assistance and Disaster Risk Reduction: A Criti-
cal Perspective”, in: UNDP, Human Development
Report Office, Occasional paper on: Human Develop-
ment Report 2007/2008 - Fighting climate change:
Human solidarity in a divided world (New York:
UNDP); at: <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/
d0002903/Natural_disasters_HDR_UNDP_2007.pdf>.
47 In January 2010, the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change
Research has focused on ‘securities’ as one of four
research areas besides resilience, transitions and CIAS
(A Community Integrated Assessment System). Within
the context of securities these research topics are being
analysed: “a) Food, water and human security, b) Biofu-
els: food security, energy, and equity implications, c)
Food security, agriculture, fisheries and nutrition, d)
Human security in the face of climate change and
other stresses: health, migration and conflict, e)
Implications of climate change extreme events for
individual resilience and behavioural responses, f) Water
security: Adaptation strategies for river basins and water
infrastructure.” See the overview and details at: <http://
www.tyndall.ac.uk/research/transition-period/securities>.
48 See for details at: <http://clisec.zmaw.de/Contact.850.0.
html>.
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differs from ‘old geopolitics’ and that suggests to in-
troduce the political and especially the security di-
mension into this new research agenda building on
the ‘theory or securitization’ (Wæver 1995, 2008; Bu-
zan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998, 2004) that focuses on is-
sues of ‘utmost importance’ that require ‘extraordi-
nary means’. This new research approach suggests
introducing both the environmental dimension and
especially global environmental change issues into
spatial policy and strategic considerations and a polit-
ical dimension and a security perspective into earth
system analysis and science in the natural sciences. 
1.5 Horizontal Cooperation Among 
Ministries and International 
Organizations on GEC, Security 
and Disasters 
While multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary cooperation
among scientists has not been easy, the cooperation
has often been difficult between organized civil soci-
ety and the state, as well as the vertical cooperation
between local, state and federal governments and the
horizontal cooperation among different units within a
ministry, and even more difficult is the collaboration
among ministries and on the international level
among international organizations.
Issues of GEC, security and disasters are not only
an object of intensive scientific analysis by and among
the three communities reviewed above by many gov-
ernment agencies and international organizations, but
they have also become key issues of debate and con-
troversy between organized civil society, including
business organizations and the states on the national
level as well as among transnational state-centred and
non-governmental organizations. In the realm of inter-
national environment policy, several regimes – most
prominently the climate regime – have evolved where
these three key actors, the representatives of interna-
tional society, and of the business community are con-
tinuously focusing their activities to influence the
positions of their respective governments and to sup-
port or oppose the outcome of international negotia-
tion processes, most recently at COP 15 of the UN-
FCCC in Copenhagen in December 2009. Thus, the
activities of the state negotiators always focus simulta-
neously on the international but also on the national
level to reflect the competing and often opposite in-
terests of the business community, of social move-
ments and social organizations, as well as of the spe-
cific interests of powerful lobby groups and
international NGOs.
Global environmental change and especially cli-
mate change issues have not only been the exclusive
interest of the nation state at the national level, but
also of the state, municipal and local governments.
They have played a crucial role in the process of
agenda setting and policy formulation and implemen-
tation. The specific role and influence of the states
and municipalities depends on the governmental sys-
tem and whether a centralized or a federal system of
government exists where certain competences are
shared between the federal government and the
states. But any impact of extreme weather events and
natural hazards must first be addressed at the local
and municipal level.
Horizontal cooperation among national or state
ministries among the DGs of the European Union
with shared competences with national ministries and
implementation agencies as well as international
organizations and agencies have often been subopti-
mal due to competing and conflicting competencies
and ‘turf conflicts’. Nevertheless, reactive and proac-
tive policies as well as decisions on issues of global
environmental change and in particular on climate
change require multi-sectoral approaches that always
involve many ministries, DGs, or international organi-
zations (table 1.2).
1.6 Key Questions and Structure of 
the Book
In the five preface essays above the Nobel Laureate in
atmospheric chemistry, Paul C. Crutzen (the Nether-
lands), introduces the ‘Anthropocene’ as the new era
in the geology of humankind that is influenced by the
direct and increasing human interventions into the
processes of the Earth system. Jayantha Dhanapala
(President, Pugwash Conferences on Science and
World Affairs, former UN Under Secretary General
for Disarmament) in the second essay suggests: “Con-
necting Inconvenient Truths: Urgency of Nuclear Dis-
armament in a World of Pressing Problems”. In the
next essay Ulrich Beck (Professor em. University of
Munich and LSE) reflects on “Living in and coping
with the world risk society”. Hania Zlotnik (Director,
UN Populations Division, UN, New York from Mex-
ico) gives an overview on global “trends of population
growth, urbanization and migration until 2050”. In a
co-authored essay eight authors from the Potsdam In-
stitute of Climate Change Research (PIK), Christoph
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Table 1.2: Different competencies and responsibilities of state and international bodies on security, natural hazards and
global environmental change issues. Source: Developed by the authors. 




• External (diplomacy 
and the military)
• Civil defence, protection and 
infrastructure
• Humanitarian search and rescue, 
reconstruction, 
disaster relief










• Local and municipal government
• NGOs: firefighters, catastrophe 
protection, Red Cross and other 
humanitarian NGOs
• Social movements
• Local government units and offi-
cials
• Units of municipalities: imple-
mentation level of state and fed-
eral laws NGOs
• Social movements
• Professionals checking the imple-
mentation of legal norms
Nation state
(federal or central 
government)
• Ministry of Interior 
(national, federal 
police, intelligence)
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
• Ministry of Defence
• -Subsidiary units of ministries of 
interior responsible for civil pro-
tection
• Ministry of Interior or
• Ministry of Defence
• Ministries of environment, devel-






• DG External affairs
• DG Environment 
• DG Development (ECHO)
• DG External Relations
• DG Development
• DG Environment
• DG External Relations
• DG for Climate Policy
International/
regional
• OSCE, AU, OAS,AL
• NATO and other mil-
itary alliances
• UN-OCHA, UNDP, UNEP, World 
Bank
• UN/ISDR
• International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent 
• Humanitarian NGOs 
• OSCE, basket II
• OAS, 
• NAFTA (CEC, BECC)a)
• AL (Council of Arab Environmen-
tal Affairs Ministers) 
• AU (African Ministerial Confer-
ence on the Environment)
International/
global
• UN (SC, MSC), GA
• UN SG
• NATO
• UN/ISDR, UN-OCHA • UN (SC, GA, GS, ECOSOC)
• UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, 
Germany
• UNCCD Secretariat in Bonn, Ger-
many












• Hyogo Framework of Action 
(recommen-dations)
• EU (directives, regulations, deci-
sions and recommendations on 
civil protection)
• UN/ISDR guidelines and recom-
mendations
• International environmental law: 
treaties & conventions (UNCBD, 
UNFCCC, with legally binding 
Kyoto Protocol and successor 
regime)
a) CEC = Commission for Environmental Cooperation; BECC = Border Environment Cooperation Commission of NAFTA
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Müller, Hermann Lotze-Campen, Veronika Huber,
Alexander Popp (all from Germany), Anastasia Svire-
jeva-Hopkins (from Canada and Russia), Michael
Krause and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber (Professor
and Director of PIK, both from Germany), raise the
issue of steps “Towards a great land-use transforma-
tion?” 
The book is structured in ten parts, of which the
first develops the key concepts of security threats,
challenges, vulnerabilities and risks (1.6.1), while the
second reviews the more narrow military and political
hard and soft security dangers and concerns (1.6.2).
The third assesses economic, social, environmental se-
curity and human threats, challenges, vulnerabilities
and risks in the Mediterranean, in Central Asia and
China (1.6.3) and the fourth focuses on the threats,
challenges, vulnerabilities and risks for urban centres
in hazards and disasters (1.6.4). The fifth part ad-
dresses different approaches to coping with global en-
vironmental change: climate change, soil and desertifi-
cation as well as with water management, food and
health issues (1.6.5). The sixth part shifts the analytical
focus to coping with hazards and strategies for ad-
dressing social vulnerability and resilience building
(1.6.6), while the seventh reviews different modes for
coping with GEC as well as scientific and interna-
tional and regional political strategies, policies and
measures (1.6.7). The remaining three parts focus on
vulnerability mapping and indicators of environmen-
tal security issues (1.6.8.), discuss moves towards an
improved early warning of conflicts and hazards
(1.6.9) and offer both conceptual and policy oriented
conclusions for moving from knowledge to action
(1.6.10).
1.6.1 Concepts of Security Threats, 
Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks 
Of the next four chapters three offer a conceptualiza-
tion of the four key concepts of threats, challenges,
vulnerabilities and risks. From a political science per-
spective in chapter 2 Hans Günter Brauch (Adj. Profes-
sor (PD), Free University of Berlin, Germany) reviews
the conceptual evolution and use by different scientific
communities and in the areas of security, global environ-
mental change and natural hazards of the four key “Con-
cepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and
Risks.” In chapter 3, Omar Darío Cardona A. (Profes-
sor, Centre of Studies on Disasters and Risks, Univer-
sity of Los Andes, Colombia) analyses “Disaster Risk
and Vulnerability: Concepts and Measurement of Hu-
man and Environmental Insecurity” from the vantage
point of a civil engineer, while Czeslaw Mesjasz (As-
soc. Professor, Economic University Cracow, Poland)
develops the linkages between “Economic Vulnerabil-
ity and Economic Security” in chapter 4. Finally, in
chapter 5: Lidia Mesjasz (Assistant Professor, Eco-
nomic University Cracow, Poland) discusses in an eco-
nomic case study problems of “Debt Relief, Eco-
nomic Growth and Poverty Reduction in Low-Income
Countries”.
1.6.2 Military and Political Security Threats, 
Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks 
In the second part, fifteen chapters offer a conceptual
mapping of the four key terms used in this book for
the military and political security realm. The first six
chapters address security conceptualizations in Eu-
rope or specific European security issues and of
NATO, this is followed by four chapters focusing on
Russia, the United States and China, two on the Mid-
dle East and two on Africa.
Chapter 6 starts with an analysis by Ambassador
Alyson J.K. Bailes (Visiting professor, University of
Iceland, Reykjavik from the United Kingdom) and the
former director, of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) on “Security threats, chal-
lenges, vulnerabilities and risks in the evolution and
implementation of the European Security Strategy”
from 2003 up to the adoption of the implementation
paper in December 2008. In chapter 7, Pál Dunay
(Faculty member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy,
Geneva from Hungary) reviews the “NATO’s tradi-
tional security problems”. In chapter 8, Eduard Soler
i Lecha (Coordinador del Programa Mediterráneo,
Fundación CIDOB, Barcelona, Spain) focuses on “Eu-
ropean Responses to Security Threats in the Mediter-
ranean in the Early 21st Century”. In chapter 9, Mus-
tafa Aydin (Rector, Kadir Has University, Istanbul,
Turkey) and Asli Toksabay Esen (research associate,
Economic Policy Research Institute of Turkey
(TEPAV), Ankara, Turkey) discuss “Inside/outside:
Turkey’s security dilemmas and priorities in the early
21
st century”. In chapter 10, Omar Serrano (Ph.D.
candidate, Graduate Institute of International and De-
velopment Studies, Geneva from Mexico and Switzer-
land) provides a quantitative analysis of “Promoting
democracy as a security goal. The inward/outward
paradox of the EU’s foreign policy”; and in chapter 11,
Vilho Harle (Professor, University of Tampere, Fin-
land) and Sami Moisi (Docent at the Academy of Fin-
land; senior research fellow, University of Turku, Fin-
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land) offer a critical assessment of the “Rhetoric of
military and other security challenges in Finland”.
In chapter 12 Alexander Sergunin (Professor, St.
Petersburg State University, Russia) assesses the
“Changes in the Perception of Military Threats, Chal-
lenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks in Russia (1991–
2008)”, while Pál Dunay reviews in chapter 13 from
the outside “Russian security policy in the 21st century
based on the experiences of its first decade”. This is
followed in chapter 14 by a critical review by Hans
Günter Brauch of the: “Security Threats, Challenges,
Vulnerabilities and Risks in US National Security Doc-
uments (1990–2010)” that covers the two decades
since the end of the Cold War of the US administra-
tions of George Bush (1989–1993), William J. Clinton
(1993–2001), George W. Bush (2001–2009) and
Barack Obama (since 2009). This section concludes
in chapter 15 with an essay by Zhongqin Zhao (Brig.
General, Associate Professor, Military Academy,
Shijiazhuang, China) on the “Non-traditional security
and the new concept of security of China”.
The third section shifts the focus on the Middle
East and on West Africa. In chapter 16, Gamal Selim
(PhD candidate, University of Calgary, Canada from
Egypt) assesses the “Perceptions of hard security is-
sues in the Arab world”, while in chapter 17, Mo-
hamed El-Sayed Selim (Professor, Kuwait University
from Egypt) analyses the: “Arab perceptions of soft se-
curity issues”. 
In the last two chapters on West Africa, Kwesi
Aning (Head, Conflict Prevention Department, Kofi
Annan Center, Accra, Ghana) and Andrews Atta-Asa-
moah (Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Nairobi, Kenya from Ghana) analyse in chapter 18:
“Military challenges and threats in West Africa”, while
John Emeka Akude (Lecturer, Research Fellow, Uni-
versity of Cologne, Germany from Nigeria) gives in
chapter 19 a theoretically-based empirical analysis on
“Weak sates and security threats in West Africa”.
1.6.3 Environmental and Human Security 
Dangers in the Near East and Three 
Regional Prospects until 2020 and 2050 
This third part consists of nine chapters that are
organized in two sections, whereof in the first part
authors from Tunisia, Palestine and Israel address
environmental and human security dangers in the
Middle East and North Africa, and in the second sec-
tion three chapters deal with regional environmental
security prospects until 2020 and 2050 and potential
impacts that may create instability and conflicts. 
In chapter 20, Bechir Chourou (Director, Univer-
sity of Tunis-Carthage, and Professor of International
Relations from Tunisia who taught in the United
States, Europe and Tunisia) discusses multiple “Envi-
ronmental challenges and risks in North Africa”; in
chapter 21: Bassam Ossama Hayek (Director, Eco-
tech Park, Royal Scientific Society (RSS)., Royal Sci-
entific Society, Amman, Jordan) and Nisreen Daifal-
lah Al Hmoud (Researcher, Environmental Research
Centre (RSS), Jordan) analyse: “Water degradation as
a human security challenge in Jordan”; and in chapter
22: Marwan Haddad (Professor, Nablus University,
Palestine) assesses: “Water scarcity and degradation in
Palestine as challenges, vulnerabilities and risks for
environmental security”. 
The next two chapters provide two distinct analy-
ses on climate change impacts from a Palestinian and
Israeli perspective. In chapter 23, Hilmi S. Salem
(Research Professor and Director General, Applied
Sciences and Engineering Research Centers, Palestine
Technical University Kadoorie, Palestine) discusses
“Social, environmental, and security impacts of cli-
mate change on the Eastern Mediterranean”; while in
chapter 24 Arie Issar (Professor em., Ben Gurion Uni-
versity, Beer Sheva, Israel) develops his own concept
of “Progressive development of the water resources of
Israel and Palestine to mitigate the negative impact of
global warming”. This section concludes with chapter
25 by Mohamed Dajani Daoudi (Professor and direc-
tor of America Institute, Al Quds University, Jerusa-
lem) and Ashraf M. Dajani (Ph. D. Candidate, Euro-
pean University Institute, Florence, Italy from
Palestine) on: “Jerusalem: Where To? In search for
hidden opportunities”, in which both authors discuss
proposals by Christians, Jews and Muslims and de-
velop their own concept of a sustainable conflict res-
olution for solving the highly disputed Jerusalem ques-
tion.
In chapter 26, Hans Günter Brauch, discusses
“Human and Environmental Security Challenges
Posed by Global Environmental and Climate Change
for the Mediterranean”, while Ernst Giese (Professor
emeritus, University of Giessen, Germany) and Jenni-
fer Sehring (Assistant professor, University of Würz-
burg, Germany) assess in chapter 27 the impacts of
“Global environmental change and conflict potential
in Central Asia” and in chapter 28: Thomas Heberer
(Professor, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany) and
Anja Senz (Lecturer, University of Duisburg-Essen)
analyse the “Impact of environmental change on sta-
bility and conflict potentials in China”.
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1.6.4 Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and 
Risks for Urban Centres in Hazards and 
Disasters
In part IV the introductory chapter 29 by Mark Pel-
ling (Reader, King’s College, London, UK) offers a
conceptual introduction on “The vulnerability of cit-
ies to disasters and climate change: A conceptual
framework”. In chapter 30 Fabien Nathan (Project
Manager at Sogreah Consultants in Echirolles,
France), discusses “Vulnerability to natural hazards:
case study on landslide risks in La Paz”. In chapter 31:
Mabel-Cristina Marulanda (Technical University of
Catalonia (UPC), Barcelona, Spain from Colombia),
Omar Darío Cardona A. (Colombia) and Alex H. Bar-
bat (Professor, UPC, Barcelona, Spain) in a case study
on Latin America are “Revealing the impact of small
disasters to the economic and social development”;
while in chapter 32: Carmen Lacambra (PhD candi-
date, University of Cambridge, UK from Colombia)
and Kaveh Zahedi (Climate Change Coordinator at
UNEP from the UK) analyse: “Climate change, natu-
ral hazards and coastal ecosystems in Latin America:
A framework for analysis”.
In chapter 33 Monalisa Chatterjee, (PhD candi-
date, Rutgers University, USA from India) addresses
the: “Flood loss redistribution in a Third World mega-
city: The case of Mumbai”; while in chapter 34: Reena
Singh (Research associate, University of Cologne,
Germany from India) focuses on: “Coping with water-
and wastewater-related risks in the megacity Delhi”;
and in chapter 35: Nanda Kishor (Doctoral Fellow,
University of Hyderabad, India) offers a critical
discussion on: “Politics of displacement and vulner-
ability”.
In chapter 36 by Xiaomeng Shen (Associate aca-
demic officer, United Nations University Institute for
Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) Bonn,
Germany from China) focuses on “Linking Oriental
and Western thinking to mitigate flood risk compar-
ing risk perceptions of floods: The cases of Beijing
and Bonn”. In the next two chapters on hazards in
Istanbul, Sidika Tekeli-Yesil (Research assistant, Insti-
tute of Social and Preventive Medicine, Swiss Tropical
Institute in Basel, Switzerland from Turkey) analyses
in chapter 37 the “Preparation for an Earthquake in
the megacity Istanbul”; while in chapter 38 Ebru
Gencer (Consultant at ARC and a member of the ISO-
CARP Urban Planning Advisory Team for Haiti and
Chile) reviews: “Risk management strategies for the
predicted earthquake hazard in Istanbul”. Finally, in
chapter 39: Adeniyi Sulaiman Gbadegesin (Professor,
University of Ibadan, Nigeria); Felix Olorunfemi
(Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of Social and
Economic Research (NISER), Ibadan, Nigeria) and
Usman Adebimpe Raheem (Lecturer, University of
Ilorin, Nigeria) assess the “Urban vulnerability to cli-
mate change and natural hazards in Nigeria”. 
1.6.5 Coping with Global Environmental 
Change: Climate Change, 
Desertification, Water Management, 
Food and Health 
This part is organized in five sections and includes 28
chapters. First, in chapter 40 Debarati Guha-Sapir
(Director, WHO Collaborating Centre for Research
on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and Profes-
sor, University of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium) and
Femke Vos (Researcher, CRED, University of Lou-
vain, Brussels from the Netherlands and Belgium)
offer a statistical overview on “Quantifying global
environmental change impacts: methods, criteria and
definitions for compiling data on hydro-meteorologi-
cal disasters”. The following five sections deal with
the coping activities and efforts with regard to climate
change (section A with chapters 41 to 46), to soil and
desertification (section B with chapters 47 to 55),
water management (section C with chapters 56–60),
food (section D with chapters 61 to 65) and health
(section E with chapters 66 to 67).
In section A on climate change, Stefan Bauer (Sen-
ior researcher, German Development Institute, Bonn;
research assistant, German Advisory Council on Glo-
bal Change (WBGU), Berlin, Germany) in chapter 41
addresses “Stormy weather: International security in
the shadow of climate change”. In chapter 42 Jürgen
Scheffran (Professor, Hamburg University, Germany)
offers a theoretical analysis on: “Security risks of cli-
mate change: vulnerabilities, threats, conflicts and
strategies”, while Anders Jägersköp (Programme
Director, Stockholm International Water Institute
(SIWI), Stockholm, Sweden) in chapter 43 discusses:
“New threats? Risk and securitization theory on cli-
mate change and water”. 
The next two chapters focus on the Nile River and
the Nile Basin. In chapter 44 a team of nine authors
consisting of Carlo Buontempo (Senior scientist, Met
Office Hadley Centre, UK from Italy), Jens Kristian
Lørup (DHI, Denmark), Mamdouh A. Antar (Man-
ager, Nile Forecast Centre, Ministry of Water Re-
sources and Irrigation, Planning Sector, Cairo, Egypt),
Michael Sanderso (Senior climate consultant, Met Of-
fice Hadley Centre, UK), Michael Butts (Head, Inno-
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vation for Water Resources and Environmental Man-
agement, DHI, Denmark from New Zealand), Erika
Palin (Climate change consultant, Met Office Hadley
Centre, UK), Rachel McCarthy (Climate change con-
sultant, Met Office Hadley Centre, UK), Richard
Jones (Manager, regional climate predictions, Met Of-
fice Hadley Centre, UK) and Richard Betts (Head, cli-
mate impacts, Met Office Hadley Centre, UK) are
“Dealing with uncertainties in climate change impacts
assessments: A case study on the Nile Basin”, Mo-
hammed El Raey (Professor em., University of Alex-
andria, Egypt) in chapter 45 gives an empirical analysis
of: “Mapping areas affected by sea-level rise due to cli-
mate change in the Nile Delta until 2100”. Finally, in
chapter 46 Hans Jürgen Boehmer (Senior research sci-
entist and managing director, Interdisciplinary Latin
America Center (ILZ), University of Bonn, Germany)
analyses the “Vulnerability of tropical montane rain
forest ecosystems due to climate change”.
In section B on issues of soil degradation, drought
and desertification in drylands nine chapters address
a wide area of themes that are related to environmen-
tal security issues. In chapter 47, Hans Guenter
Brauch and Úrsula Oswald Spring introduce into the
theme of “Securitizing land degradation and desertifi-
cation: A proactive soil security concept”. In chapter
48 Uri Safriel (Professor, Hebrew Universty, Jerusa-
lem, Israel) analyses: “Alternative livelihoods for at-
taining sustainability and security in drylands”, while
in chapter 49 Adeel Zafer (Director, UNU’s Institute
on Water, Environment and Health, Hamilton, Can-
ada from Pakistan): addresses “Societal vulnerability
to desertification and policy response options”. In
chapter 50, Ismail Abd El Galil Hussein (Chairman,
Desert Research Centre, Cairo, Egypt): provides an
overview of the “Desertification process in Egypt”. In
chapter 51, Tulio Arredondo Moreno (Researcher, Di-
vision Ciencias Ambientales (IPICYT), San Luís Po-
tosí, Mexico) and Elisabeth Huber-Sannwald (Re-
searcher, IPICYT, San Luís Potosí, Mexico from
Austria) discuss the “Impacts of drought on agricul-
ture in Northern Mexico”. In chapter 52 Pietro Laure-
ano (President, Research Centre on Local and Tradi-
tional Knowledge (IPOGEA), Florence, Italy) reviews
the “Traditional knowledge in coping with desertifica-
tion”.
The next three chapters address problems of de-
sertification in drylands in the Sahara, of agriculture
in drylands in Almería and of impacts of climate
change on desertification in Murcia in Spain. Chapter
53 that is co-authored by Monique Mainguet
(Professor em., University of Reims Champagne Ar-
denne, France), Frederic Dumay (Research engineer,
University of Reims Champagne Ardenne, France),
Lahcen Kabiri (Professor, Moulay Ismaïl University,
Meknes, Morocco) and Boualem Rémini (Professor,
Blida University, Algeria) offer an analysis of
“Prodromes of desertification in the Oasis of Tafilalet
(Morocco) and specific local solutions”. In chapter 54
Andrés Miguel García Lorca (Professor, University of
Almería, Spain) reviews the “Agriculture in drylands:
Experience in Almería”; while in chapter 55 Francisco
López-Bermúdez (Professor, University of Murcia,
Spain), Jorge García Gómez (Agronomic engineer,
Eurovertice Consultants S.L., Murcia, Spain), Juan
Manuel Quiñonero Rubio (Ph.D. candidate, Univer-
sity of Murcia, Spain) analyse “Land-use changes, de-
sertification, and climate change impacts in South-
eastern Spain”.
In section C in five chapters authors from Sweden,
China, India, Bangladesh, Niger, Mauritania and Tu-
nisia analyse issues of water management with a spe-
cific focus on drylands. In chapter 56 Jacob Granit
(Project Director, Stockholm International Water In-
stitute (SIWI), Sweden) introduces into the topic by
“Reconsidering integrated water resources manage-
ment: Promoting economic growth and tackling envi-
ronmental stress”. In chapter 57: Zhanyi Gao (Direc-
tor, Department of Irrigation and Drainage, Institute
of Water Resources and Hydropower Research
(IWHR), and Director, National Centre for Efficient
Irrigation Technology Research, Beijing, PR China)
and Yaqiong Hu (Senior Engineer, IWHR and Natio-
nal Centre for Efficient Irrigation Technology Rese-
arch, Beijing, PR China) focus on “Coping with popu-
lation growth, climate change, water scarcity and
growing food demand in China in the 21st century”.
In chapter 58 Mohammed Rahman Zillur (PhD
candidate, The Australian National University (ANU)
from Bangladesh) and Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt (Fellow,
Australian National University, College of Asia and
the Pacific from India) offer an analysis on “Ensuring
water security in rural areas of Bangladesh under cli-
mate change and non-climatic drivers of change”,
while in chapter 59 Kanupria Harish (Project Direc-
tor, Jal Bhagirathi Foundation, Jodhpur, India) and
Mathews Mullackal (Head, Programme Develop-
ment Group, JBF, Jodhpur, India): discuss “Applying
bottom-up participatory strategies and traditional
methods of water harvesting in the Desert Thar,
Rajasthan”. Finally, in chapter 60: Abdelkader Dodo
(Hydrogeologist and manager, Iullemeden Aquifer
System (IAS) project, Sahara and Sahel Observatory
(OSS) Tunis from Niger), Mohamedou Ould Bab Sy
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(Hydrogeologist, OSS, Tunis from Mauritania) and
Jihad Channem (Special assistant to Executive Secre-
tary and communications officer, OSS, Tunis from
Tunisia) offer an overview on “Coping with water
scarcity in the Sahel: Assessing ground water
resources in the Western Sahel”. 
Section D on coping with food security issues
combines five chapters. In chapter 61 John Grin (Pro-
fessor, University of Amsterdam and until December
2009 scientific director, Amsterdam School for Social
Science Research, the Netherlands) and Esther Mari-
jnen (BSC student, University of Amsterdam) discuss
“Global threats, Global changes and connected com-
munities in the global agrofood system” and in chap-
ter 62 Úrsula Oswald Spring deals with “Genetically
modified organisms: A threat for food security and a
risk for food sovereignty and survival”.
utive Secretary, Comité Permanent inter Etats de
Lutte Contre Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS) from
Burkina Faso) gives an overview on “Natural disasters
and major challenges towards achieving food security
in the Sahel: The experience of CILSS”, while in chap-
ter 64 Sreeja Nair (Research associate, Center for
Global Environment Research, TERI, New Delhi, In-
dia) focuses on “Responding to climate variability and
change under a multi-level governance framework”. Fi-
nally, in chapter 65 Cecilia Conde (Senior Researcher,
Centro de Ciencias de la Atmósfera, UNAM, Mexico
City, Mexico) addresses “Coping with climate change
impacts on coffee and maize for peasants in Mexico.” 
In section E on coping with health security issues
in chapter 66: Fátima Flores Palacios (Research
Professor, UNAM, Cuernavaca, Mexico) and Wolfgang
Wagner (Professor, University of Linz, Austria) address
“The Impact of AIDS on women’s social life in a Mex-
ican rural community”, while in chapter 67: Tanja Wolf
(WHO Regional Office Europe, Rome, Italy from
Germany), Glenn McGregor (Director, School of En-
vironment, University of Auckland, New Zealand
from UK) and Anna Paldy (Deputy director, National
Institute of Environmental Health, Budapest, Hun-
gary) offer an “Integrated assessment of vulnerability
to heat stress in urban areas”.
1.6.6 Coping with Hazards and Strategies for 
Social Vulnerability and Resilience 
Building
This part combines five chapters by authors from Ger-
many, France, Guatemala, the United States and Mex-
ico that are or were recently working for or connected
to the United Nations University’s Institute on the
Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) in
Bonn (Germany). In chapter 68 Jörn Birkmann (Aca-
demic officer, head, vulnerability assessment section,
UNU-EHS from Germany) offers a theory-guided
analysis on: “Regulation and coupling of society and
nature in the context of natural hazards”. In chapter
69: K. Marre (Former academic officer, UNU-EHS)
and Fabrice Renaud (Acting director, head,
environmental assessment and resource vulnerability
section, UNU-EHS from France) provide an empirical
analysis of “Differentials in impacts and recovery in
the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami:
local examples at different scales in Sri Lanka”. Juan
Carlos de Villagrán (Programme officer, UN-SPIDER
Programme, UNOOSA, United Nations Office Vi-
enna, Austria; former academic officer and head, risk
management section, UNU-EHS, Bonn, Germany
from Guatemala) in chapter 70 addresses: “Risks in
Central America: Bringing them under control”; while
in chapter 71 Koko Warner (Academic officer, head,
environmental migration, social vulnerability and ad-
aptation section, UNU-EHS from the USA), discusses
“Economics and social vulnerability: Dynamics of en-
titlement and access”. Finally, in chapter 72 Úrsula
Oswald Spring (first chair holder, MRF chair on so-
cial vulnerability, UNU-EHS from Mexico) offers a
critical discussion on “Social vulnerability, discrimina-
tion and resilience-building in disaster risk reduction”.
1.6.7 Coping with Global Environmental 
Change: Scientific International and 
Regional Political Strategies, Policies 
and Measures
This part includes 16 chapters that address in three
sections the scientific research goals (section A, chap-
ters 73 to 78) and strategies for coping with GEC,
especially the global (section B, chapters 79 to 82) and
regional (section C, chapters 83 to 86) and national
(section C, chapters 87 to 89) strategies, policies and
measures for coping with climate change. 
Section A on scientific research goals and strate-
gies for coping with GEC starts with chapter 73 by
Gordon McBean (Professor and director of policy
studies, Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction,
University of Western Ontario, London, Canada) on
“Coping with global environmental change – Need
for an interdisciplinary, integrated approach”. 
The next five chapters provide an overview on the
international GEC scientific programmes. In chapter
74 Rik Leemans (Professor, Wageningen University;
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director, WIMEK graduate school; chair, Earth Sys-
tem Science Partnership (ESSP), the Netherlands),
Martin Rice (ESSP, Paris from UK, PhD Student at
Sydney University, Australia), Ann Henderson-Sellers
(Professor, Macquarie University, ARC Professorial
Research Fellow, Climate Risk Concentration of
Research; former director, World Climate Research
Programme (WCRP), Australia) and Kevin Noone
(Professor, Department of Applied Environmental Sci-
ence and Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm
University; Director, Global Environmental Change
Secretariat, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Stockholm, Sweden from the USA) summarize and
assess the “Research agenda and policy input of the
Earth System Science Partnership for coping with glo-
bal environmental change”. 
In chapter 75 Louise von Falkenhayn (former Ac-
ademic Officer, International Human Dimensions
Programme on Global Environmental Change
(IHDP) from Australia), Andreas Rechkemmer
(Lecturer, University of Cologne and Guest professor
Beijing Normal University; former Executive Director,
IHDP, from Germany) and Oran R. Young (Profes-
sor, Bren School of Environmental Science and Man-
agement, University of California, Santa Barbara,
USA; chair, Scientific Committee, IHDP) give an over-
view on the activities of “The International Human Di-
mensions Programme on Global Environmental
Change: Taking stock and moving forward”. 
In chapter 76 Bruno A. Walther (Visiting assistant
professor, Taipei Medical University Taipei, Taiwan;
former science officer, Diversitas from Germany),
Anne Larigauderie (Executive director, Diversitas,
Paris from France) and Michel Loreau (Professor,
McGill University, Montreal, Canada; chairman,
Scientific Steering Committee, Diversitas from Can-
ada) review the activities of “DIVERSITAS: Biodiver-
sity science integrating research and policy for human
wellbeing”. 
In chapter 77 Kevin J. Noone (Professor, Depart-
ment of Applied Environmental Science and Stock-
holm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University; Direc-
tor, Global Environmental Change Secretariat, Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences), Carlos Nobre (Direc-
tor, Centro de Previsão de Tempo e Estudos Climáti-
cos – CPTEC, Brazil; chairman, Scientific Steering
Committee, IGBP from Brazil) and Sybil Seitzinger
(Executive Director of the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme from the USA) assess the “Sci-
entific research agenda of the International Geo-
sphere-Biosphere Programme: Coping with global en-
vironmental change”. 
Finally, in chapter 78: John A. Church (Professor,
CSIRO, Centre for Australian Weather and Climate
Research, Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooper-
ative Research Centre; director, World Climate Re-
search Programme (WCRP) from Australia), Ghassem
R. Asrar (Director, WCRP’s Joint Planning Staff from
the USA), Antonio J. Busalacchi (Professor and direc-
tor Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center (ES-
SIC), University of Maryland, USA; Chair, Joint Scien-
tific Committee, WCRP from the USA) and Carolin
E. Arndt (Programme officer, IPCC Secretariat; scien-
tific consultant, WCRP’s Joint Planning Staff from
Germany) analyse the “Climate information for cop-
ing with environmental change: Contributions of the
World Climate Research Programme”.
In section B four chapters (79 to 82) review global
strategies, policies and measures for coping with cli-
mate change focusing on the activities of the IPCC, of
UNESCO and UNDP. In chapter 79: Martin Parry
(Professor, Imperial College, University of London;
former Co-Chair, Working Group II, IPCC, FAR from
the UK), Osvaldo Canziani (Professor, University of
Buenos Aires, University of Asunción and La Molina;
former Co-Chair, Working Group II, IPCC, FAR from
Argentina), Jean Palutikof (Professor, Griffith Univer-
sity, Queensland, Australia; former staff director,
Working Group II, IPCC, FAR from the UK) and
Clair Hanson (Senior research associate, University of
East Anglia, UK; former deputy head, IPCC Technical
Support Unit, UK Met Office, Working Group II,
IPCC, FAR from the UK) summarize the “Key IPCC
conclusions on climate change impacts and adapta-
tions”. In chapter 80 Peter Bosch (Former coordinator
and editor, Working Group III, IPCC, AR4 from the
Netherlands) and Bert Metz (Former co-chairman
(1997–2008), Working Group III, IPCC, AR4 from the
Netherlands) offer an overview on the “Options for
mitigating climate change results of IPCC working
group III of the Fourth Assessment Report of the
IPCC”.
In chapter 81 Walter Erdelen (Assistant Director-
General for Natural Sciences, UNESCO since 2001
from Germany) and Badaoui Rouhban (Director, Sec-
tion, Disaster Reduction, Natural Sciences Sector,
UNESCO from Lebanon) review and analyse “Global
climate change, natural hazards and the environment:
an overview of UNESCO’s activities”. Finally, in chap-
ter 82 Yannick Glemarec (Executive coordinator,
UNDP’s Global Environment Facility from France),
Veerle Vandeweerd (Director, Environment and En-
ergy Group, UNDP from Belgium) and Vivienne Ca-
ballero (Programme officer, UNDP-UNEP Poverty
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and Environment Initiative, Regional Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean; former climate change
programme specialist, Environment and Energy
Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP from
Colombia) give an overview on the “Climate Change
and Development: UNDP’s Approach to Helping
Countries Build a New Paradigm”.
In section C four chapters (83 to 86) discuss re-
gional strategies, policies and measures for coping
with climate change. In chapter 83: Christian Egen-
hofer (Senior Fellow, Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS) from Germany), Arno Behrens (Re-
search Fellow, CEPS from Germany) and Anton Geor-
giev (Researcher, CEPS from Bulgaria) review “EU
strategies for coping with global environmental
change: Perspective beyond 2012”. In chapter 84 Paul
Harris (Lingnan University, Hong Kong) assesses ef-
forts for “Coping with climate change in East Asia:
Vulnerabilities and responsibilities”. In chapter 85
Ricardo Zapata-Marti (CEPAL from Chile) reviews
and discusses “Strategies for coping with climate
change in Latin America: Perspective beyond 2012”.
In chapter 86 Ariel Macaspac Penetrante (a coordina-
tor of the programme of international negotiation
processes at IISA from Germany) discusses “Politics
of Equity and Justice in Climate Change Negotiations
in North-South Relations”.
In section D three chapters (87 to 89) review dif-
ferent national perspectives of the USA, China and Ja-
pan. In chapter 87 Yu Hongyuan (Assoc. Professor,
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, PR
China) and Paul J. Smith (Assoc. Professor, US Naval
War College, Newport, Rhode Island) analyse the pol-
icies of “Climate change: Long-term security implica-
tions for China and the international community”. In
chapter 88 Hiroshi Ohta (Professor, Waseda Univer-
sity, Japan) offers an overview on the “Japanese cli-
mate change policy: Moving beyond the Kyoto Proc-
ess”. Finally, in chapter 89 Narichika Kanie (Assoc.
Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Department
of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of
Decision Science and Technology) Hiromi Nishimoto
(Ph.D. student, Graduate School of Global Environ-
mental Studies, Kyoto University), Yasuaki Hijioka
(Senior Researcher of the National Institute of Envi-
ronmental Studies in Japan), and Yasuko Kameyama
(Senior Researcher, National Institute for Environ-
mental Studies) analyse the evolution “Implications of
Equity Consideration and Emission Reduction Tar-
gets: Lessons from the Case of Japan’s Mid-Term Tar-
get”.
1.6.8 Vulnerability Mapping and 
Environmental Security Indicators 
The following two chapters introduce two technical
tools into the environmental security analysis, remote
sensing and indicators. In chapter 90 Juan M.
Quiñonero-Rubio (PhD candidate, University of Mur-
cia; researcher, Technical University of Cartagena,
Spain), Francisco López-Bermúdez (Professor, Univer-
sity of Murcia), Francisco Alonso-Sarría (Research as-
sociate, Institute of Water and Environment (INU-
AMA), University of Murcia) and Francisco J.
Gomariz-Castillo (Lecturer, University of Murcia; sub-
director, INUAMA) offer an empirical analysis on:
“Land use and flood risk changes in coastal areas in
South-eastern Spain”. From an economic perspective
in chapter 91 Jochen Jesinghaus (Economist and engi-
neer, European Commission, Joint Research Centre
(JRC), Ispra, Italy from Germany) suggests in a
conceptual analysis “Monitoring conflict risk: The
contribution of globally used indicator systems”.
1.6.9 Improved Early Warning of Conflicts and 
Hazards
These two chapters address improved early warning
of conflicts and hazards that represent different re-
search communities that have so far hardly interacted
although in many so-called ‘complex emergencies’
natural hazards have impacted on conflict prone re-
gions, as the case of the December 2004 tsunami has
shown for Sri Lanka where the conflict intensified af-
ter the tsunami while it was resolved in the case of the
Aceh province in Sumatra (Indonesia) with the assist-
ance of an outside mediator.49 In chapter 92 Patrick
Meier (Doctoral research fellow, Harvard Humani-
tarian Initiative (HHI), Harvard University; PhD can-
didate, Fletcher School, Tufts University, USA) analy-
ses “Networking disaster and conflict early warning in
responses to climate change” in a case study on CE-
WARN in East Africa, while in chapter 93 Juan Carlos
Villagrán de León offers a “Vulnerability assessment
in Sri Lanka and the context of tsunami early warn-
ing”.
49 See the poster by Úrsula Oswald Spring and Hans Gün-
ter Brauch: "Mainstreaming Early Warning of Hazards
and Conflicts", presented at the Third International
Conference on Early Warning (EWC III): From Concept to
Action, Bonn, Germany, 27–29 March 2006; at: <http://
www.afes-press.de/pdf/Brauch_Oswald,%20final. pdf>.
00_GEC_Hex5.book  Seite 59  Freitag, 1. Oktober 2010  12:32 12
60 Hans Günter Brauch and Úrsula Oswald Spring
1.6.10 Summary and Conclusions
In chapter 94 Hans Günter Brauch, Simon Dalby (Pro-
fessor, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada) and Úr-
sula Oswald Spring develop a new policy-focused
“Political geoecology for the Anthropocene” and fi-
nally in chapter 95 Hans Günter Brauch and Úrsula
Oswald Spring suggest in the concluding chapter for
“Coping with global environmental change: Sustaina-
bility revolution towards a sustainable peace”.
1.7 Concluding Remark 
These three volumes of this Global Environmental
and Human Security Handbook for the Anthro-
pocene (GEHSHA) offer a global mapping of the
manifold and diverse reconceptualizations of security
that have been triggered by the end of the Cold War,
the impact of the globalization process and by the
new dangers and concerns posed by multiple issues of
GEC for the security and survival of humankind, less
for the ‘top billion’ of the people in OECD countries
but especially for the rest of the world, most particu-
larly for those that were excluded from economic
growth since the end of World War II. The rethinking
of their political and ecological spokespersons mat-
ters and should not be ignored any longer during the
21
st century.
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82 Climate Change and Development: UNDP’s Approach to Helping 
Countries Build a New Paradigm
Veerle Vandeweerd, Yannick Glemarec and Vivienne Caballero
82.1 Introduction1
UNDP recognizes climate change as a key human de-
velopment issue. Without immediate action, climate
change will reverse decades of development achieve-
ments and undermine efforts to reach human security
and achieve the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). As the global development network of the
United Nations, UNDP’s goal is to align human devel-
opment and climate change responses through a coor-
dinated mix of policy and financial instruments. To
achieve this, UNDP is engaging in strategic partner-
ships to support the efforts of developing countries
and vulnerable groups to significantly scale up mitiga-
tion and adaptation action. Effective action is possible
and affordable (Stern 2006). The benefits of moving
towards less carbon intensive yet sustainable econo-
mies are likely to be immense, but so would be the
costs of inaction (UNDP HDR 2007/2008: 8). 
Calling for a new development paradigm that inte-
grates climate change into strategies and plans at all
levels, and that links the policy setting with the financ-
ing of solutions, UNDP is committed to enhance de-
velopment taking into account the rapid global envi-
ronmental changes in key ecosystems as well as in the
economic and financial sphere (box 82.1).
The future of global human security is directly de-
pendent on the success of the development measures
put in place today by the international community.
There is unprecedented scientific consensus that ur-
gent decisive action is required now. The daily life of
the poorest 40 per cent of the world’s population –
about 2.6 billion people – is already affected by cli-
mate change (UNDP HDR 2007/2008: 2). This seg-
ment of the population has contributed the least to
global warming and is likely to be the least resilient to
the impacts of climate change, such as worsening
floods, droughts, crop failures, and more intense and
frequent extreme weather events (IPCC 2007b: 373).
Cognizant of this critical global environmental
change issue and aware of the need for a new devel-
opment paradigm, UNDP is committed to empower-
ing countries to alleviate poverty while meeting the
challenges arising from a changing climate. In its role
as the United Nations’ global development network,
UNDP aims at aligning human development and cli-
mate change management efforts by promoting miti-
gation and adaptation activities that do not slow so-
cio-economic progress down but rather accelerate it. 
Although the majority of efforts to tackle climate
change have focused until now on reducing emissions
(Schipper/Cigarán/Mckenzie Hedger 2008: 134), it is
now clear, and fully accepted by the negotiators of the
climate change regime, that the window of opportu-
nity for action on adaptation is as narrow as the one
for mitigation, if the MDGs (box 82.2) are to be
achieved. Successful climate change management will
require a remarkable scaling up of both mitigation
and adaptation actions at the global, regional, na-
tional, and local levels.  
This chapter discusses UNDP’s strategy to help
countries build a new development paradigm that ef-
fectively addresses climate change. Decades of experi-
ence in the international development arena allow
UNDP to recognize climate change as a fundamental
challenge with substantial implications for the entire
spectrum of human development, including conflict-
prone issues such as water scarcity, soil degradation,
food security, poverty, and environmental migration.
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the substantive
contribution made to this paper by Luis Gómez-
Echeverri, independent climate change expert, and the
input provided by other UNDP experts. This paper is
based on, and relies heavily on, the corporately
endorsed UNDP Climate Change Strategy (2008),
which is the result of a consultative and collaborative
effort within UNDP and outside experts. The views
expressed in this publication are those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent those of the United
Nations, including UNDP, or their Member States.
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This chapter proposes that these issues need to be
tackled at the very core of development: strengthen-
ing institutional capacities for more cohesive and effi-
cient governance, integrating climate change into stra-
tegic planning as well as conflict prevention efforts,
and equitable economic development. In the climate
change context, this implies scaling up mitigation and
adaptation actions. 
Discussing UNDP’s vision, this chapter presents a
brief review of the current climate change context for
action (82.2); an overview of UNDP’s ongoing activi-
ties highlighting experience with mitigation, adapta-
tion, and existing partnerships (82.3); and a discussion
on the dimensions and strategic priorities for scaled
up action (82.4). 
82.2 Analytical Framework
The impacts of climate change will fall disproportion-
ately on the poor and lead to greater inequality and
insecurity in developing countries (Stern 2006: 29).
Box 82.1: UNDP. Source: <www.undp.org>.
UNDP is the UN's global development network, an organ-
ization advocating change and connecting countries to
knowledge, experience and resources to help their people
build a better life. UNDP works in 166 countries, assisting
them to identify and develop their own solutions to global
and national development challenges. As they develop
local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and our
wide range of partners. 
World leaders have pledged to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cut-
ting poverty in half by 2015. UNDP's network coordinates
global and national efforts to reach these goals. UNDP’s
focus is helping countries build and share solutions to the
challenges of: democratic governance, poverty reduction,
crisis prevention and recovery, environment and energy,
and HIV/AIDS. 
UNDP helps developing countries attract and use aid
effectively. UNDP encourages the protection of human
rights and the empowerment of women. Its annual
Human Development Report (HDR) focuses the global
debate on key development issues, providing new measure-
ment tools, innovative analysis and often controversial pol-
icy proposals. The global HDR's analytical framework and
inclusive approach carry over into regional, national and
local HDRs.
Box 82.2: Climate change threatens achieving the MDGs. Source: <www.undp.org/mdg>
• MDG 1 (Poverty and hunger): People relying on sub-
sistence agriculture and natural resource harvesting –
such as fishing, hunting, forestry – will be among those
most impacted by climate change. In addition to
threatening livelihoods, a change in cropping patterns
will affect food security, international production and
trade, and international human security (WBGU 2008:
94). These expected changes fundamentally hinder the
efforts to reduce extreme poverty and hunger. 
• MDG 2 (Education): Weather events and climate
related stresses can interfere with the time and oppor-
tunity for children to attend school. Climate change
also threatens to destroy or force a change of use of
infrastructure such as schoolhouses, and it may
increase the displacement and migration of families,
thus disrupting and limiting educational opportunities.
• MDG 3 (Gender): Since a disproportionate percentage
of the poor are women, climate change puts them
most at risk in their traditional roles as the primary
users and managers of natural resources, primary car-
egivers and unpaid labourers (Stern 2006:114). Efforts
to include women in planning processes will help
ensure that their particular needs and constraints are
recognized and addressed.
• MDGs 4,5,6 (Health related): The effects of climate
change on health are particularly important in water
management since floods and droughts can lead to
increased vulnerability to water-borne diseases, and
lack of safe drinking water and sanitation (Biemans/
Bresser/ Kabat/van Schaik 2006:30). The spread into
new areas of vector-borne and air-borne diseases and
heat related stresses are also expected to increase. By
2020, between 75 and 250 million people, mainly in
Africa, are projected to live under increased water
stress. For 2080, the figure is estimated to be as high
as three billion people (IPCC 2007:194). Water scarcity
can lead to conflict over resources jeopardizing human
security. 
• MDG 7 (Environment): Climate change is a lead
cause of global environmental change. It will impose
fundamental alterations to ecosystem structure, func-
tion and productivity. This includes a serious threat to
biodiversity and the need to rethink land use and nat-
ural resource management (WBGU 2008: 5). 
• MDG 8 (Partnership): Addressing climate change and
global human security will demand unprecedented
cooperation among a wide variety of actors and insti-
tutions, including scientific, business, political and
advocacy communities.
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Climate change intensifies existing environmental cri-
ses thereby triggering land-use and water-use conflicts
as well as environmental migration (GTZ 2008: 19).
The effects of climate-induced shocks on critical gov-
ernance function and structure will intensify the rela-
tionship between global environment and human se-
curity. As such, these effects may disrupt institutional
and political stability and magnify the propensity to
conflict. For instance, human migration from arid and
land-locked Burkina Faso to coastal Cote d’Ivoire –
due to environmental degradation – can be linked,
along with other influencing factors, to the political
collapse and civil war experienced in the region
(UNDP 2009: 11).
Water shortages will be exacerbated, leading to
water scarcity problems, reducing access to safe drink-
ing water and having an impact on precipitation fre-
quency and intensity, which affects local growing sea-
sons as well as international production and trade
(UNESCO-WWAP 2003). In particular, this will be the
case for the poorest and most vulnerable countries,
which are already facing serious development chal-
lenges and human security threats (Brown/Hammill/
McLeman 2007: 1142). Climate change will also have
a harmful effect on health and it will increase the level
of risk for the most vulnerable particularly to the im-
pacts of extreme weather events and severe droughts
(Epstein/Mills 2005: 9). And there is evidence that
these and many other effects are already being felt in
many regions of the world, for instance the resur-
gence of malaria in East African highlands (Cox/Hay
et al 2001: 1). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC 2007) stated that the world is warming and
that human activity – rather than just natural varia-
tions – has contributed to current levels of warming.
The IPCC concluded that regional climate patterns
are changing, for instance: crop yields could increase
by 20 per cent in East and South-east Asia, but de-
crease by up to 30 per cent in Central and South Asia;
and rain fed agriculture could drop by half in some
African countries by 2020. The loss of biodiversity
will have additional negative effects on people’s liveli-
hoods and ecosystem stability (IPCC 2007: 280). 
The 2007/2008 Human Development Report
(HDR) estimated that stabilizing greenhouse gas con-
centrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents
catastrophic climate change will require a global 50
per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by
2050 from 1990 levels. The report recommended that
both developed and developing countries reduce their
emissions. Developed countries are to cut greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 80 per cent by 2050, with
20–30 per cent cuts by 2020. For major emitters in de-
veloping countries, the recommendation is to have an
emissions trajectory that peaks in 2020, with 20 per
cent cuts by 2050. (UNDP HDR 2007/2008)
Addressing climate change will demand unprece-
dented efforts and currently available financial re-
sources are likely to be insufficient. However, as sug-
gested by the Stern Review (2006), failure to invest in
activities addressing climate change could cost the
global economy up to 20 per cent of its GDP (UN-
FCCC 2007d; IEA 2006). 
A number of major international events and agree-
ments confirm the unequivocal consensus by the po-
litical, business, scientific, and advocacy communities
to agree on a future climate change agreement as was
stressed by the decisions of the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral’s High Level Event (2007) and Summit on Cli-
mate Change (2009), by the discussion by the Security
Council on the security implications of climate
change impacts (2007) and the Communiqués of the
G-8 Summits at Heiligendamm (2007), Hokkaido
Toyako (2008) and Aquila (2009). The ‘Bali Road
Map’ (2007), adopted by governments at the 13th
Conference of Parties (COP-13) of the UNFCCC, es-
tablished ambitious goals to be achieved by COP-15 in
Copenhagen. With the Copenhagen Accord (2009),
the world made essential progress towards a future in-
ternational framework. While negotiations will need
to continue through COP-16 in Mexico (2010), the
Copenhagen Accord is the reflection of an unprece-
dented high-level political statement of purpose on
the issue of climate change (Averchenkova UNDP
2010: 5). 
The UN Secretary-General launched in February
2010 a High-Level Advisory Group on Climate
Change Financing, aiming to mobilize new and inno-
vative financial resources to reach US$100 billion an-
nually by 2020, as agreed in the Copenhagen Accord.
In the same spirit, UNDP continues to advocate for
the recognition of sustainable development and pov-
erty eradication as global priorities that need to be at
the foundation of international negotiations if the
world is to move forward in a path of greater climate
security.
82.3 UNDP’s Experience with Global 
Environmental Change 
In accordance with its overarching mission to fight
poverty, the focus of UNDP’s work has been to align
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sustainable human development and climate change
policy responses paying special attention to the needs
of the poorest and most vulnerable developing coun-
tries. Delivering environmental finance services,
UNDP uses its resources to leverage new sources of
environmental finance and to re-direct financial flows
from public and private sectors towards environmen-
tally sustainable practices (figure 82.1). Highlights of
UNDP’s results in environment for the period 2005–
2009 include an estimated 413 million tonnes of CO2
emissions avoided as a result of effective projects and
127 new protected areas covering more than 10 mil-
lion hectares created in 50 countries.
With widespread country office presence, UNDP
has mobilized approximately $1.58 billion (and $3 bil-
lion in co-financing for the period 2004–2007) in
over 140 countries through a diverse project portfolio
that supports climate change responses at the global,
regional, national, sub-national, and community/local
levels (figure 82.2).
UNDP’s partners comprise a variety of national,
bilateral, and multilateral development agencies, fi-
nancial institutions and civil society, including the
World Bank, Regional Development Banks, other UN
agencies, private sector, regional associations, NGOs,
CBOs, faith communities and academic institutions,
among others. 
In partnership with the World Bank and UNEP,
UNDP is an implementing agency of the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF), and also the recipient of
large amounts of other funds dedicated directly and
indirectly to global environmental change. With a
growing climate change portfolio, integrated country
level solutions are promoted in recognition of the fact
that mitigation and adaptation are closely interlinked
and essential to one another. For instance, reducing
emissions through sustainable land management prac-
tices increases the resilience of ecosystems and in turn
improves the resilience and adaptive capacities of vul-
nerable communities (UNDP 2009: 57). Moreover, a
shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy alternatives
can reduce the energy costs of oil-importing coun-
tries, reduce gender inequalities, improve health, in-
crease energy security, provide increased access to en-
ergy for the rural poor, and reduce local environmen-
tal health impacts (UNDP 2008a: 12). 
UNDP has made strides towards ‘Delivering as
One UN’ by partnering with UNEP and committing
to jointly lead the UN System in the task of incorpo-
rating climate change in development strategies and
programmes at the country level. Both agencies are
working in joint programmes such as the Territorial
Approach to Climate Change (TACC), which pro-
motes climate resilient and lower carbon territories
Figure 82.1: Delivery of UNDP Environmental Finance Services Source: UNDP (2009a: 8).
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(box 82.7), and the Poverty and Environment Initia-
tive (PEI), which mainstreams environment into na-
tional development planning.
Another step forward is the Nairobi Framework,
agreed in 2006 by UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank,
the African Development Bank, and the UNFCCC,
with the purpose of supporting the capacity develop-
ment efforts of low income countries vis-à-vis the
CDM. 
Launched in 2007, the UNDP-Spanish MDG
Achievement Fund pursues a coordinated response of
the UN system towards the achievement of the
MDGs. The Fund has been supporting adaptation
through an initial allocation of US$94 million, which
finances inter-agency initiatives that strengthen the
adaptive capacity of developing countries.
More recently, UNDP, FAO, and UNEP have inau-
gurated the United Nations Collaborative Programme
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and For-
est Degradation in Developing Countries (FAO/
UNDP/UNEP: 2008). This multi-donor trust fund
was established in 2008 to allow donors to pool re-
sources and provide funding to assist developing
countries in formulating and implementing national
REDD strategies and mechanisms. At the national
level, UN-REDD is implemented in coordination with
the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
(FCPF). 
82.3.1 Climate Change Mitigation: UNDP’s 
Experience
With over 15 years of experience in approximately 100
countries supporting energy efficiency and clean en-
ergy development, UNDP in partnership with GEF
have been deemed particularly successful at develop-
ing countries’ capacities to remove barriers to clean
energy and create greater energy access for the poor.
Five strategic priorities are addressed: (i) transforming
market policies to promote energy efficient products
and processes, (ii) increasing access to local sources
of financing for renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency, (iii) promoting power-sector policy frame-
works to support renewable energy, (iv) renewable en-
ergy for poverty alleviation, (v) catalysing shifts in
modes of urban transport.   
The approach to mitigation has evolved from sup-
porting technology demonstration projects, to estab-
lishing an enabling environment for direct investment
towards environmentally-friendly and climate-friendly
technologies (box 82.4). In the case of wind power,
for example, where UNDP may have supported pilot
wind farms in the past, it now focuses on the policy
change and institutional development needed to pro-
mote greater private sector investment in wind energy,
such as smart wind tariffs, power purchase agree-
ments, and capitalization of pilot financial instru-
ments (UNDP 2008a: 13).
UNDP has directly reduced CO2 emissions from
land use change, specifically from land degradation
Figure 82.2: Support Levels for Global Environmental Change Responses. Source: UNDP (2008a: 27).
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and deforestation, over an area of more than 1 million
km2. This was achieved through strategic support to
programmes on sustainable land management and bi-
odiversity conservation. In doing this, UNDP has
been able to prove methodologies and adopt best
practices to help countries develop the systemic and
institutional frameworks and capacities to manage
land use and land use change (LULUC). For exam-
ple, providing support to efforts towards decentral-
ized and participatory governance, enhanced property
rights, land use planning, and transforming market
systems to deliver financial payments to small farmers
and other landowners maintaining on-farm ecosystem
goods and services, including carbon storage (UNDP
2008a: 13). 
Box 82.3: MDG Carbon Facility. Source: <www.mdgcarbonfacility.org>.
The MDG Carbon Facility assists developing countries to
leverage carbon finance for clean energy development and
sustainable land use practices. Building on UNDP-GEF
market development activities and UNDP capacity devel-
opment efforts for CDM and JI, the Facility provides ded-
icated project management services to individual project
investors in emerging carbon markets. The core objectives
of the Facility are: (i) up-scaling carbon finance in coun-
tries that are presently under-represented; and (ii) promot-
ing carbon projects that contribute both to climate change
risk management and to the MDGs. Once a carbon mar-
ket is established and inclusive of private-sector investment
and technologies conducive to long-term development, the
MDG Carbon Facility is designed to exit that market as its
goal of market transformation is considered accomplished
(UNDP 2009: 119). UNDP proposes a three-step approach
to capacity development and leveraging carbon finance:
Box 82.4:  Montreal Protocol Programme. Source: <www.undp.org/montrealprotocol>.
By 2010, the Multilateral Fund for Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (MLF), as a whole, has prevented the equivalent of
between 9.7 and 12.5 gigatonnes of CO2 from entering the
atmosphere. The acceleration of the phase-out of the last
group of substances – HCFCs – that are both ozone
depleting chemicals as well as global warming gases was 
approved in 2007, and will enable the MLF to continue to
play an important role in climate change mitigation. As
implementing agencies, over the last 20 years UNDP has
eliminated over 60,000 tonnes of ozone depleting sub-
stances that are also potent greenhouse gases, mobilizing
$500 million in 100 countries to adopt strategies that pre-
serve the ozone layer and provide climate benefits.
Box 82.5: Capacity Development for the Clean Development Mechanism. Source: <www.undp.org/climate-
change/carbon-finance/CDM/>.
Since 2000, UNDP has implemented CDM and JI capacity
development activities in over 20 countries spanning sev-
eral regions (UNDP 2006: 20). The ultimate goal is to ena-
ble developing countries to take maximum advantage of
the new financing opportunities provided by the CDM. In
countries where adequate technical assistance and private
sector involvement has been sustained over an extended
period of time, significant lessons have been learnt. These
countries include Brazil, China, India, Morocco, the Phil-
ippines and South Africa. In Brazil, for example, UNDP, in
association with a private energy company, led a multi-
agency CDM project cycle for bagasse co-generation
accounting for 120,000 tonnes of CO2 per year mitigated
over a 14 year period. The project used a learning-by-doing
methodology and was coordinated with public-private
capacity, creating an enabling environment to policy-mak-
ing. Support to knowledge sharing include the completion
of a worldwide review of experience with CDM “Clean
Development Mechanism: An assessment of Progress”
(UNDP 2006a) and “The Clean Development Mecha-
nism: A User’s Guide” (UNDP 2003).
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82.3.2 UNDP’s Role in Enhancing Countries’ 
Adaptive Capacities 
The key focus in this area has been on building adap-
tive capacities and increasing long-term resilience of
vulnerable ecosystems and economies in developing
countries at the national, sub-national, and local lev-
els. The aim is to integrate climate change responses
into national development planning processes, policy-
setting, and key sustainable development practices,
while identifying and leveraging financing for adapta-
tion activities (UNDP 2005). The overall objective is
to promote ‘no regrets’ short- and long-term coping
strategies to reduce adverse impacts on vulnerable
communities and countries (figure 82.3). 
Support to adaptation activities spans over a wide
range of cross-cutting areas, including water govern-
ance and sanitation, public health, and disaster risk
management. On the latter, the focus has been on
working with vulnerable communities to increase
their preparedness and resilience to weather-related
shocks, in particular drought risk reduction in collab-
oration with the Drylands Development Centre
(DDC) and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Re-
covery (BCPR). 
Projected climate variability induced by climate
change will have an acute influence over the hydro-
logic cycle, which in turn will put pressure on already
scarce water resources, leading to increased competi-
tion, tension and conflict, particularly over shared
water basins (World Bank 2009a: 3) In this context,
responsive strategies to prevent climate-induced con-
flicts in transboundary basins become utterly impor-
tant (IPCC 2007: 442; Stern 2006: 137). Through a
combined portfolio in the areas of water governance
and international waters, UNDP is assisting in devel-
oping the capacity of water-stressed countries as well
as countries sharing large water bodies to identify,
design, and implement remedial measures and to ena-
ble stakeholders to plan around increasing water scar-
city in an equitable, transparent, and peaceful manner.
In this process, support has been provided for adopt-
ing a framework for cooperation in the Nile Basin, ini-
tiating legal reform in the Kura-Aras Basin, and imple-
menting of a conflict resolution mechanism in the
Mekong Basin.
At the community level, UNDP implements on-
the-ground activities through dedicated facilities such
as the UNDP-GEF Small Grants Programme (GEF/
SGP/UNDP 2007) and innovative partnerships such as
the Community Based Adaptation Programme with
UNESCO and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV).
Since 1992, UNDP-GEF has assisted over 100
countries to meet their reporting requirements to the
UNFCCC in preparing National Climate Change Vul-
nerability Assessments and National Adaptation
Plans of Action (NAPAs). Based on analyses of their
NAPAs, assistance will be provided to more than 30
least developed countries to facilitate access to re-
sources from the UNFCCC Least Developed Coun-
tries Fund (LDCF) for priority adaptation initiatives.
Figure 82.3: UNDP-GEF Adaptation portfolio. UNDP has leveraged over $800 million (including grants and co-
financing) for climate change resilient development in 75 countries. Source: Data generated from UNDP
2010 <http://ccmap.undp.org>.
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82.4 Scaling Up Climate Change 
Action: Adopting a New 
Development Paradigm 
A large part of UNDP’s portfolio focuses on helping
developing countries to create a ‘carbon-enabled’ envi-
ronment to attract and drive direct investment toward
lower carbon technologies and sustainable land man-
agement at the national and sub-national level. This
entails providing support and capacity building in the
areas of policy formulation, regulatory frameworks,
and production of strategies that embed climate
change action.
Aiming to help countries achieve market transfor-
mation at the national level, UNDP taps into the re-
sources of the wider UN system to complement and
synergize its support. UNDP will enhance synergies
within the UN family of agencies harmonizing the ef-
forts of the UN at the country level and addressing
the interface between the MDGs and climate change.
An agreement between the UN and the Bretton
Woods institutions on climate change is urgently
needed. A collaborative compact on climate change
among the UN, IFIs, regional institutions, donor com-
munity, and private sector is also a necessity. 
UNDP’s climate change strategy identifies six key
dimensions to be reached through four strategic prior-
ities, as described in sections (82.4.1) and (82.4.2)
below.
82.4.1 Six Key Dimensions for Scaling Up 
Climate Change Action
Figure 82.4 illustrates the scaling up of climate change
actions along the six dimensions. The red lines are a
qualitative description of current climate change ac-
tion in a number of countries in terms of the six di-
mensions described above, whereas the green lines
represent the scaling up required for a new develop-
ment paradigm that mainstreams climate change into
strategies and plans, and that links policy-setting with
the financing of solutions. 
82.4.2 UNDP’s Strategic Priorities for Climate 
Change Action: Helping Countries Build 
the New Paradigm 
Effectively integrating climate change with develop-
ment work, UNDP is scaling up its on-going climate
change services along these six dimensions through
four strategic priorities. The first priority focuses on
planning and policy, the second and third on imple-
mentation of adaptation and mitigation, and the
fourth deals with mainstreaming climate change into
UN programming at all levels from local to global. 
Box 82.6: Methodologies and resources on adaptation. Source: <www.adaptationlearning.net> and <www.undp.
org/climatechange/pillar_adaptation.shtml>.
Focusing its efforts on climate risk ‘hot spots’ where both
vulnerability and hazard are high, UNDP has developed a
set of resources to assist developing countries in planning
adaptation through development:
Methods for adaptation
• Adaptation Policy Framework (UNDP 2005): compre-
hensive guidance for policy-makers through a struc-
tured approach to formulating and implementing
adaptation strategies, policies, and measures
<www.undp.org/climatechange/adapt/apf.html>.
• Strategic Environmental Assessment Approach to
Adaptation guidance to integrate climate change into
national/sectoral development planning and processes
www.seataskteam.net
• Toolkit for Designing Climate Change Adaptation Ini-




• Thematic Areas Guidance Paper on baseline and
impact projections by region and development chal-
lenge as well as opportunities in six thematic areas.
<www.undp.org/climatechange/adapt>.
• Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: set of indica-
tors linked to the MDGs, to support mainstreaming of




• The Adaptation Learning Mechanism: a UN Inter-
Agency Global Knowledge Platform that captures and
disseminates experiences and good practices <www.
adaptationlearning.net>.
• Country Adaptation Profiles for 140+ developing
countries with multi-model projections, historic trends
and projected future changes <http://sdnhq.undp.
org/gef-adaptation/profiles/>. 
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82.4.2.1 Strategic Priority 1: Strengthening the 
Capacity of Developing Countries to 
Design Integrated Climate Change 
Action and Investment Plans 
Coordinated national policy positions will be neces-
sary for solutions to climate change to be effective.
These positions need to be developed by engaging a
variety of stakeholders, including governments as well
as private sector, NGOs, and civil society. For medium
and small-size economies it will be imperative to re-
ceive assistance to integrate climate change in their
sectoral planning, budgeting and decision-making
processes, while leveraging innovative financing, and
also capitalizing on any opportunities provided by
emerging financing frameworks – e.g. the Copenha-
gen Green Climate Fund (CGCF).
Enhancing the capacity of decision-makers to as-
sess the policy implications of international negotia-
tions will be critical. In response, support will be pro-
vided for launching national capacity building
workshops for government officials, members of civil
society, NGOs, parliamentarians, and the business
community. 
To build the knowledge base and integrate the
economics of climate change into national planning
processes, in-depth sectoral and cross-sectoral eco-
nomic analyses, including cost benefit analysis of al-
ternative policy and mitigation and adaptation op-
tions need to be produced and subsequently shared
globally, nationally, and sub-nationally through dedi-
cated interactive knowledge platforms. 
At the national level, activities under this strategic
priority will build on climate change assessments such
as National Communications to the UNFCCC, Tech-
nology Needs Assessments, and reports like the
UNDP-led National Human Development Reports.
These activities will complement such existing assess-
ments with in-depth economic analyses and the en-
gagement of a wider range of stakeholders at the sub-
national level (box 82.7; figure 82.5).  
82.4.2.2 Strategic Priority 2: Enhancing the Long-
term Adaptive Capacity of Developing 
Countries and Promoting Adaptation 
Actions 
Early adaptation action generates economic benefits
as it prepares communities for expected harmful im-
pacts and can therefore reduce threats to human
health, sources of livelihood, ecosystems, and infra-
structure. Governments must play a pivotal role, by
Figure 82.4: Six dimensions for scaling up climate change. Source: Adapted from UNDP (2008: 17).
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Box 82.7: The Territorial Approach to Climate Change (TACC). Source: <www.undp.org/climatechange>.
The engagement of sub-national governments is crucial as
it is estimated that decisions at this level can influence 50-
80 per cent of GHG emissions and most site-dependent
adaptation actions (UNDP 2009: 11). To respond to the
growing demand from sub-national authorities, UNDP
and UNEP will be joining efforts to enhance capacities for
long-term planning at the territorial level (regions, prov-
inces, states or municipalities). The TACC initiative
encourages the creation of Integrated Territorial Climate
Plans (ITCP) to identify and prioritize adaptation and mit-
igation policies, regulations and investment decisions,
based on an assessment of physical and socio-economic
climate change impacts through a comprehensive method-
ological approach (UNDP 2009: 69), as described in the
diagram below. 
TACC will be accompanying 50 regions in the formulation
of ITCPs that respond to a dynamic, participatory and reit-
erative three-pronged process: (i) long-term vision that
benefits the entire community, (ii) prioritization of inte-
grated mitigation and adaptation activities around the
most urgent problems, and (iii) inclusion of all relevant
stakeholders within the community (UNDP 2009: 59).
This work will be carried out with a new set of develop-
ment partners engaging associations of regions such as:
Forum of Global Associations of Regions (FOGAR), Net-
work of Regional Governments for Sustainable Develop-
ment (NRG4SD), the Northern Forum, the International
Association of Francophone Regions, the Latin American
Organization of Sub-National Governments, the European
Assembly of Regions and a large number of national and
multinational companies.
Figure 82.5: Methodologies and processes for developing an ITCP. Source: Glemarec (UNDP 2009: 60).
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making a fact-based case for adaptation, encouraging
direct investments and designing long-term policies
that integrate adaptation. Developing countries can
create an enabling environment to adaptation by over-
coming three challenges: difficulty in getting political
traction, difficulty in determining what the appropri-
ate policy mix is and how to mainstream adaptation
into national development processes, and difficulty
leveraging finance to develop capacities and policies
(UNDP 2008: 20).
Assistance needs to be provided to governments in
addressing these challenges by carrying out economic
assessments of adaptation versus inaction and deter-
mining early action incentives. In addition, it will be
necessary to assess adaptation options by conducting
prospective exercises to characterize future climate
conditions. While dependent on available data, tech-
nical capacity and/or partnerships with Centres of Ex-
cellence, a possible alternative is to use global climate
models to develop climate projections and identify cli-
mate analogues in others (UNDP 2009: 103). Figure
82.6 shows suggested key steps in characterizing fu-
ture climate change conditions. 
This set of actions will help countries and territo-
ries identify and prioritize short-term ‘no regrets’ ad-
aptation measures, such as use of drought tolerant
crops, revised land-use plans, and enhanced emer-
gency preparedness. 
To implement these adaptation responses, guid-
ance needs to be provided for accessing dedicated
funds, i.e. Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF),
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and Adap-
tation Fund, and assistance for mobilizing innovative
sources of funding (e.g., a tax on domestic air travel).
Sustainability will be ensured by strengthening the ca-
pacity of developing countries to integrate adaptation
into domestic plans, budgetary and fiscal policies, in-
vestments, and practices.
UNDP will provide most support to adaptation
‘hot spots’, such as LDCs and Small Island Develop-
ing States (SIDS). Support will move beyond isolated
adaptation initiatives or projects, towards cross-secto-
ral programmatic approaches, with a focus on main-
streaming adaptation into development processes
(box 82.6).   
Figure 82.6 illustrates key steps in characterizing
future climatic conditions using global climate models
to develop climate projections and identifying climate
analogues in others, following the approach suggested
by Hallegatte et al (2007: 47). Assessing adaptation
options requires: (i) a vulnerability analysis, (ii) a sys-
tematic analysis of the implications of alternative cli-
mate change analogues, and (iii) an analysis of key fac-
tors for adaptation strategies (e.g. income from crop
production). By comparing analogue projections – in
this case Hadley Centre and CSIRO Centre – it is pos-
sible to assess the vulnerability of each adaptation
measure to incorrect climate projections and evaluate
the likely net-benefit of a range of adaptation options
(UNDP 2009: 103). The map series below (figure
82.7–82.9) provides an example on the assessment of
adaptation options to cope with the impacts of cli-
mate change on African agriculture, based on re-
search work conducted by Kurukulasuriya et al
Figure 82.6: Key Steps in Assessing Adaptation Options Source: Kurukulasuriya/Mendelsohn (2008). Kurukulasuriya/
Glemarec/Retiere (UNDP 2009: 103). 
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(2006). These types of maps are an example of pow-
erful tools to convey complex information to deci-
sion-makers to raise awareness and develop planning
and budgetary allocations for adaptation actions
(UNDP 2009: 105).
Figure 82.7: Key Data for Vulnerability Analysis. Source: Kurukulasuriya/Mendelsohn (2006). Kurukulasuriya/Glemarec/
Retiere (UNDP 2009: 106). 
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82.4.2.3 Strategic Priority 3: Enhancing the 
Capacity of Developing Countries to 
Attract and Drive Direct Private and 
Public Investment towards Lower 
Carbon Technologies and Sustainable 
Land Use Practices
This strategic priority aims at creating a ‘carbon-ena-
bled’ environment (public policies, institutions, hu-
man resource capacities) for countries to be better po-
sitioned to access emerging sources of environmental
finance (carbon finance, REDD, payment for ecosys-
tem services, public-private partnerships, ODA, cor-
porate social responsibility, green bonds, index insur-
ance and weather derivatives, among others). 
A substantial increase in total investment flows to
developing countries will be needed for them to
adopt technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions and do not slow-down economic growth. The
rapidly expanding carbon market offers considerable
potential to augment the flow of the needed finances
and technologies. However, while the carbon market
and other market instruments hold the promise of
boosting resources in the coming years, it is evident
that developing countries will need assistance to truly
benefit from such opportunities. Capacity develop-
ment services will play an important role in address-
Figure 82.8: Climate Analogues. Source: Kurukulasuriya/Mendelsohn (2006). Kurukulasuriya/Glemarec/Retiere (UNDP
2009: 107).
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ing the disparities among countries in terms of access-
ing the CDM and other market instruments (UNDP
2003c: 11). 
Furthermore, developing countries will need ca-
pacity development support to meet the challenge of
driving massive shifts in investment patterns in a wide
range of sectors, including power generation (box
82.8), industry, waste management, transport, build-
ings, agriculture and forestry. 
In response, UNDP will help put in place effective
public policies and markets to attract and drive direct
investment towards lower carbon technologies. This
addresses regulatory gaps, setting performance stand-
ards and codes for energy efficient infrastructure and
appliances, and providing economic incentives for
GHG reduction activities (smart tariffs, quotas). As-
sistance will also be provided to countries in imple-
menting frameworks and investment pipelines to pro-
Figure 82.9: Adaptation Profiles. Source: Kurukulasuriya/Mendelsohn (2006). Kurukulasuriya/Glemarec/Retiere (UNDP
2009: 108). 
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mote technology development, transfer, and dissemi-
nation. To help governments establish an institutional
and regulatory infrastructure to access carbon fi-
nance, dedicated capacity building services should
aim at operationalising Designated National Authori-
ties (DNAs) and promoting solid legal frameworks
such as clear ownership rights. 
Encouraging innovative technological and non-
technological solutions will be pivotal. UNDP will
promote greater off-grid access to energy for rural
communities (foundations, micro-grants, etc.), and
will pilot REDD emissions reduction schemes, testing
a number of alternative payment structures and bene-
fit transfer mechanisms that reach end users in a trans-
parent and equitable manner. 
82.4.2.4 Strategic Priority 4: Integrate Climate 
Change into UN and UNDP 
Development Assistance Service 
Countries in Addressing Climate Change
With sustainable human development at the heart of
its mandate, UNDP’s core practices are all essential to
addressing climate change not as a stand-alone but
rather as a cross-cutting issue. Efficiently mainstream-
ing climate change into core activities and in its fidu-
ciary policies will maximize opportunities to address
potential risks. It will also ensure a double dividend in
terms of climate change solutions and the improve-
ment of human well-being. Moreover, it will lessen the
possibility of reversing decades of technical assistance
hard-won development achievements, and decrease
the likelihood of threats to international human secu-
rity (EC 2008: 2).
The interface of development and climate change
support at UNDP is exemplified by the work of the-
matic areas such as governance (e.g. strengthening in-
stitutional capacity increases aid effectiveness); pov-
Box 82.8: An approach to mixing policies and financing for wind energy. Source: <www.undp.org/energy/>.
While wind energy is a rapidly growing technology, lessons
learnt in this sector demonstrate that good wind resources
alone are not sufficient to ensure sound and cost-effective
development of this climate-friendly technology. The only
countries that have been successful are those in which pre-
conditions have been met through the set up of an ena-
bling environment, comprehensive public policies and ade-
quate financing strategies (UNDP 2009: 111). Figure 82.10
below illustrates an approach to sequencing financial
instruments. In this example public finance is mobilized to
remove barriers for direct investment, which reduces asso-
ciated risks and makes it easier to (i) secure traditional
finance for underlying projects, and (ii) access traditional
finance from emerging carbon markets to increase the
profitability of wind energy.
Figure 82.10: Sequencing public finance and carbon finance. Source: Glemarec (UNDP 2009: 112).
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erty reduction (e.g. mainstreaming climate responses
into PRSPs); crisis prevention and recovery (e.g. inte-
gration of climate change into risk reduction); and en-
vironment and energy (e.g. mainstreaming climate
into the management of water resources, land, and bi-
odiversity and energy access for the poor).   
82.5 Concluding Remarks
Climate change has been described as a threat multi-
plier that may exacerbate current vulnerabilities, ten-
sions, and conflicts in countries and regions (EC
2008: 2). Developing countries deserve particular at-
tention, not only because they are most at risk from
expected adverse impacts, but also because they offer
a variety of cost-effective opportunities to reduce
emissions while advancing sustainable development
goals and addressing the security dimension of cli-
mate change. 
However, current levels of finance channelled
through the financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC,
ODA, or other means, while significant, are not likely
to be sufficient. The two-fold challenge is therefore to
(i) find ways to attract enough direct investment to
meet the needs of lower income countries so they can
these direct investments towards lower carbon tech-
nologies, preventing countries from being locked into
unsustainable pathways for subsequent 30 to 50 years.
Stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at a
level that prevents catastrophic climate change will re-
quire further work towards a sustainable develop-
ment-centric international agreement that is universal,
equitable, and cost-effective. It will be critical for de-
veloping countries to be actively engaged in the inter-
national negotiations that will define the specifics of
such agreement in the reference framework of the Co-
penhagen Accord. Countries also need strengthened
capacities to ponder the implications of the different
negotiations within the context of their national sus-
tainable development objectives.
To effectively participate in, and fully benefit
from, a new climate resilient development paradigm,
developing countries must engage governments, the
private sector and civil society stakeholders to secure
broad-based support at the local, national, regional
and global level. They also need cross-sectoral coordi-
nation given that actions to promote increased resil-
ience to the impacts of climate change and lower-
GHG emissions is dependent on a wide range of sec-
tors, such as energy, agriculture, health, water re-
sources, and infrastructure. 
Developing countries will tremendously benefit
from assistance in taking immediate action to imple-
ment innovative approaches, as well as from support
in assessing the most suitable opportunities under the
provisions of the Copenhagen Accord and future
frameworks reached by COP-16 in Mexico 2010 and
beyond. 
Given the opportunity to rethink the structure,
logic, and potential of human development and secu-
rity, the international community needs to address the
challenges of climate change within the framework of
a new development paradigm that sets the world on a
path towards greater climate security. 
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